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INTRODUCTION: THE PRESENCE THEORY OF DIRECTOR
RESPONSIBILITY
The Investment Company Act of 1940 1 was fashioned largely in
response to a report to the Congress on investment trusts and invest-
ment companies by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).2
That Investment Trust Study focused on the danger to those who invest
in mutual funds 3 and other investment companies posed by the insider
securities transactions, inequitable capital structures, and outright dis-
honesty prevalent in the pre-1940 fund industry.4 The Study cited
specific abuses by the investment advisers of such companies, including
domination of the funds and use of fund assets to promote the advisers'
interests at the expense of fund shareholders.5
The regulatory scheme of the 1940 Act attacked these particular
abuses by requiring registration of the fund and its securities,' prescrib-
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the 1940 Act].
2 SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMt-
PANIES (1939-1942) [hereinafter cited as INVESTMENT TRUST STUDY]. The Study
appears in parts as H.R. Documents beginning with the third session of the seventy-
fifth Congress (1938) and ending with the first session of the seventy-seventh Congress
(1942).
3 "Mutual fund" here refers to an open-end investment company, as defined by
§5(a)(1) of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. §80a-5(a) (1) (1970). The fund offers the
public securities representing a proportionate share of a constantly changing portfolio.
Because the fund must redeem its securities upon demand at their current net asset
value, a continuous selling effort is often undertaken both to offset the resulting cash
outflow and to promote fund growth. Fund shares are distributed by an underwriter,
usually an affiliate of the fund's investment adviser, and retailed by broker-dealers,
who usually charge the investor a "sales load" in addition to the net asset value of
his shares. For a description of the investment company industry's structure and
the regulatory framework within which it operates, see SEC, REPORT ON PUBLIC
PoLIcY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 33-77 (1966) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC POLICY REPORT].
4 INVESTMENT TRUST STUDY, supra note 2, pt. 3, at 1914, 1924, 2541, 2640-2720
(SEC Printings, 1940, 1942). The Study found the industry replete with instances
of insider self-dealing and use of fund assets either as sources of capital for their
promoters' private ventures or as dumping grounds for unsaleable blocks of stock
taken by investment advisers who were also underwriters. Insiders often purchased
fund shares below net asset value and received interest-free loans. Indeed, outright
embezzlement of fund assets had also occurred.
5 E.g., INVESTmENT TRUST STUDY, supra note 2, pt. 3, at 1922, 2640-2720 (SEC
Printings, 1940, 1942).
6 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7, -8 (1970). The recent amendments to the 1940 Act remove
the exemption from registration under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 formerly
granted to those advisers whose only clients were registered investment companies.
Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, § 24(a), Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 24(a),
84 Stat. 1430; see Investment Advisers Act of 1940, §203(b), 15 U.S.C. §80b-3
(1970). In addition, the fund must file with the SEC a registration statement
described in form N-SB-1. See 1 CCH MUTUAL FUNDS GUIDE 112013-14, at 1313-14.
The fund's shares must be registered under § 5(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1970), as described in form S-5. See 1 CCH MUTUAL FUNDS
GUIDE 112021-22, at 1340-61. Finally, the fund or its securities must be registered
under the blue sky laws of each state in which its shares are sold.
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ing accounting procedures, periodic reporting methods, and alignment
of capital structures,8 and limiting transactions between the funds and
their affiliates, including their advisers.' The Act further required that
all adviser compensation for managing the fund's portfolio be precisely
described in a contract initially approved by the shareholders and
annually renewed by the board of directors."0 To bring an element of
independent negotiation and decisionmaking to the directors' renewal,
as well as to their review of the adviser's handling of fund assets, the
1940 Act required that at least forty percent of the board be neither
officers, employees, nor controlling persons of the adviser."
In addition to specific abuses and the problem of adviser com-
pensation, the Investment Trust Study mentioned but gave secondary
importance to potential areas of conflict of interest between fund and
adviser, such as fund share-selling practices 12 and the adviser's use of
fund brokerage.13  Reflecting the Study's priorities, the 1940 Act did
not deal specifically with these areas of potential conflict, but relied upon
the presence of the non-affiliated directors to provide both adequate
representation of shareholder interests and a sufficient safeguard against
7 All registered investment companies must make periodic reports to their share-
holders and the SEC, which is authorized to prescribe reporting rules and accounting
procedures for the funds. Not only must the funds' records be available for inspection
by the SEC, but all relevant financial statements must be certified by independent
public accountants approved by the shareholders. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-17, -29 to -31
(1970). The basic reporting document filed annually with the SEC is form N-1R,
which requires statements of fund policy, reports on trading activities, and financial
statements and exhibits. The entire form N-1R is given to the fund's independent
directors for their review, although only the first half is public. See 1 CCH MUTUAL
FUNDS GumE 111 6201-07, at 4201-38.
8 The 1940 Act prohibits open-end investment companies from issuing any debt
securities. 15 U.S.C. §80a-18(f) (1) (1970).
9 Absent prior SEC approval, loans or sales of property between a fund and its
affiliated persons are prohibited. The Act also limits the activities of affiliated persons
acting as brokers for the fund. Id. §§ 80a-17, -36.
Id. §80a-15(c).
11 1940 Act § 10(a), ch. 686, tit. I, 54 Stat. 806, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (a)
(1970). In 1970 this provision was replaced. See note 32 infra & accompanying
text. Section 2(a) (3) of the 1940 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (3) (1970), defines an
"affiliated person" of either the fund or its adviser as:
(A) any person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding with
power to vote, 5 per centum or more of the outstanding voting securities of
such other person; (B) any person 5 per centum or more of whose outstand-
ing voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with
power to vote, by such other person; (C) any person directly or indirectly
controlling, controlled by, or under common control with, such other person;
(D) any officer, director, partner, copartner, or employee of such other
person; (E) if such other person is an investment company, any investment
adviser thereof or any member of an advisory board thereof; and (F) if such
other person is an unincorporated investment company not having a board of
directors, the depositor thereof.
12 See WHARTON SCHOOL OF FNANcE & ComERcE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS,
H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962) (discussing Investment Trust
Study, supra note 2) [hereinafter cited as WHARTON REPORT].
13 Id. 525-39.
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adviser abuse.14 Thus, the Investment Company Act placed final re-
sponsibility for resolving most of these potential conflicts of interest with
those directors who were "not affiliated" with the fund's investment
adviser.
The success of the 1940 Act's regulatory pattern became evident
as renewed investor confidence and favor swelled mutual fund net assets
from $450 million at the end of 1940:'o to more than $55 billion in
1971." This remarkable growth, however, drew attention to economies
of scale, selling practices, and alternative uses of fund brokerage-in-
cidents of fund management the SEC and others came to regard as the
most serious problems in the investment company industry.
In response, the SEC undertook studies directed primarily to areas
given secondary importance in the regulatory scheme of the 1940 Act.
The first of these studies was prepared for the SEC in 1962 by the
University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School.' 7  The following year,
the Commission itself examined the mutual fund industry as part of its
Special Study of Securities Markets.'8  The Wharton Report and the
Special Study suggested that higher initial sales charges created unde-
sirable selling pressures that in turn produced fund growth of question-
able benefit to existing shareholders. 9 Both of these early studies of
14 The safeguards Congress adopted were the requirements of § 15 of the Act
dealing with the content and approval of the advisory and underwriting contracts.
1940 Act, ch. 686, tit. I, 54 Stat. 812, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1970).
When the 1940 Act was proposed, many people advocated more drastic approaches
such as requiring either that management be internalized or that external advisers
furnish their services at cost. The internalized-management approach had recently
been adopted by Congress in § 13 (d) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935, ch. 687, tit. I, 49 Stat. 825 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §79m(d) (1970)), which
required that, when a mutual service company furnished services or sold goods to
operating members of the system, the cost be fairly allocated among all the companies
in the system. This approach, however, was rejected because small investment com-
panies could not afford managerial staffs of their own. Instead, external advisers'
service contracts were made subject to approval by the funds' non-affiliated directors.
See Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcommn. of the Senate Comm. on Banking &
Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 251-52 (1940) (Investment Trusts & Invest-
ment Companies). See also PUBLIC POLICY REpOR, supra note 3, at 148.
During the Senate hearings on what was to become the 1940 Act, the Chief
Counsel of the SEC's Investment Trust Study remarked that "a few elementary
safeguards" would suffice to protect fund shareholders in the areas of the advisory
fee, sale of fund shares, and use of brokerage. Hearings on S. 3580 Before a
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1,
at 252 (1940).
135 PUBLIC PoLIcY REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
10 The Investment Company Institute, an association representing many of the
industry's mutual funds and their advisers, reported that mutual fund assets reached
a record high of $55.9 billion in April 1971. The Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia),
May 19, 1971, at 37, col. 8.
1 7 WHARTOIN REPORT, supra note 12.
18 SEC, REPORT OF SPECIA. STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 89-255 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SEC SPECIAL
STUDY].
1 9 
WHARTON REPORT, supra note 12, at 6; SEC SPECAx STUDY, supra note 18,
at 121-212; see id. 107-10.
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the regulated fund industry found that advisers placed fund portfolio
business with brokers who sold fund shares or offered research and
statistical services." The SEC's 1966 report, Public Policy Implica-
tions of Investment Company Growth,"' similarly concluded that such
practices benefited advisers but had potentially adverse effects for the
funds those advisers managed. Advisers were found to be under pres-
sures to turn over or churn the portfolio based upon commission
business rather than upon wise investment policy; to avoid the third
market, which might offer a fund better prices because no minimum
commissions were charged, but which offered no services in return for
portfolio business; and to pay higher than necessary commissions while
failing to recapture any portion of them for the funds' benefit. 2
In addition, the Wharton Report had found that most mutual fund
advisory fees did not reflect the economies of scale inherent in the
management of greater assets, and that funds were charged substantially
higher fees than other types of advisory accounts? 3
The inability of the regulatory techniques of the 1940 Act to re-
spond to these problems was attributed to two characteristics of the fund
industry. Shareholders were believed to be primarily concerned with
performance rather than the cost of investment advice and gave little
consideration to the advisory fee and other fund expenses when pur-
chasing their shares or ratifying the advisory contract.24 Thus, advisers
had no incentive to reduce the cost of their services." In addition, the
non-affiliated directors had not asserted themselves effectively on behalf
of the shareholders, either in negotiating the advisory fee or in reviewing
adviser practices.2" Noting the dependence of a fund on its existing
adviser, the SEC's Public Policy Report attributed the inability of the
non-affiliated directors to secure meaningful reductions in advisory fees
to the lack of "arm's-length bargaining," and specifically to the directors'
inability to terminate negotiations with the fund's adviser and bargain
for similar services with others in the industry. 7 The Commission also
20 WHARToN REPORT, supra note 12, at 32-33, 527, 536-37; SEC SPEcIAL STUDY,
supra note 18, at 218, 233.
21 Supra note 3.
22 PUBliC PoLIcY REPORT, supra note 3, at 16-17, 173-75.
2 3 WHARToN REPoRT, supra note 12, at 490-91, 493-94.
24 Id. 34-35; see PuBLIc PoLicy REPoRT, supra note 3, at 12, 128-29.
25 The Wharton Report concluded that:
[C]ompetition in the mutual fund business has assumed the principal nonprice
forms-variety of product, product quality, and sales promotion . . . . Man-
agement fee rates and the allocation of brokerage business have not as yet
elicited important competitive responses for a major part of the industry.
WHARTON REPORT, supra note 12, at 35.
26Id. 34; PUBLIc POLICY REPORT, supra note 3, at 130-31.
27 PUBLIC Po ,c REPORT, supra note 3, at 131.
[Vo1.120:179
MUTUAL FUND INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
repeated the Wharton Report's earlier conclusion that the non-affiliated
directors "may be of restricted value as an instrument for providing
effective representation of mutual fund shareholders in dealings between
the fund and its investment adviser." 28
Although the possibility of requiring internalized fund management
was discussed in its Public Policy Report, 9 the Commission's recom-
mendations for legislative changes assumed that the existent pattern,
by which funds typically secured their investment advisory and manage-
ment services from separate, external advisers, would continue. Thus,
when Congress undertook a comprehensive revision of the 1940 Act, no
radical restructuring of the industry was proposed.3" Instead, the Com-
mission sought to increase the effectiveness of existing controls.
Despite its doubts concerning the non-affiliated directors' abilities to pro-
tect fund shareholders, the Commission concluded that these directors
"can and should play an active role in representing the interests of share-
holders . . . where the interests of the professional managers may not
coincide with those of the company and its public investors." 1
This Article will trace the evolution of the 1940 Act's regulatory
approach as it has been congressionally and judicially modified in re-
sponse to the problems articulated in these studies. Exploring the
ramifications of those changes, the Article will attempt to clarify and
explain the developing role that independent directors are now required
to assume in fund management.
Part I considers the new problems raised by both the growth of
fund assets and the emergence of the fund complex as the dominant form
of organization in the investment company industry. After four years
of legislative consideration of alternative methods of dealing with these
problems, Congress enacted the Investment Company Amendments Act
of 1970.32 The 1970 Amendments and recent case law influence the
28 Id. 130 (quoting WHARTON REPORT, supra note 12, at 34).
29 Supra note 3, at 8, 102-11, 148-49.
30 PUBLIC PoLIcY REPORT, supra note 3, at 148. Although the SEC found that
internalization could produce significant savings in management costs for large mutual
funds, it again concluded that this step might inflict increased costs on smaller funds.
To require internalization might thus inhibit the promotion of new funds and eliminate
smaller existing funds. Id. 148-49; see note 14 supra.
A second reason the SEC was unwilling to propose internalization may have
been that the securities of about 20 investment advisers were then publicly held.
PUBLIC POLIcY REPORT, supra note 3, at 46.
31 PUBLIC POLICY REPORT, supra note 3, at 148.
32 Act of Dec. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413, amending: 1940 Act,
ch. 686, tit. I, 54 Stat. 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970)), Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. II, 54 Stat. 847 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to
-21 (1970)) ; Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-aa (1970)) ; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1970)) [hereinafter termed 1970 Amendments].
The 1970 Amendments became law on December 14, 1970, see BNA SEC. REG. &
L. REP. No. 81, at A-25 (Dec. 16, 1970), but many sections were not to take effect
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duties of the independent director especially in those areas of fund man-
agement in which the interests of the adviser and the fund are in
conflict. Part II focuses on the other federal and state statutes defining
director obligations and the operational framework of a fund. Part III
presents a profile of present director practices, based upon interviews
with independent directors and adviser officials, that helps define
reasonable limits on what independent directors can be expected to do.
Part IV sets forth the various elements of a sound business decision
by independent directors in specific areas such as the advisory fee, the
underwriting contract, use of fund brokerage, and shareholder-account-
ing and custodian expenses. Finally, Part V suggests guidelines for
independent directors in evaluating the information presented in these
various areas.
I. EVOLVING THEORIES OF DIRECTOR RESPONSIBILITY
A. The Investment Company Amendinents Act of 1970
Legislative proposals between 1967 and 1970 focused on alternative
methods to remedy the shortcomings of the 1940 Act. One approach
was an attempt to fashion a standard upon which meaningful judicial
supervision of management compensation could be based. A second
approach was to revise the definition of the non-affiliated directors in
order to increase their independence from the fund's adviser. The
procedures for approval of the advisory contract were also defined with
greater particularity by specifying the adviser's duty to disclose and the
non-affiliated directors' duty to request and evaluate certain information
before giving their approval.
Early drafts advocated requiring a "reasonable" advisory fee-a
judicially reviewable standard that would ease the burden upon the Com-
mission or a shareholder when either challenged management's com-
pensation. Later bills placed more emphasis upon defining non-affiliated-
director and adviser responsibilities in the presentation and approval of
the advisory contract. Major spokesmen for the opposing viewpoints
were the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Investment
Company Institute (ICI). The Commission's first proposals to imple-
until 6, 12, or 18 months after enactment. 1970 Amendments § 30, Pub. L. No. 91-547,
§ 30, 84 Stat. 1436. For example, the substitution of the phrase "interested persons"
for "affiliated persons" made by § 5(d) will take effect on December 14, 1971; the
addition, made by § 20, of a new standard of adviser fiduciary obligation to the 1940
Act, ch. 686, tit. I, 54 Stat. 841, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 35 (1970), is to take effect
on June 14, 1972. The delays were intended to give funds and their advisers time
to recompose their boards and conform their advisory contracts to the new require-
ments. Cf. HOUSE COMm. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, INVESTMENT COM-
PANY AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1970, -.R. RE'. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 199
(1970).
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ment the recommendations of its Public Policy Report,3 S. 1659 and
H.R. 9510, would have amended section 15 of the 1940 Act to require
that all compensation received by management for services to the fund
should be "reasonable." "' As guidelines for applying the standard, the
bills included a list of five factors to structure the directors' and, if
necessary, a court's inquiry." The emphasis was thus on a judicial
examination of the fee, an approach opening the proposals to charges
of judicial ratemaking.38 The bills also amended the definitional sec-
tions of the 1940 Act to include the concept of "interested persons." 37
To bar those having family or material business relationships with the
adviser from serving as non-affiliated directors, the phrase "interested"
was substituted for "affiliated" in most places where the latter had
appeared in the Act.3" These proposals were attacked by a minority of
33 See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING & CUnENCY, 90Tr CONG., 1ST SESS., INVEST-
mENT COMPANY AMENDMENTS OF 1967, at v (Comm. Print 1967) (statement of Sen.
Sparkman) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED 1967 AMENDMENTS].
34 S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (1967); H.R. 9510, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 8(d) (1967). For the Technical Statement of the Securities and Exchange
Commission explaining these proposals, see CCH FED. SEC. L. REP., SPECIAL REP.
No. 2, May 8, 1967.
35 The elements of "reasonableness" suggested by the SEC were:
(A) The nature and extent of the services to be provided . . .
(B) The quality of the services theretofore rendered to such investment
company . . ., or, if no such services have been theretofore rendered, the
quality of the services rendered to other investment clients, if any . . . ;
(C) The extent to which the compensation . . . takes into account
economies attributable to the growth and size of such investment company
giving due consideration to the extent to which such economies are
reflected in the charges made or compensation received for investment
advisory services and other services provided to investment companies having
no investment adviser . . . ;
(D) The value of all [non-compensatory] benefits . . . directly or
indirectly received or receivable by the . . . investment adviser by reason of
his relationship to such investment company;
(E) Such other factors as are appropriate and material.
S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (1967).
36 David Silver, General Counsel of the Investment Company Institute, sum-
marized the industry's objections:
The reasonable test made it clear, notwithstanding Commission's analogy to
the reasonable man of tort law, that in the economic area the reasonable test
is a word of art used in rate making. What was done was to put rate making
back into the courts where it was in the 19th century before the courts proved
unable to handle rate making. . . . The administrative agency is saying that
the courts are a more appropriate rate-making body under the reasonable
proposal.
MUTUAL FUNDS 306-07 (Practising Law Institute 1970).
37 S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. §2(3) (1967).
3SId. §§5, 8(c), 18. The SEC's proposals would have substituted the new
phrase in most cases in which "affiliated person" appeared in the 1940 Act. See
PRoPoSED 1967 AMENDMENTS, supra note 33, at 29-57. The final version of the 1970
Amendments substituted the new definition in fewer sections, omitting § 10(b) (1).
Neither version made the substitution in §§ 10(f) or 17, which prohibit transactions
between the fund and affiliated persons of the fund or its adviser. See SENATE
CoMm. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, INVESTMENT COMPANY AMENDMENTS ACT OF
1969, S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969
SENATE REPORT] ; PROPOSED 1967 AMENDMENTS, supra note 33, at 22.
1971]
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a House subcommittee. The minority argued that the existence of
competitive investments, voting rights, and independent director super-
vision provided a sufficient check against adviser abuse. 9 The minority
further argued that management fees were not only reasonable but were
declining,40 and that in light of these findings the present judicial
remedy, shareholder derivative actions in which the plaintiff had the
burden of proving "waste of corporate assets," 4- was a sufficient safe-
guard of the shareholders' interests. 2
In 1968, the Senate Banking Committee reported S. 3724,"3 which
would have adopted the notion of a reasonable fee but would have de-
leted specific criteria because the Committee concluded that the elements
of reasonableness were too numerous to be made part of the legislation."
The bill would also have amended section 15 (d) to require that share-
holder suits challenging the reasonableness of advisory fees could only
be brought if the Commission refused or failed to bring suit within six
months after requested by the shareholder.4 The proposals expanded
the definition of "interested persons" 46 and provided that the inde-
pendent directors' decision with regard to adviser compensation should
be given "substantial weight." 7 Finally, section 36, authorizing the
Commission to enjoin an adviser's "gross abuse of trust," was to be
amended to permit the Commission to enjoin a "breach of fiduciary
duty involving personal misconduct," a standard intended by the
Commission to reduce its burden of proof.4
39 Hearings on H.R. 9510 & 9511 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce & Finance
of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser.
90-21, pt. 1, at 241 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1967 House Hearings].
40 Id.
41 See note 53 infra.
421967 House Hearings, supra note 39, at 237-42.
43 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
4 4 SENATE COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, INVESTMENT COMPANY AMEND-
MENTS AcT OF 1968, S. RE,. No. 1351, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as 1968 SENATE REPORT]. This version of the amendments listed only all types
of compensation paid, services rendered, and "other relevant and material" circum-
stances.
451d. 6. This proposal merely increased the industry's opposition to the reason-
ableness standard. Although designed to allay investment advisers' fears that the
new legislation would encourage "strike suits," the change was seen by the industry
as a shift of the ratemaking power from the courts to the SEC. Id. 48-50.
46 S. 3724 expanded the earlier SEC-proposed definition of "interested persons"
to include any broker-dealer registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
affiliated persons of any such broker-dealer, and legal counsel of the fund, its adviser
or underwriter. Id. 31; cf. S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. §2(3) (1967).
47 1968 SENATE REPORT, -supra note 44, at 5-6.
4 8 "Breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct" was substituted for
the SEC-proposed standard of "breach of fiduciary duty." The "personal misconduct"
standard is similar to that used in § 5(d) of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933,
12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (4) (1970). The Committee apparently thought a higher standard
was necessary to preclude §36(a)'s use as the basis for "unspecified regulatory
actions." See 1968 SENATE REPORT, supra note 44, at 11.
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Echoing much of the industry's position, the Banking Committee
minority report on S. 3724 characterized this scheme as "agency rate-
making." It suggested that if a fee were challenged, the fund's directors
would be coerced by the threat of a Commission suit for an injunction
or a shareholder derivative action to negotiate a fee acceptable to the
Commission staff.49 The Commission's "right of first refusal" would,
in their view, make the non-affiliated directors' determination merely a
formal step on the director-Commission-court road to "reasonableness."
The minority members adopted the industry's view that the Wharton
Report and the two SEC studies incorrectly assessed the effectiveness
of the non-affiliated directors. They suggested that:
There is no real evidence in any report of the Commission
or in any of the material submitted to the hearings which pro-
vides a basis for this conclusion. The conclusion is, in fact,
supported only by another conclusion, that the investment ad-
visory contract is almost invariably renewed as a matter of
course. . . . There is every reason to expect that the man-
agement contract should be routinely renewed absent, of
course, the abuses to which Congress addressed itself in 1939
and 1940, and which Congress sought to end by the adoption
of the scheme of oversight by independent directors-appar-
ently with great success.50
The minority proposed that sixty percent of the directors be outsiders,
that they be expressly charged with the responsibility for shareholder
protection, and that they be subject to suit if they approved an exces-
sive fee.51
The successive drafts leading to the Investment Company Amend-
ments Act of 1970, reflected a compromise between the SEC and the
mutual fund industry. 2 Advisers sought to preserve the doctrine that
actions receiving the disinterested approval of the board should not be
overturned unless the transaction amounted to "waste" of corporate
assets.'1 The SEC sponsored proposals making clear that waste of
assets was no longer the standard. Over these discussions loomed more
than fifty shareholder derivative actions alleging that the advisers' com-
49 1968 SmNATE REPORT, supra note 44, at 48-52.
5o Id. 51-52.
51Id. 52.
52 Hearings on H.R. 11,995, S. 2224, H.R. 13,754, & H.R. 14,737 Before the
Subcomin. on Commerce & Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign
Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 91-33, pt. 1, at 138 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as 1969 House Hearings].
53 The waste-of-assets doctrine developed in Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474,
184 A.2d 602 (Ch. 1962), made it extremely difficult for shareholders to obtain
judicial review of allegedly excessive management fees and is mentioned in the
legislative debates as a major cause of the need for amendments. See 1969 House
Hearings, supra note 52, at 188. See also text accompanying notes 65-67 infra.
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pensation was excessive." Although no shareholder had won a judg-
ment at that time,5 5 the cost of settlement,"' and the potential of large
liability 5' made the negotiators aware of the importance of a mutually
acceptable standard for judicial review of the advisory fee.
The reasonableness standard was unacceptable to many in the fund
industry.5" The industry's spokesmen, however, apparently foresaw
that a new standard of adviser obligation was inevitable. Thus, the
industry switched from placing the entire emphasis of its proposals on
the new definition of interested persons to a search for an acceptable
standard of judicial review." The compromise reached between the
industry and the Commission was contained in S. 2224,6" which became
the 1970 Amendments. The Amendments deleted the reference to a
"reasonable fee" in section 15 and substituted not only a different
standard but a different approach to judicial review of the advisory
fee." Section 36(b) expressly imposed a "fiduciary duty" upon the
adviser with respect to its compensation, an approach preserving the
.54 PUBLIC POLICY REPORT, supra note 3, at 132; see, e.g., Moses v. Burgin, 316
F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1970), rev'd, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
40 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1971); Horenstein v. Waddell & Reed, Inc.,
[1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,678 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
Kurach v. Weissman, 49 F.R.D. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
55 The first major decision finding for a shareholder under § 36 of the 1940 Act
was decided by the First Circuit on June 4, 1971. Moses v. Burgin 445 F.2d 369
(1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Dec. 14, 19715. For a dis-
cussion of the impact of the case, see Wall St. J., June 7, 1971, at 1, cols. 4-5
(Fidelity Funds' Manager is Found Guilty of Interest Conflicts; Wide Impact Seen).
56 See, e.g., Neuwirth v. Allen, 338 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1964); Alleghany Corp. v.
Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, aff'd en banc, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted sub nom. Holt v. Alleghany Corp., 384 U.S. 28, rehearing
denied, 384 U.S. 967 (1966) ; Glicken v. Bradford, 35 F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
Saminsky v. Abbott, 40 Del. Ch. 528, 185 A.2d 765 (Ch. 1961), settlement approved,
41 Del. Ch. 320, 194 A.2d 549 (Ch. 1963), aff'd. sub nora. Kleinman v. Saminsky,
41 Del. Ch. 572, 200 A.2d 572 (Ch.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 900 (1964). See also
Eisenberg & Phillips, Mutual Fund Litigation--New Frontiers for the Investment
Company Act, 62 CoLum. L. Rrv. 73 (1962).
57 See PUBLIC PoLicy, supra note 3, at 138-47.
58 See Baris, Mutual Fund Legislation, 4 REv. SEC. REG. 977 (1971).
59 See Hearings on S. 34 & S. 296 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking &
Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1969).
60 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The Senate version of the 1970 Amendments
was passed on May 26, 1969. 115 CONG. Rc. 13,700-01 (1969). The House version,
passed on September 23, 1970, 116 CONG. REc. H9104 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1970),
differed only in the requirement that the plaintiff prove a breach of fiduciary duty
under § 36(b) by "clear and convincing evidence," a higher burden of proof than
that imposed by the Senate. Compare S. 2224, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 20 (1969),
with H.R. 17,333, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 20 (1970). The conference committee
agreed upon the Senate's version. H.R. REP. No. 1631, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18
(1970). For a further analysis of the legislative history of the 1970 Amendments,
see Rottenberg, Developing Limits on Compensation of Mutual Fund Advisers, 7
Hagv. J. LEGIs. 309 (1970).
61 The deletion of the reasonableness standard and substitution of the adviser's
fiduciary obligation changed not only the standard of judicial review but the method
for testing management's compensation. The test no longer modified the fee in § 15
but was made part of the adviser's duties under § 36. 1969 SENATE RxPoRT, supra
note 38, at 5-6.
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traditional pattern in which a court examines the fiduciary's perform-
ance of his duties as well as the fee itself. 2 The 1970 Amendments,
however, do not define the scope of this obligation; nor does the legisla-
tive history indicate that the Commission and industry spokesmen ever
agreed upon a common definition." Of equal importance but also un-
answered by the Amendments was the effect to be given the independent
directors' approval of the advisory fee and review of adviser practices.64
The 1970 Amendments also added subsection 15(c), which re-
quires that before the independent directors approve the advisory
contract:
It shall be the duty of the directors of a registered invest-
ment company to request and evaluate, and the duty of an
investment adviser to such company to furnish, such infor-
mation as may reasonably be necessary to evaluate the terms
of any contract whereby a person undertakes regularly to
serve or act as investment adviser of such company.05
Although receiving far less attention during the legislative debates,68
the impact of the two duties imposed by section 15 (c) may be greater
than the fiduciary standard of section 36(b). Section 15(c) makes
clear that independent director approval of the advisory fee remains a
necessary condition of fund management. Unless willing to assume
that Congress had no reason for requiring it, courts should give this ap-
proval weight in deciding whether fiduciary duties have been performed.
How the courts should approach the independent directors' re-
sponsibilities can be answered in part by defining three key phrases or
621d. 6.
63 The SEC apparently did not believe that this compromise would impair the
effectiveness of its earlier proposals. In their view, the fiduciary standard was:
a significant and meaningful improvement over the existing law and at least
as helpful as the reasonableness standard of S. 34.
The Commission therefore supports these provisions as a satisfactory and
even more effective method than its original proposal to test the reasonable-
ness of mutual fund management fees.
1969 House Hearings, supra note 52, at 138-39.
The industry, however, placed more emphasis on the change. General Counsel
David Silver of the Investment Company Institute suggested that, at least in his
view, the fiduciary duty language implied a higher standard:
I think there is a difference.
The fiduciary test at least requires the court to determine, in accordance
with the traditional judicial function, that somebody did something wrong,
not that the court under the reasonable test, is obligated to set a fee. Here
the court would be required to try the advisor, not the fee, and find out
qualitatively whether people in the negotiation behaved unreasonably.
MUTUAL FUNDS 306-07 (Practising Law Institute 1970) (emphasis added).
64 See text accompanying notes 92-97 infra.
6515 U.S.C. §80a-15(c) (1970) (emphasis added).
06 The original SEC proposals would also have required that the adviser provide
a specific breakdown of the advisory fee. See H.R. 9510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a)
(1967); S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a) (1967). See also CCH FFD. SEC.
L. REP., SPECIAL REP. No. 2, May 8, 1967.
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groups of phrases of the 1970 Amendments. First, what information
must the adviser "furnish" under section 15(c), and how can the
adviser fulfill its "fiduciary" obligation under section 36(b) ? Second,
what information must the independent directors "request and evaluate"
under section 15 (c)? Finally, what circumstances will lead to favor-
able consideration by a court of the independent directors' approval of
the advisory contract? 67
1. Pre-Amendments Concept of Adviser Fiduciary Obligation
Several years before amendments to the 1940 Act were proposed,
two circuit courts had held that under the Act an investment adviser
stood in a fiduciary relationship with the funds it managed.6" Both
decisions suggest that a "fiduciary" relationship in the mutual fund
context implies duties to the fund closely analogous to those of the fund's
directors because the adviser is often in a position to influence board
decisionmaking and may hold several of the fund's directorships.69 In
addition, whenever the adviser's interest conflicts with that of the fund,
the adviser's duty is that owed by the affiliated directors. Because
their loyalty is divided, the affiliated directors are held to a higher
standard of loyalty and their decisions subject to closer judicial review
than those of the independent directors.7" This distinction is sound
because the affiliated directors (or the adviser), who may stand to profit
from a particular decision in a conflict area, will have to exercise greater
care if they are to ensure that conflicting interests do not motivate them
but that in fact the fund's interests are controlling.7
Once the adviser is recognized to have the same obligations as an
affiliated director, any contract between fund and adviser is analogous
to a contract between corporations with overlapping directorships or
between a controlling person and his corporation, because in each of
67 Section 36(b) (2) provides that the approval of the advisory contract by the
board of directors shall be given "such consideration by the court as is deemed
appropriate under all the circumstances." 15 U.S.C. §80a-35 (b) (2) (1970).
68 Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961); SEC v. Insurance Securities,
Inc., 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958). See SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963) (citing with approval
Professor Loss' reference to "the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory
relationship." 2 L. Loss, SEcuarrus RauL.ATiox 1412 (2d ed. 1961)).
69 See Eisenberg & Lehr, An Aspect of the Emerging "Federal Corporation
Law": Directorial Responsibility Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 20
RUTGERS L. REv. 181 (1966); Greene, Fiduciary Standards of Conduct Under the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 28 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 266 (1959); Note, Rights
and Obligations in the Mutual Fund: A Source of Law, 20 VAxD. L. REv. 1120
(1967).
70 See e.g. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) ; Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S.
524 (19205; Lanza v. Drexel & Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fim. SEc.
L. REP. 92,826 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1970); Eisenberg & Lehr, supra note 69; Folk,
Civil Liabilities Under the Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, Part I-Section 11
of Securities Act of 1933, 55 VA. L. REv. 1, 37-46 (1969).
71 Cf. text accompanying notes 73 & 74 infra.
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these situations some of the same individuals typically sit on both sides
of the agreement.72 The "interested transactions" statutes of several
states provide that these contracts are neither void nor voidable for that
reason alone if they are ratified by a majority of the disinterested
directors after complete disclosure, and are fundamentally fair.73 Judi-
cial scrutiny, therefore, focuses on the question of the "fairness" of the
transaction. In the mutual fund context, fairness encompasses a pro-
hibition against not only direct use of fund assets for the adviser's own
interests, but any practice benefiting one of a complex of funds in which
the fund's net asset size, fee arrangement, or potential growth gives the
adviser a greater self-interest in it than in the others.74
The effect of the pre-Amendments fairness standard, however, was
blunted by a line of decisions, beginning with Saxe v. Brady, holding
that ratification by the shareholders or independent directors relieved
the adviser of the duty to prove fairness and required the plaintiffs to
prove "that no person of ordinary sound business judgment would be
expected to entertain the view that the consideration was a fair exchange
for the value which was given." 75
Although the 1970 Amendments make explicit the adviser's
fiduciary obligation and seek to reimpose a fairness standard, they
leave open the effect a court should now give to the independent di-
rectors' sound business judgment. This question is really twofold:
when would it be to the adviser's advantage to seek board approval, and
when does the adviser have a fiduciary obligation to submit a trans-
action for their approval ? 76 The distinction between these questions is
72 See, e.g., Levien v. Sinclair Oil Corp., - Del. Ch. -, -, 261 A.2d 911, 914
(Ch. 1969); Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E.
378 (1918).
73E.g., DE.. CODE ANx. tit. 8, §144 (1968), as amended (Supp. 1970); N.Y.
Bus. CoRp. LAW §713(a) (McKinney 1963); see W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS
oN CORpoRATioxs 552-59, 571 (4th ed. 1969). See also Geddes v. Anaconda Copper
Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921) ; Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d
268, 166 N.E.2d 793 (1960); Note, The Fairness Test of Corporate Contracts with
Interested Directors, 61 HARv. L. REv. 335 (1948).
74 For a complete explanation of the factors which may lead an adviser to favor
some funds over others, see Glazer, A Study of Mutual Fund Complexes, 119 U. PA.
L. Rv. 205, 226-33 (1970).
7540 Del. Ch. 474, 486, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Ch. 1962). This standard has also
been applied following the disinterested approval of the non-affiliated directors. For
examples of how courts apply the "sound business judgment" doctrine, see Kurach v.
Weissman, 49 F.R.D. 304, 305-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Acampora v. Birkland, 220
F. Supp. 527, 548-49 (D. Colo. 1963); Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, 170
A.2d 720 (Ch. 1961).
78 The First Circuit recently termed this obligation the fiduciary "duty of dis-
closure." Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 376 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40
U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1971). The adviser's fiduciary duties encompass most
of its transactions with the funds it manages. See Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d
1337, 1348 (2d Cir. 1971). Here, the discussion is limited to instances in which the
fiduciary standard implies not only that the dealings must be inherently fair, but also
that, after complete disclosure, they must have been approved by the independent
directors.
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crucial to judicial review of director approval. If the adviser has no
fiduciary obligation to submit a transaction for board review, it may
choose not to do so and forego only the protection director approval
might afford. But if the adviser has a fiduciary obligation to submit
the practice to the board and does not, or does so but fails to present all
relevant information, it will incur liability for whatever losses the fund
suffers regardless whether a reasonable board could have decided that
the transaction was fair. It is probable that section 36(b) specifically
limits the adviser's fiduciary duty to disclose its practices to only those
practices affecting the advisory fee because that section employs the
fiduciary standard only "with respect to the receipt of compensation." ",
This conclusion, however, does not imply that the adviser does not have
other fiduciary duties beyond disclosing information necessary for the
independent directors' approval of the advisory contract. These duties
include, among others, a fiduciary's obligation not to sell his office or
usurp fund opportunities. In these areas, the fairness standard applies
but does not require that the adviser disclose its practices to the di-
rectors. If the transaction is inherently fair, the adviser cannot be
found to have breached his duty under the statute.
This analysis of the adviser's fiduciary duty to disclose suggests
that section 36(b) merely gives statutory eminence to duties that could
be found in pre-Amendments case law interpreting the adviser's
fiduciary duties and that section 15(c) offers the only really new
approach to these questions."
The two duties of section 15 (c) are stated disjunctively: the inde-
pendent directors must request and evaluate what they know to be
relevant, and the adviser must furnish or submit for their approval
information on certain transactions regardless of their request. 79  Sec-
tion 15 (c) limits the adviser's fiduciary duty to disclose to information
bearing on the contract for investment advice. To conclude that the
adviser's fiduciary duty to submit a transaction for board approval
encompasses only the advisory fee is, then, consistent with section
36(b). This interpretation is strengthened by the similarity between
the negotiation of the advisory fee and the setting of executive salaries
7715 U.S.C. §80a-35(b) (1970).
78 Although most mutual fund attorneys recognized that the adviser's dominance
of the funds implied some fiduciary duties, several industry spokesmen insisted that
because the advisory fee was negotiated with the non-affiliated directors at arm's-
length these duties did not encompass that fee. University of Pennsylvania Law
School, Conference on Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. Rlv. 662, 745 (1967) (remarks
of Alfred Jaretzki, Jr.) The present "breach of fiduciary duty" language in § 36(b),
which applies specifically to the adviser's compensation, was designed in part to moot
this argument.
79See text accompanying notes 65-67 supra.
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by the officers or directors of a corporation.s° In this area, involving
the most acute conflict of interest, the adviser cannot choose to forego
board approval. Of course, the conclusion that the adviser's fiduciary
duty to disclose extends only to the advisory fee does not mean that it
would not be prudent to seek the disinterested approval of the board in
many other areas. Nor does this conclusion suggest that the adviser
does not have other fiduciary duties in which a fairness standard will be
imposed."' Rather, this interpretation of section 15(c) implies that
when a shareholder challenges an advisory fee, compliance with the
adviser's fiduciary duty to have made full disclosure to the independent
directors before they approved the fee is an essential element of fairness.
In all other areas of its dealings with the fund, the adviser can establish
the fairness of the transaction by showing that a reasonable board might
have approved the arrangement. 2
2. The Independent Directors' Duty To Request and
Evaluate Information
Just as section 36(b) helps define the adviser's duty to disclose
under section 15(c), the other provisions of the 1940 Act requiring
specific board action should be reflected in the construction of the inde-
pendent directors' duty to pass on certain transactions. Admittedly the
"request and evaluate" phrase appears in section 15(c) and modifies
only their duty to approve the advisory contract." The 1940 Act also
requires, however, that they approve the distribution contract, 14 value
non-listed securities, and select the fund's accountants."5 In addition,
the 1940 Act and state law place final responsibility for the expenditure
of fund assets on the directors."6 Thus, before renewing the advisory
contract the independent directors must evaluate the fee not only in
the light of the investment advisory services offered by the adviser but
with regard to the underwriting contract and fund expenses such as
80 The SEC's Public Policy Report attributes the adviser's ability to dictate its
own compensation to (1) the absence of competitive pressures, (2) the limitations
on disclosure, (3) the ineffectiveness of shareholder voting rights, and (4) the
obstacles to effective action by the non-affiliated directors. PuLIc PoLicy REPORT,
supra note 3, at 132; see Note, Management Compensation: The SEC Mutual Funds
Report, 3 CoLum. J. LAw & Soc. PR B. 66 (1967).
81 See note 76 supra.
82 Cf. text accompanying notes 95-97 infra.
83 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (c) (1970); see text accompanying note 65 supra.
84 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (b) (1970).
85 Id. § 80a-31 (a).
86 The legal framework of most funds is defined initially by the various state
corporation codes or trust laws under which they are organized. For a comprehensive
discussion of the legal context in which funds operate, see Glazer, supra note 74, at
208-17. See also Jaretzki, Duties and Responsibilities of Directors of Mutual Funds,
29 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 777, 780-85 (1964).
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brokerage commissions, shareholder accounting, and custodial and other
costs not included in the advisory fee. The adviser's obligation to
provide this information is derived from section 15 (c), not its fiduciary
obligation under section 36(b). The effect of an adviser failing to
adequately inform the directors is that they cannot effectively approve
the advisory contract, and any fees paid thereunder must be returned
to the fund."1
3. The Weight To Be Given Independent
Director Approval
The practical consequences of determining when the adviser has a
fiduciary duty to submit a transaction for board approval are twofold.
The first question is, who must bear the burden of proof? Because the
fairness of a transaction can seldom be proved without information in
the hands of the insiders, it is usually held that if a breach of a fiduciary
duty is alleged, the defendants have the burden of proof." If, however,
the transaction has been approved by the shareholders, or, one must
conclude a fortiori, an informed business judgment of independent
directors, the burden of proof may shift to the plaintiff.80 Finally,
an occasional case has suggested that if the plaintiff does establish a
prima facie case the burden of proof reverts to the insiders.9° The 1970
Amendments reject these occasional cases and, in effect, reach the
former by requiring board approval and then, in section 36(b), stating:
"the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving a breach of fiduciary
duty." 91
The remaining question is the weight a court should give the
independent directors' approval of specific transactions between fund
and adviser. Section 36(b) provides that with regard to the advisory
fee "approval by the board of directors . . . shall be given such
consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate under all the cir-
87 An action brought to enforce the adviser's statutory obligation to disclose
under § 15(c) would not be subject to the limitations on damages and time for filing
the action imposed by § 36(b). The damages, however, might be offset by a quantum
meritit counterclaim by the adviser for the cost of the services rendered.
88 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining
Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921) ; C. ISRAELS, CORPORATE PRACTICE 197 (2d ed. 1968).
89 Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 486, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Ch. 1962); cf.
Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963).
90 See, e.g., Mayflower Hotel Stockholders Protective Comm. v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp., 73 F. Supp. 721 (D.D.C. 1947), rev'd, 173 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
91 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (b) (1) (1970). A student commentator has suggested that
while this section may place the burden of proof ultimately on the plaintiff, the
defendant still has a burden to come forward with a justification for his actions once
the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of fraud. Note, Mutual Fund Advisory
Fees and the New Standard of Fiduciary Duty-Interpreting the 1970 Mutual Fund
Act, 56 CORNELL L. RPv. 627, 645-47 (1971).
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cumstances." 92 This phrase may indicate congressional rejection of the
Saxe v. Brady doctrine that makes shareholder ratification a significant
consideration in the fairness analysis. This suggestion, however, does
not follow a fortiori from the statutory language, 93 which only indicates
that independent director approval is no longer conclusive.94  In addi-
tion, this statutory language may reject an extension of the "waste"
doctrine that protects an adviser practice if a court believes a hypo-
thetical board could reasonably have found the transaction fair."' This
conclusion is consistent with the earlier analysis suggesting that in the
fee area the adviser must present the arrangements for investment advice
for board scrutiny and cannot defend his compensation solely on the
basis of fairness. In areas beyond the advisory fee, the 1970 Amend-
ments are silent as to the weight to be given board approval, and
presumably the waste standard still applies.
This analysis produces a curious result. In the advisory fee con-
text, where the independent-director and adviser duties are most
explicit, section 36(b) seems to instruct the courts to disregard the
independent directors' determination when weighing the fairness of the
fee. Surely Congress did not imply that the adviser's disclosures and
directors' evaluation and decision should be entirely meaningless. A
better construction is that the court should decide how well the adviser
has informed the independent directors so that their approval is a matter
of substance.9" The 1970 Amendments do not list the information
that must be presented to the board but do indicate both that the
adviser must play a greater role in securing board approval and that
the independent directors' judgment should be a significant, although no
longer controlling, factor in the determination of fairness.
97
B. The Moses v. Burgin Concept of Director Responsibility
Although no court decisions have dealt with the standards imposed
by the 1970 Amendments, Moses v. Burgin,"8 the most recent appellate
decision construing the former section 36 "gross misconduct or abuse
of trust" standard, may indicate how a court will apply fiduciary prin-
ciples to the adviser and, especially, the affiliated directors of a mutual
9215 U.S.C. §80a-35(b)(2) (1970).
93 But see Note, supra note 91, at 650 (little weight assignable because approval
of little value).
94 See 1969 SErATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 15-16.
9, See Eisenberg & Lehr, supra note 69, at 224.
96 The legislative history of § 36(b) (2) suggests that courts might weight director
approval according to "whether the deliberations of the directors [were] a matter of
substance or a mere formality." 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 15.
97 Id.
98 445 F2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Dec. 14,
1971).
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fund. The suit, a derivative action on behalf of Fidelity Fund, Inc.
(the Fund), named the Fund, Fidelity Management and Research
Company (Fidelity), the Fund's investment adviser, Crosby Corpora-
tion (Crosby), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fidelity that acted as
underwriter for the Fund, two affiliated directors, and six non-affiliated
directors as defendants. Following dismissal of the allegations raised
in the district court,99 the derivative plaintiff, a fund shareholder, sought
judicial review of whether the Fund through its adviser had an oppor-
tunity and obligation to recapture a portion of the commissions paid to
brokers who executed the fund's purchases and sales of investment
securities. °°
As do most advisers, Fidelity not only recommended investments
but selected the broker, on a national or regional exchange or on the
over-the-counter market, through which each trade would be executed.
Before 1971 nearly all exchanges maintained fixed commission sched-
ules, 1' and after 1968 most prohibited direct or indirect rebate or dis-
count reducing these minimum fees.' 2 Although it was unclear whether
the "antirebate rules" prohibited refunds other than cash,'0° Fidelity
directed portfolio brokerage to brokers who would "give up" a portion
of their commissions to brokers who sold fund shares 104 and, to a lesser
99 Moses v. Burgin, 316 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1970).
100 In the district court, the plaintiff also alleged violations of §§ 1, 15(a), 36,
and 37 of the 1940 Act and breaches of the adviser's common law fiduciary duties.
Id. at 35.
101 See, e.g., N.Y. STocK ExcHr. CONST. art. XV, §§ 2, 7, in 2 CCH NEvw YORK
STocK Excu. GUIDE 1 1702, 1707, at 1091-94, 1097 (1971) ; see Wall St. J., May 3,
1971, at 11, col. 1 (American Exchange Narrowly Approves Negotiated-Rate Rule).
102 See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK ExcH. CONST. art. XV, § 1, in 2 CCH NEW YORK
STOCK Excn:. GUIDE 1 1701 (1970). For a discussion of the minimum commission
fee structures maintained by most exchanges before 1971, see Miller & Carlson,
Recapture of Brokerage Commissions by Muctual Funds, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 35 (1970).
For a discussion the rebate and fee-splitting practices prevalent on the regional
exchanges, see Welles, The War Between the Big Board and the Regionals, INST.
INv., Dec. 1970, at 21.
103 Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 372 (1st Cir. 1971). An exception to the
antirebate rules permits a broker to reduce its fee for "statistical and investment
advisory services" by the amount of brokerage it receives from the customer. NYSE
rule 440A, in 2 CCH N.Y. STOCK Excia. GUIDE 11 2440A, at 3781-3 to -5 (1971).
The district court in Moses v. Burgin limited this exception to "that miniscule portion
of the advisory fee which covered publications such as investment letters, loose-leaf
and like investment services, and the conventional statistical information stockbrokers
give customers in return for their business." 316 F. Supp. 31, 44 (D. Mass. 1970).
This interpretation is clearly at odds with that of New York Stock Exchange
Vice President Robert Bishop, who interprets rule 440A as permitting reduction of
the advisory fee by the full amount of the brokerage commissions. Plaintiff's Reply
Brief After Trial at 23, Moses v. Burgin, 316 F. Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1970). Judge
Wyzansld's interpretation is also contrary to the experience of several advisers who
credit the profits of broker affiliates on regional exchanges against their fund's
advisory fees. See BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP., No. 69, at A-1 to -3 (Sept. 23,
1970) (concluding that rule 440A permits dollar-for-dollar offsetting of brokerage
commissions against the advisory fee).
104 Under this "give-up" practice the fund's adviser directs the executing broker
to turn over a portion of his commission to another broker who had no role in the
transaction, but who has previously sold shares in the fund or who has provided
statistical information. 316 F. Supp. at 37.
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extent, those who had provided Fidelity with research and statistical
information.
Plaintiff's allegations on appeal were twofold. First, she alleged
that despite the antirebate rules recapture of a portion of these com-
missions was possible either through the creation of a broker affiliate,
on a regional exchange, that could execute the Fund's portfolio trans-
actions, or by channeling present give-ups to Crosby, which was already
a registered broker-dealer."' Either way, the recaptured brokerage could
be used to offset fund expenses by allowance of a credit against the
advisory fee.'0 6 Second, she alleged that Fidelity's give-up practices
benefited the adviser more than the Fund by stimulating sales that en-
hanced Crosby's commissions and increased the size of the Fund, which,
in turn, increased Fidelity's advisory fee.'07 In sum, she contended that
the adviser and the affiliated directors, who owned ninety percent of the
adviser's stock, used Fund assets for their own benefit while withholding
the potential for recapture from the non-affiliated directors--conduct
alleged to amount to a "gross abuse of trust," "' as then prohibited by
section 36 of the 1940 Act.
The First Circuit's resolution of each of these claims will be dis-
cussed in Part IV's analysis of the directors' role in managing fund
brokerage, but it is important here to point out how and why Judge
Aldrich, speaking for the court, reached these issues. Fidelity's prin-
cipal contention was that even if recapture were practical, the directors
could choose between the benefits of recapture and the adviser's use of
brokerage to promote sales; if they chose the latter, they should not be
second-guessed by a court." Judge Aldrich responded that "if recovery
was freely available to Fund, the directors had no such choice." 110 He
reasoned that because the Fund's charter required all new sales to be at
net asset value to protect existing shareholders, any reduction in asset
value caused by rewarding the selling broker with brokerage that could
be practically recaptured for the Fund was strictly prohibited. The
conclusion that the non-affiliated directors' approval could not have
shielded the adviser from liability was simply Judge Aldrich's manner
of saying that there was no way that the give-up practices of Fidelity
could have been fair to the funds.
Judge Aldrich's opinion, however, did not stop there but discussed
at great length the obligation of the adviser and affiliated directors to
105 445 F2d at 372.
106 Id.
1071d.
108 Id. at 373.
109 Id. at 374.
110 Id.
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disclose possible recapture techniques to the non-affiliated directors. Set-
ting aside the district court's finding that Fidelity fully informed its
directors,"' Judge Aldrich concluded that Fidelity was well aware of
the potential for recapture but that the information communicated to
the non-affiliated directors through Fidelity's reports and those of its
law firm failed to properly inform the directors so that they could reach
a sound business judgment on the alternative uses of fund brokerage."'
Why the court undertook this seemingly gratuitous discussion of
the non-affiliated directors' role after stating that, if it was practical to
recapture, they had no choice but to do so, can be explained by two
theories. First, Judge Aldrich drew a clear distinction between the
obligations of the affiliated and non-affiliated directors. The purpose of
this distinction may have been to protect the non-affiliated directors
from liability, a technique often employed when a court fears that too
high a standard will place an unreasonable burden on outside directors."13
After finding that the affiliated directors had breached their fiduciary
duties, he concluded:
On the other hand, the unaffiliated directors . . . have
not been shown to have had any knowledge of the possibility
of NASD recapture. Nor did they have any personal con-
flicting interest which should have sharpened their attention.
Plaintiff has not shown that they violated any duty to discover
and explore the issue on their own; recapture was a new
problem, and they were entitled to rely on the Management
defendants . . . to advise them of its emergence. While the
unaffiliated directors are not free of all obligations to consider
matters on their own, we see no basis for holding them in
this case."1
4
This ruling does not free the non-affiliated directors from responsibility
to investigate problems the adviser has not reported to them, but it
1 316 F. Supp. at 48.
112445 F.2d at 378.
113 In Lanza v. Drexel & Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FFD. SEC.
L. REP. 92,826 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1970), an action alleging inter alia that the outside
directors had breached their fiduciary duties, District Judge Frankel noted:
[An outside director], not involved in the daily business, may think he
"knows" things contrary to what he is told by the management upon which
he must perforce rely. He may be wrong. His primary loyalties are familiar
and stern ones. How and when he must-or may-run off to "warn" or
advise outsiders dealing with his corporation could suggest questions of great
refinement. At the very least, such actions would violate the decorum of
the management hierarchy; at most, it could cost him his seat on the board
and a judgment for interfering with a corporate opportunity. If people of
stature and creative potential are still wanted for corporate directorships, we
lust take care how agonisingly subtle their choices are to be. See Barnes v.
Andrews, 298 Fed. 614, 620 (S. D. N. Y. 1924) (L. Hand, J.).
Id. at 90,105 n.18 (emphasis added).
114 445 F.2d at 384.
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limits their obligation to do so to areas in which they have knowledge,
potential conflicts, or in which the adviser has brought a matter to their
attention without a full explanation.
Second, the discussion in Moses of non-affiliated director respon-
sibilities recognizes that although the 1940 Act places final responsibility
for fund management in their hands, the adviser, through the affiliated
directors, must bring to their attention new problems of conflict of in-
terest in fund operations. This is consistent with the observation above
that the SEC and Congress are moving away from the 1940 Act's ex-
clusive reliance upon the non-affiliated directors for shareholder pro-
tection and toward assignment of greater responsibility to the adviser.
The Moses decision, however, carries this analysis a step further by
beginning to spell out how a court using fiduciary principles might
approach the role of both the non-affiliated directors and the adviser.
Judge Aldrich's analysis of the adviser's duty to disclose recapture tech-
niques suggests that an adviser must do more than simply tell the inde-
pendent directors that a problem exists and stand ready to answer their
questions. Fidelity had not entirely ignored the brokerage issue but
had discussed some aspects of the problems with its directors, supplied
one independent director with SEC reports dealing with brokerage, and
instructed its law firm to explore the possibilities of recapture." 5 None-
theless, Judge Aldrich concluded that:
[T]he Management defendants saw a question, . . they
knew it to be in an area where there was a conflict between
their personal interests and the direct interests of the Fund
treasury, and . . . they did not inform the unaffiliated
directors or submit it to their consideration."-
The Moses decision does not set forth a standard by which the
fund's adviser might have "made [effective] the functioning of the
mechanism protecting Fund from their overreaching," 117 but by nega-
tive inference suggests how much further the adviser should have gone.
If Fidelity's presentation of the problem was insufficient for the di-
rector's consideration, Judge Aldrich must have been suggesting that
the adviser and, particularly, the affiliated directors must point out and
describe each area of potential conflict when seeking the independent
directors' approval. To be complete, such a presentation would have to
encompass the present practice of the fund and others in the industry,
the legal issues raised, and an analysis of the probable benefits and dis-
advantages of the various alternatives. In addition, the affiliated di-
5Id. at 377-81.
16 Id. at 378.
1171d. at 384.
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rectors must explain the area to the outsiders and may not rely upon
them to raise discerning questions. The affiliated directors must pose
the difficult problems raised by a conflict of interest and show how each
party to the transaction would benefit. If the adviser were to make such
a presentation, the independent director concept could, in Judge
Aldrich's view, "function effectively."
II. SOURCES OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR RESPONSIBILITY
Although the 1940 Act is the only statute that speaks explicitly
of independent director responsibilities, common law doctrines of fidu-
ciary obligation help define the federal standards of adviser and director
responsibility. In addition, the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, and state blue sky laws help develop the regulatory en-
vironment in which funds, through their directors and investment
advisers, must operate.
A. State Law Duties
1. The Problem of Preemption
Although sections 36(a) and (b) of the 1940 Act specifically limit
the defendants and remedies available in SEC or shareholder derivative
actions to enforce both adviser and director responsibilities, the sub-
stantive standards controlling such actions are unclear. In addition, the
legislative history of the 1970 Amendments is silent on whether section
36(a)'s "breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct" and
section 36(b)'s "breach of fiduciary duty" standards merely recite state
law definitions or instead imply that federal courts should fashion a
uniform federal standard. Thus, the problem of preemption arises from
the choice among the standards defined by judicially created equitable
principles, state statutes, and sections 36(a) and (b) of the 1940 Act.
The problem is especially acute where the three standards impose differ-
ing levels of responsibility. And, finally, the 1940 Act, unlike the 1933
and 1934 Acts, does not contain a "savings clause" that preserves
state law rights and obligations except where specifically altered by
federal law."'
Preemption is a problem because shareholder litigants often file
simultaneously in federal district and state trial courts "' and because
118 Securities Act of 1933, § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1970); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, §28(a), 15 U.S.C. §78bb(a) (1970).
119 This practice has been strongly criticized. Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d
1337, 1341 n.5 (2d Cir. 1971).
[Vo1.120:179
MUTUAL FUND INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
dismissal of the federal claims does not compel denial of recovery on
state law grounds. Dicta in DeRenzis v. Levy 20 suggest that the 1940
Act's regulatory scheme preempts all other regulation although, of
course, that statute cannot anticipate every problem. And the opinion
of the district court in Moses v. Burgin specifically denies plaintiff's
contentions that the standards applied by the court should be derived
from a "general federal common law of fiduciary obligation." ' Under
its construction of the charter provision prohibiting sales below net
asset value, the First Circuit found it unnecessary to reach either this
contention or the contention that plaintiff had a valid claim by pendent
jurisdiction because in its view neither argument would have altered
the result.
A very recent Second Circuit opinion, however, speaks specifically
to the preemption issue. In Rosenfeld v. Black 122 shareholders of the
former Lazard Fund (the Fund) sought an accounting of profits
realized by Lazard Freres (Lazard), the Fund's investment adviser,
when it was replaced in this position by Moody's Advisors and Dis-
tributors, Inc. (Moody's A & D), a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Moody's Investors Service, Inc., which was in turn a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (D & B). Although its prospec-
tus provided for redemptions at net asset value, the Fund, in contrast
to most open-end funds, did not continuously offer its shares. Without
new sales to offset redemptions, Fund assets diminished to a point at
which continuous sales and new investment policies were in Lazard's
opinion necessary to meet competition. Because it was not prepared to
build a sales network or change its investment philosophies, Lazard
negotiated a series of agreements with D & B providing for the merger
of the Fund into Moody's Capital Fund and Capital Fund's employment
of Moody's A & D as investment adviser and underwriter. In addition,
Lazard and D & B entered an agreement on April 5, 1967, providing
for the transfer of 75,000 shares of D & B common stock to Lazard over
a five year period to commence on the date the new advisory contract
between Capital Fund and Moody's A & D was approved by the
shareholders.
Although the proxy statement soliciting approval of the merger
discussed the April 5 agreement, the shareholders were not asked to
ratify the agreement. Plaintiffs alleged that the D & B shares were not
delivered as consideration for the merger agreements, covenants not to
compete, and consulting arrangements, but as payment for Lazard's
120297 F. Supp. 998, 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
121316 F. Supp. 35, 55 (D. Mass. 1970).
122445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971).
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assistance in securing the appointment of Moody's A & D as investment
adviser and the profits anticipated from the appointment. Although
finding no evidence to support this contention, the district court chose
instead to rest its summary judgment for the defendants on section
15 (a) of the 1940 Act, which requires that an advisory contract auto-
matically terminate if assigned by either party."2 District Judge
Mansfield relied upon the Ninth Circuit's statement in SEC v. Insurance
Securities, Inc., (ISI) 124 that section 15 (a) "gives force and effect to
[the] statutory finding and declaration of policy" that there should be
no transfer of control without shareholder consent. 25
The Second Circuit reversed in a decision by Judge Friendly.
12
The broad implications of this opinion will be discussed in Part IV, but
we must here note how the court dealt with the defendant's contention,
based upon the ISI decision, that section 15 of the 1940 Act constitutes
a policy determination by Congress that compliance with the share-
holder-approval and termination-on-assignment provisions of this sec-
tion were to be the exclusive protection for the fund when a change of
advisers occurred. Judge Friendly responded that section 15 did not
withdraw safeguards already afforded by equity but merely supple-
mented them and should not be construed as the exclusive antidote for
a sale of fiduciary office. He concluded by noting:
We held in Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 421 (2d
Cir. 1961), that in requiring annual approval of investment
advisory contracts by directors (or, alternatively, by stock-
holders) Congress meant to prescribe a uniform federal stand-
ard of directorial responsibility. . . There is thus every
reason for believing that Congress meant to adopt the estab-
lished prophylactic rule. Just as it is unimaginable that, with
respect to the responsibility of directors of investment com-
panies, Congress would have been content "if a particular state
of incorporation should be satisfied with lower standards of
fiduciary responsibility for directors than those prevailing
generally," see 294 F.2d at 421, it is similarly unthinkable
that if a particular state had chosen not to recognize the rule
of equity here in question Congress would have sanctioned an
investment adviser's profiting from using his influence in se-
123 The district court opinion is found at 319 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
The reasons for Judge Mansfield's conclusions are not entirely clear. He may have
concluded that once the shareholders had ratified the new adviser, any taint caused
by the former adviser's influence was removed. Alternatively, he may have believed
that termination of the contract on assignment left no fiduciary office to be sold or
that when the contract terminated, all fiduciary obligations of the adviser similarly
terminated.
124254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958).
125 Id. at 649.
126445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971).
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curing stockholder approval of the appointment of a suc-
cessor.1
2 7
This language suggests that the standards for judicial review in
cases brought under the 1940 Act are exclusively federal and that a
federal common law of director and adviser fiduciary responsibility is
developing based upon both state law concepts and principles of equity
inherent in either the Act's policies as stated in section 1(b) or the
specific responsibilities imposed by sections 15(c), 35(a), and 35(b).
Thus, if a state standard is lower than standards implicit in the 1940
Act's statutory scheme, the federal law will apply.
A more difficult problem is posed when a state standard is higher
than that imposed by federal law. For example, a plaintiff might be
able to prove waste of assets but not "breach of fiduciary duty involving
personal misconduct," the federal standard which implies that the de-
fendant must have actually profited by the challenged transaction. 8
Here, a federal court might dismiss the section 36 (a) claim but find for
the plaintiff on common law principles. Such a decision would not be
inconsistent with federal standards and could be said to help effectuate
the remedial purposes of the Act.
A final variation of the preemption problem is posed when a state
court adopts federal standards but is asked to disregard the limitations
on damages imposed by sections 36(a) and (b). The legislative his-
tory of these sections suggests that the amount of damages recoverable,
the short period in which actions may be initiated, and the class of
persons against whom money damages may be recovered, are all parts
of a carefully designed scheme that could be disrupted if a state court
were to extend liability beyond the bounds of section 36.129
2. State Law Duties of Care and Loyalty
The independent directors' common law duty of care is often stated
in terms of the degree of diligence a businessman of ordinary prudence
exercises in the management of his own affairs. 3  The duty of care
standard usually leads, however, to only cursory review by the courts;
cases in which directors have been found liable for corporate losses
127Id. at 1345.
128 See note 48 supra.
129 See, e.g., J969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 16. For an introductory
discussion of the preemption problem, see MUTuAL FUNDS 335-39 (Practising Law
Institute 1970).
13OSee Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 203, 38 N.Y.S.2d
270, 273 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd mere., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1st Dep't
1944). See also cases cited in W. CARY, supra note 73, at 513-50. For an example
of the statutory version of the duty of care, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408
(1967); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §717 (McKinney 1963).
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attributable to a lack of due care are extremely rare."3' There are
several reasons underlying the laxity of this standard. Courts are re-
luctant to overturn a business judgment of the board and may use the
"sound business judgment" test to protect the directors in cases in
which a hypothetical board could reasonably have arrived at an identical
solution.'32  Courts have also traditionally favored outside directors. A
lenient standard may result from the fear that too strict a standard of
care would impose an intolerable burden on directors who are not in-
timately involved in daily operations.' 33
When developing a federal standard of independent director obli-
gation, a federal court might require a greater degree of care than
usually imposed by state courts because the common law duty of care
has always recognized that the character of the enterprise and the re-
sponsibilities of directors of different types of corporations must be
considered when construing that standard.'34 In most corporate set-
tings, management and shareholders seek a common goal of profit
maximization by selling a product at the lowest cost yet highest price
to the public. But the customers of the fund's manager are the fund's
own shareholders, and their interests in reducing the costs of the
investment management conflict with the adviser's interest in the great-
est return for management services. The resolution of conflicts of
interest inherent in the fund enterprise is the special responsibility dele-
gated the independent directors by the 1940 Act. Thus, the duty of
care increases as the potential conflicts between professional money
managers and their clients are recognized. Whether this theory of the
duty of care is considered a distinct principle or a part of the duty of
loyalty because it is based on conflicts of interest, it is consistent with
federal concepts of enforcing director responsibilities.
A more rigorous standard of director responsibility is imposed by
the duty of loyalty. This duty prohibits a director from pursuing his
own interests or those of a third party over the interests of the share-
holders he represents. 3 5 When such a breach is alleged, a court will
apply the stricter standard of fairness: whether "under all the cir-
cumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's-length
131 Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification
of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YAIE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968). See also Note,
Rights and Obligations in the Mutual Fund: A Source of Law, 20 VAND. L. Rtv.
1120, 1135-39 (1967).
132 See notes 75 & 96 supra.
133 See note 113 supra.
'34 See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125
(Sup. Ct. 1963) ; W. CARY, supra note 73, at 543-48.
135 See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) ; Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del.
Ch. 255, 5 A2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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bargain." ' If a director or an adviser receives the benefit of a trans-
action, and the fund sustains loss or is deprived of profit thereby, the
directors could be liable for breach of loyalty.
For example, in a very recent decision in a context similar to that
of a mutual fund, Goodman v. Perpetual Building Association,1' 7 the
directors of a building and loan association were also general partners
of Fidelity Investment Company, a partnership that managed prop-
erties, made short-term loans, and acted as an insurance agent and
broker. When customers of Perpetual received their loans, they were
informed that they could purchase insurance from Fidelity. Finding
that Perpetual could have qualified as an insurance agent and broker
and thus written hazard insurance for commissions on properties
insuring its loans, the court ruled that the receipt of such commissions
by the directors through Fidelity usurped a corporate opportunity. This
breach of fiduciary duty made them liable for the association's lost
commissions.
In the mutual fund context, the relationship between Perpetual
and Fidelity would be analogous to that of a fund and a broker affiliate
of its adviser, and the problems would be dealt with under section 17 (e)
of the 1940 Act. 3 ' But unlike the Perpetual-Fidelity relationship, in
which there are no disinterested directors to make a judgment solely
for the benefit of the Association, in a mutual fund context the inde-
pendent directors are charged with the responsibility of making the
determination whether fund portfolio business may be channeled through
the adviser's broker affiliate. The affiliated directors' duty of loyalty,
however, requires that they fully explain the alternative uses of fund
brokerage and discuss the possibilities of recapture as a precondition to
the independent directors' approving such transactions.3 9
B. Federal and State Regulatory Statutes Beyond the 1940 Act
1. The Federal Securities Acts and the BarChris Decision
Independent director responsibility not only stems from the 1940
Act 140 but is also influenced by three other federal securities acts and by
136 Pepper v. Litton, 308 US. 295 306-07 (1939); see Geddes v. Anaconda
Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (19215 ; Johnson v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 296
F. Supp. 802 (D.D.C. 1969).
137320 F. Supp. 20 (D.D.C. 1970).
13815 U.S.C. §80a-17(e) (1970). Section 17(a) prohibits a fund and an
affiliated person of that fund to join in any transaction violating SEC rules. Section
17(b) requires SEC approval before entering any such transaction. Section 17(e),
however, permits an affiliated person to perform services for the fund as either under-
writer or broker. See text accompanying notes 324-39 infra.
139 See generally text accompanying notes 112-16 supra.
140 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (1970).
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state blue sky laws. Mutual fund advisers must now register under
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. This change, which was brought
about by the 1970 Amendments, has particular significance for incentive
fee structures and the extension of SEC disciplinary powers over ad-
visers and persons associated with them.'41 Additionally, the publicly
offered shares of the fund must be registered under the Securities Act
of 1933,14' and the proxy solicitation completed in compliance with the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The sale of fund shares is regulated
under the 1940 Act, the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act, the rules
of the SEC and NASD, and the various state blue sky laws.
The SEC has frequently used the disclosure requirements of
section 5 of the 1933 Act, section 14 of the 1934 Act, and section 31
of the 1940 Act as regulatory techniques. For example, in a 1959 SEC
disciplinary proceeding, In re ivtanaged Fund, Inc.,43 the Commission
suspended the effectiveness of the fund's registration under the 1933
Act because its prospectus misstated the fund's investment policy,
failed to disclose that the actual management of the fund was not per-
formed by the investment adviser as provided in the advisory contract
but had been delegated to a person not mentioned in the prospectus, and
misrepresented the directors' role in fund affairs. In a more recent
disciplinary action, In re Provident Management Corp.," the SEC
ruled that an investment adviser and its controlling persons had violated
the disclosure sections of all three acts by failing to report in the fund's
prospectus, proxy materials, or form N-1R that the adviser's broker
affiliate was receiving certain "clearance commissions"-fees related to
the adviser's ability to channel fund transactions to certain New York
Stock Exchange brokers rather than provide any execution services. 145
In addition to SEC disciplinary actions based upon the disclosure
requirements, section 11 of the 1933 Act ... might be used by a share-
holder to enforce the responsibilities of the fund's directors or officers.
141 By requiring registration under the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§80b-1 to -20 (1970), the 1970 Amendments authorize the SEC to bar or suspend
any individual from associating with an adviser and make failure to supervise
employees a basis for disciplinary action. Id. § 80b-3; see note 6 supra.
142Id. §77e-5; see form S-5, CCH MUTUAL FUNDS GUIDE 11 2021-23A, at
1340-61.
143 39 S.E.C. 313 (1959). A stop order suspending the fund's effectiveness is
often an effective means of bringing misstatements in the fund's prospectus to the
public's attention. See Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. SEC, 100 F2d 888 (10th Cir.
1939).
144 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9028 (Dec. 1, 1970), in [1970-
1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 77,937.
145 See In re Imperial Financial Services, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 7684 (Aug. 26, 1965), in [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 77,287.
146 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
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The leading case in this context, Escott v. BarChris Construction
Corp.,47 suggests that although the independent directors are not held
to the same standard of care and diligence as insiders, they do bear a
heavy burden in checking the accuracy of the fund's registration state-
ment. 4 ' Before joining the board, the outside directors of BarChris
made general inquiries into the company's financial condition and its
officers' reputation. Once on the board, they asked few discerning
questions and accepted at face value the inside directors' assurances.
Because their initial inquiry was irrelevant to the truth of the registra-
tion statement, and their later questioning was so superficial, the court
found that the outside directors failed to establish a reasonable inquiry
sufficient to make out the due diligence defense of section 11 of the 1933
Act, the statutory standard of care applicable to all signers of the
registration statement.
In a comprehensive analysis of the broad implications of the
BarChris decision, Professor Folk suggests that outsider directors with
particular knowledge or skill may bear a greater burden in showing
that they have made reasonable inquiries.'49 Thus, "specialist directors,"
those with particular expertise in areas of the fund's investments or
fund operations, may be required to ask more probing questions of the
adviser in order to establish their reasonable inquiry. 5 For example,
an independent director who is an investment banker may be required
to scrutinize with the care employed in his own business the adviser's
valuation of non-listed securities. Similarly, a real estate investor may
be held to a higher standard of diligence when approving the fund's
participation in a real estate investment trust.
In a recent decision also involving the outside directors of the
BarChris corporation,' 51 Judge Frankel suggests that, although inde-
pendent directors are held to a lower standard of care, if they assume
the responsibilities of officers or members of an executive committee
their duty of care could increase)5' Thus, if an independent director
assumes a special responsibility, for example, reporting on new com-
panies within a certain industry group or on a particular problem of
fund operations such as the development of guidelines for the use of the
adviser's brokerage subsidiary, a court could impose the responsibility
to do so with the same degree of care as an insider. This result is par-
147283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
14s Id. at 687-89.
149 Folk, supra note 70, at 33-37.
3w50d. 37, 41.
151 Lanza v. Drexel & Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,826, at 90,089 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
152 Id. at 90,104 n.17.
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ticularly likely to occur if he receives compensation substantially in
excess of that received by other independent directors. 53
2. State Blue Sky Regulation
The blue sky laws and rules adopted by state securities adminis-
trators also regulate mutual fund policies and operations. Failure to
comply with these provisions can lead to revocation or suspension of a
fund's registration to sell securities within the state.'54
In some instances, blue sky laws go far beyond the regulation of
fund sales within the state.'- 5 For example, the Statements of Policy of
the Central Securities Administrators Council, an informal coalition of
blue sky regulators representing the states of Indiana, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Missouri, and Wisconsin, include rules governing investments,
speculative activities, redemption of shares, minimum assets, brokerage
transactions, and expense ratios.h56
Although the independent directors need not be familiar with the
intricacies of such rules and can in most instances rely on fund counsel
to seek compliance, a particular blue sky regulation may pose a conflict
of interest that the affiliated directors should explain to the entire
board. Examination of maximum expense ratios offers an illustration
of how the independent director should approach his duties in this re-
gard. Conflicts may arise when the adviser allocates the expenses of a
new fund. In many states, the aggregate annual expenses of the fund
cannot exceed approximately one and a half percent of the first $30
million of net assets.157 The adviser must reimburse the fund for any
expenses exceeding this limitation. The independent directors of the
established funds should not condone an allocation of expenses permit-
ting the adviser to keep the expense ratio of a new fund below this
limitation by shifting a portion of the new fund's promotional, special
research, legal, or administrative expenses to the established funds un-
less they are certain the shareholders of these funds will benefit pro-
portionately through either exchange privileges or increased profitability
that may enable it to hire more and better personnel and thus do a
better job of managing all the funds in the complex.
153 The responsibility of a director is usually not measured by the compensation
he receives, but if he assumes duties that independent directors typically leave to the
fund's adviser and receives added compensation for these responsibilities, a higher
standard might be imposed. See Jaretzki, supra note 86, at 780.
154 Statements of Policy Approved by Central Securities Administrators Coun-
cil, 1 CCH BLm SKY L. REP. 114851, at 651 (Aug. 31, 1971).
155 Id.
156 Id.
15 Typical maximum expense ratios limit a fund's aggregate annual expenses
of every kind, except taxes and brokerage commissions, to 1'A% of its first $30 mil-
lion net assets and 1% of any additional net assets. Id. 4856, at 654.
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C. The "Interested Persons" Definition
A cornerstone of the 1940 Act's concept of director responsibility
was section 2 (a) (3)'s definition of "affiliated persons." 158 The drafts-
men of this section sought to ensure that non-affiliated directors would
possess a substantial degree of independence from the fund's invest-
ment adviser. Their definition, however, permitted non-affiliated
directors to own up to five per cent of the adviser's stock, have frequent
business dealings with the adviser-particularly in the brokerage con-
text-and have close family relationships with adviser officials.' 59 The
SEC saw the relationships fostered by these ties as undermining any
arm's-length bargaining by the directors 160 and in its Public Policy
Report suggested that complete independence be required insofar as a
statutory definition could do so.'61 Thus, the SEC's earliest proposals
to amend the 1940 Act included a definition of "interested persons"
precluding not only affiliated persons but those with family or business
relations with the adviser from serving as independent directors."6
The industry acquiesced in this definition-possibly in the hope that
strengthening existing controls in this regard would deter Congress
from enacting the "reasonable" advisory fee standard. To move Con-
gress away from this standard and back to continued substantial re-
liance on the non-affiliated directors, the industry supported proposals
that left no question about the outside directors' independence. By the
time the SEC and industry representatives had agreed upon section
36(b)'s standard of fiduciary obligation," the industry was not in a
position to argue that the interested persons definition was no longer
necessary.
Section 2(a) (19) now defines interested persons to include affil-
iated persons of the fund, its adviser, or underwriter as previously de-
fined in section 2(a) (3) ; members of the immediate family of persons
affiliated with the adviser or underwriter; and those holding beneficial or
legal interests as fiduciaries in securities issued by the adviser, under-
writer, or their controlling persons. The new definition excludes from
independent director status any person affiliated with a broker-dealer
registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; legal counsel for
the fund or its investment adviser and underwriter (and such legal
counsel's partners or employees); and anyone having a "material busi-
158 See note 11 supra.
159 PUBLIC POLICY REPORT, supra note 3, at 332-34.
160 Id. 130-31.
101 Id. 334.
162 H.R. 9510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(3) (1967) ; S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 2(3) (1967).
1 6 3 See text accompanying notes 92-97 supra.
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ness or professional relationship" with the fund, with any other fund
within the complex, or with the adviser, underwriter or their executive
officers or controlling persons." 4
The intricacies of the "interested persons" definition pose practical
as well as legal problems for fund counsel when reviewing the status of
present directors or screening potential candidates for the board. The
breadth of these rules may in some cases exclude those who meet the
statutory goal of independence from the adviser but not its technical
definition. For example, an insurance company executive could be
excluded by the prohibition against independent directors who are
affiliated with a registered broker-dealer if a subsidiary of the insurance
company has registered as a broker-dealer so it may sell annuities as
well as its life insurance policies even though it does not function as a
trading house through which fund business could be channeled. The
same prohibition would exclude a partner in a municipal bond house
even though fund transactions were not executed through such a
broker.
A literal reading of section 2(a) (19) would, exclude both candi-
dates, but in neither case is the statutory goal of independence impaired.
If the fund does not do business with the type of firm with which a
candidate is affiliated, his eligibility should not be challenged by the
SEC. Rather the test of "interest" should be whether there exists a
relationship that could make the director dependent upon the adviser.
Experience under the 1970 Amendments is too limited to predict
whether the interested persons definition will in fact make the selection
of qualified directors much more difficult. In its only reported opinion,
however, the SEC has indicated that it will very strictly construe
the interested persons definition." Such a strict construction of the
interested persons definition may produce two undesirable consequences.
First, the selection of new independent directors may turn more upon
legal niceties than experience, knowledge, or business acumen. Second,
the pool of qualified candidates may not be sufficient to satisfy the
demand for their services.
The new phrase raises several additional problems of construction.
First, section 2(a) (19) (B) (vi) provides that no SEC determination
pursuant to the "material business relationship" part of the definition
shall become effective nor affect the status of any director until at least
164 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (19) (1970).
165 Southwestern Investors, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 78,172 (May 14, 1971). The SEC, however, avoided a decision on the issue
in this ruling. See generally Investment Company Act Release No. 6336 (Feb. 2,
1971), in [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 77,951.
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sixty days after its entry.166 The purpose of this delay is to allow a
board of directors time to rearrange its affiliated and independent
directorships and, if necessary, renew the advisory contract after the
SEC's order. Section 2(a) (9), which defines "control" (an element
of the affiliated persons definition), establishes a broad presumption of
non-control by the adviser until a contrary determination is made by the
Commission.0 7 Although the purpose of this presumption is ap-
parently the same as the delay in section 2 (a) (19), the SEC has stated
that its determinations of control will have retroactive effect.16s Thus,
a shareholder who wished to challenge a board decision might try to
avoid the prospective effect of a "material business relationship" deter-
mination by first asking the SEC to rule that a particular director was
"controlled" by the adviser and use this determination to upset a past
decision of the board.'69 This result destroys the statutory purpose
of section 2 (a) (9)'s presumption of non-control and is contrary to the
1970 Amendment's clear intent to give only prospective effect to any
determination disqualifying a director.
Affiliated and independent directors often share common interests
and sit on the boards of the same charitable, educational, or industrial
corporations. The legislative history of section 2 (a) (19) suggests that
such contacts do not constitute material business relationships. 170 The
Report of the Senate Banking Committee on S. 2224 states that the
criterion by which a relationship will be evaluated is whether it "might
tend to impair the independence" of the independent director.' 17  This
standard would not be compromised in such cases unless the selection,
compensation, or prestige of such a directorship would make the inde-
pendent director beholden to an affiliated person.
Many independent directors sit "across" a fund complex or on all
or nearly all of the funds managed by a single adviser. Here the common
practice of individuals occupying similar positions in "any other invest-
ment company having the same investment adviser or principal under-
writer" could be prohibited by a strict reading of section 2 (a) (19) (A).
160 15 U.S.C. §80a-2(a)(19)(B)(vi) (1970); see 1969 SENATE REPORT, Vipra
note 38, at 33.
167 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (9) (1970).
168 Fundamental Investors, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 285 (1962).
169 The standard of proof necessary to establish control under § 2(a) (9) may be
lower if the SEC, rather than a court, makes this determination. For example, in
Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963), the court refused to find
that the non-affiliated directors were "controlled" despite the fact that their numbers
included directors who did a substantial amount of printing business for the fund,
acted as its broker on several occasions, sold it insurance, and owned 0.4% of the
adviser's outstanding stock. Id. at 536-37, 542-43.
179 See 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 33-34.
171Id. 33.
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The standard of impairment of independence, however, is not ordi-
narily violated unless it can be shown that the benefit of sitting across
a complex flows to the director rather than to the funds,17 2 a deter-
mination usually requiring more than a showing that this arrangement
multiplies director fees.173
An independent director may involuntarily become "interested"
if he becomes the executor of an estate holding stock in the adviser or
is named beneficiary of a trust holding or acquiring such stock. 4
In addition to defining "material business relationship" with greater
precision, the SEC should either exempt de minimis, nonvoluntary
acquisitions of adviser stock or make clear that an independent director
may seek an exemption under section 6(c), which, if granted, would
obviate the necessity for restructuring the board.
7
5
D. Framework of Director Responsibilities
Three conclusions of Parts I and II should be emphasized. First,
one practical effect of the 1970 Amendments and the Moses decision is
a shift from the 1940 Act's nearly exclusive reliance upon independent
directors as a check on the adviser's compensation, use of brokerage,
and sale of shares, to what the SEC has termed a more "realistic" ap-
proach that places the main burden of shareholder protection in these
areas on the fund's adviser."' One problem with this approach is that
it leaves in doubt both the factors that independent directors should
consider before reaching a sound business judgment and the weight a
court should now give their approval in its own determination of fair-
ness. It is apparent, however, that, at least in the advisory fee context,
the independent directors' approval is a necessary condition not only for
the contract but for the fulfillment of the adviser's fiduciary duty. Al-
though the independent directors' approval of the fee no longer limits the
standard of judicial review to waste of assets, their judgment must be
given some weight by the courts. The external management relation-
ship between fund and adviser is only feasible if the independent de-
cisions of the board are given substantial weight by the court. Even
if a different course of action would have been more profitable for the
fund, without a showing that there was a lack of disclosure to the inde-
pendent directors or that the arrangement was unfair to the fund, the
board's determinations should be upheld.
172 Id.
173 The benefit derived from director's fees is not usually large enough to seriously
impair independence. See text accompanying note 208 infra.
174 1969 SExATE: REPoRT, sutpra note 38, at 34.
1
7 5 See id. 32-34 (anticipating such action).
176 1969 House Hearings, supra note 52, at 138-39.
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Second, the Moses decision suggests that the adviser's representa-
tives on the board have a special responsibility to raise and explain the
difficult questions of conflict of interest between fund and adviser. The
affiliated directors' greater responsibility could be characterized either
as the common law duty of loyalty or simply as a prerequisite for the
effective functioning of the 1940 Act's concept of fund management.
At least in the fee area, the adviser's fiduciary duties are synonymous
with the affiliated directors' duty to educate the outsiders.
Third, the 1940 Act standards of both director and adviser respon-
sibility are exclusively federal. The developing federal common law of
corporate fiduciary obligation includes only those state rules or common
law doctrines that are consistent with the Act's regulatory scheme. The
procedural aspects and remedies available in actions to enforce these
responsibilities are similarly limited to the 1940 Act's scheme.
III. PROFILE OF PRESENT DIRECTOR PRACTICES
Although several recent articles have discussed the role of the
independent directors, 7 interviews with fund officials and directors
conducted in the preparation of this Article suggest a substantial diver-
gence between legal theory and actual practice."' The following dis-
cussion of independent director practices will explore the extent of this
difference. Part IV will develop guidelines suggesting ways in which
the gap between theory and practice can be reduced.
A. Selection of Independent Directors
A chief criticism of independent directors has been that in practice
the adviser, rather than the shareholders, selects the board, or "[t]he
men who need to be watched pick the watchdogs to watch them." 179
' 77 Eisenberg & Lehr, supra note 69; Glazer, supra note 74; Mundheim, Some
Thoughts on the Duties and Responsibilities of Unaffiliated Directors of Mutual
Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1058 (1967).
178 Much of the information on particular independent director practices was
gathered through questionnaires sent to approximately 30 investment advisers and the
independent directors of the funds they managed. Twenty-four fund complexes agreed
to participate in the study by either returning the completed questionnaires or grant-
ing interviews with adviser officials and directors.
179 University of Pennsylvania Law School, Conference on Mutual Funds, 115
U. PA. L. REv. 662, 739 (1967) (remarks of Abraham L. Pomerantz). Mr.
Pomerantz went on to observe:
But obviously, you know and I know that if you are choosing an un-
affiliated director or an independent director you are not going to choose
anybody who is going to be too hard on you. You are going to tend to
pick a friend of yours; and may I say again, as a footnote, that in my
litigation I have encountered two situations where a so-called unaffiliated
or independent director happened to be the son of the leading stockholder
of the adviser.
Now, how funny can you get? And yet with straight countenance under
oath the testimony was that the son was going to "call them as he sees
them," to coin a phrase, and he was not going to be partial to his father.
Id. 739-40.
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Both the Wharton Report and the SEC Public Policy Report attribute
the lack of effective independent director control largely to the existing
selection process. 80
The power to place a slate of directors before the shareholders
through the proxy mechanism is tantamount to appointment."-' Thus,
the issue is not who will elect the directors but who should select the
candidates either for annual elections or for interim terms which the
board must fill. Like most promoters of a new enterprise, the adviser
selects the fund's original directors. Candidates for subsequent elections
are in most fund complexes selected by a nominating committee com-
posed of both affiliated and independent directors. Although the screen-
ing of possible candidates is jealously guarded by some nominating
committees, most rely upon the adviser's representatives to suggest
possible candidates whom the committee then interviews and recom-
mends. This is especially true if the president of the adviser is also
president of the fund and either a member of or the chairman of the
nominating committee. Thus, through either informal suggestions or
the veto often given the adviser's representatives on the committee, the
selection of independent directors effectively remains in the adviser's
hands.
Recently some advisers have attempted to divorce themselves en-
tirely from the selection of new independent directors. Because studies
of the industry have been critical of the adviser's hand-picking of new
directors, these advisers fear that any connection with the selection
process might be interpreted by a court as a circumstance tainting the
objectivity of later board decisions. Not only may the adviser avoid a
charge of appointing subservient directors by divorcing itself from the
selection process, but an important psychological result may carry over
into later board deliberations. The extent to which a new director seeks
information and opinion from the other independent directors rather
than from the adviser's representatives may be directly related to the
extent to which he attributes his selection to the former group.
How independent directors should be selected turns upon both the
adviser's and the existing independent directors' understanding of a
director's role in fund affairs. If, as suggested in Part IV, the inde-
pendent directors should play an active role in negotiating the advisory
contract and reviewing the adviser's practices, they should also assume
the entire responsibility for recruiting new independent directors. Sev-
eral adviser officials suggested that the present independent directors
180 WHARTON REPORT, supra note 12, at 34; PUBLIC POLICY REPORT, supra note
3, at 130.
181 See PUBLIC POLICY REPORT, supra note 3, at 129.
[Vol.120:179
MUTUAL FUND INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
on their boards might not have the broad contact that the president of
the adviser has or the influence to encourage the type of men who would
actively participate in fund affairs to join their boards. This criticism,
however, assumes that new directors should come from the financial
community in which the adviser's contacts are greatest. If the board
seeks a broader array of business experience, there is no reason to con-
clude that the adviser is better equipped than the independent directors
to encourage qualified individuals to join the board.
The qualities for which advisers and independent directors said
they look in new directors showed a striking similarity. Both assert
little interest in candidates with backgrounds in the securities industry
or those whose names and reputations might spur sales. Rather, they
seek intelligent, congenial men of varied backgrounds who will be dili-
gent in fund affairs. But the list of fund directors found in many
prospectuses suggests that, whoever selects the new directors, reputation,
prestige, and connection with the financial community are in fact im-
portant criteria. Most boards include corporation presidents, bankers,
attorneys, former government officials, and university presidents."8 2
Interestingly, most have achieved a nearly comparable measure of suc-
cess in their respective fields and frequently sit together on other
boards. 83 Currently, academics are in vogue, and many boards have
at least one economics or law professor as an independent director.
The criterion most often mentioned in interviews with fund officials
is that a candidate "must know the function of a good director." When
asked to define this phrase, both advisers and independent directors said
they wanted men who understood the corporate form of decisionmaking,
182 For example, the independent directors of one income fund include: a life
member of the corporation of Massachusetts Institute of Technology; the president
of Fiduciary Trust Company of Boston; the owner of Louis J. Hunter Associates,
which provides trustee and financial services to corporations and individuals; a partner
of a prestigious law firm; and the president of Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The Putnam Income Fund, Inc., Prospectus 4-5 (Feb. 22, 1971).
The independent directors of another income fund include: a partner of a pres-
tigious law firm; a former professor of the Graduate School of Business of Stanford
University; a former executive director of the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc.; a former president of Calaveras Cement Company; and a professor
of law at the University of California Hastings College of Law. American Express
Investment Fund, Inc., Prospectus 4-5 (Mar. 11, 1971).
183 For example, the chairman of the board and president of Broad Street
Investing Corporation is a trustee of Vassar College, as is one independent director
of the Fund. Broad Street Investing Corp., Annual Report 3 (1971).
184 For example, Dreyfus Fund recently added four new members to its board:
Dr. Alan Greenspan, an economic consultant and adviser to the Nixon administra-
tion; Dr. Jonas Salk, developer of the polio vaccine; Mrs. Eugene McCarthy; and
Mr. William Moyers, former press secretary to President Johnson. NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 22, 1971, at 92 (Directors: Stein's Salon). In addition, the board of Union
Capital Fund, Inc., includes Professor Robert Mundheim of the University of Penn-
sylvania Law School. Union Capital Fund, Inc., Prospectus 3 (May 1, 1970). And
the boards of directors of the Oppenheimer and Oppenheimer A.I.M. funds include
Professor Sidney M. Robbins of the Graduate School of Business, Columbia Univer-
sity. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc., Prospectus 8 (Apr. 24, 1970).
218 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.120:179
men who served on other boards or as presidents working with their
own boards. They seek men who know that "a good director does not
interfere with day-to-day management and does not disturb the existing
system when he joins a board." Although they seek men who will offer
advice, ask discerning questions, and contribute to board affairs, their
idea of "appropriate participation" excludes from consideration anyone
known to have caused trouble on other boards.
Two reasons were commonly given by independent directors for
accepting their board positions. First, each had hoped to gain the
chance to apply in the fund context some special expertise developed in
his own profession. Second, he had hoped to acquire knowledge about
a financial institution that might be useful either personally or in his
own business. Of course, the psychological reward of being part of a
well-known company and sharing responsibility with men of promi-
nence cannot be discounted.
In several complexes, past presidents or executive officers of the
adviser serve as independent directors either after their retirement or
after the former adviser has been bought out by the present management
company. An SEC order, pursuant to section 2(a) (19) (B) (vi) de-
fining interested persons, may exclude from independent director status
former adviser officers for a period of two years after they leave the
employ of the adviser. These directors are among the most knowledge-
able in fund matters and in some cases have proven among the most
vigorous advocates for the interests of the funds."85 Prior affiliation
with the fund's adviser, however, is certainly a circumstance that a court
should consider when determining the weight to be given a board
decision.'8 6
A possible source of future independent directors is the increasing
number of "professional directors," usually retired executives, who serve
on the boards of several industrial, service, or educational corporations.
These directors not only bring extensive experience and business
acumen to a board but often have more time to devote to fund business
than directors still active in their own professions. 8 7 Although over-
185 For example, Mr. Harold K. Bradford, the chairman of the board of the
Investors Diversified Services' group of funds, was formerly associated with the
funds' adviser, but is said now to be an outspoken advocate for the funds.
186 Section 2(a) (19) (3) (iv), which specifically provides that the SEC has au-
thority to determine who are interested persons of the adviser and hence the fund,
is limited to individuals who have had material business relationships with the ad-
viser during the past two years. One might accordingly infer that after this period
such individuals should be conclusively presumed to be independent unless entirely
unrelated grounds for disqualification exist.
187 Of course, if the "professional director" receives several fees, and those con-
stitute a substantial portion of his income, his independence may be impaired.
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lapping directorships have recently come under renewed attack,"'8 the
prohibitions found in blue sky laws against fund investments in other
corporations served by a director, and the strict enforcement of the
personnel-trading policies already in effect in most funds, minimize
nearly all objections to professional directors. A different problem
arises when an independent director sits not only on boards of more
than one fund in a single complex but on the boards of funds in several
complexes. Here the most difficult problem is not insider trading by
either the director or the fund complexes, but the potentially awkward
position in which the director may be placed if competitive pressures for
performance between complexes mean that he must approve certain
portfolio selections or investment strategies that he has been told are
unwise by the adviser of another fund group which he serves. This
situation may also deter the adviser from disclosing some new strategy
or investment approach if he believes there is any possibility a com-
petitor will learn of it through the independent director.
B. Orientation to the Role of Independent Director
The orientation of a new director is initially shaped by the person
who invites him to sit on the board. If the president of the adviser is
also president of the fund and takes an active hand in selection, the new
director may attribute his appointment to and be aligned with the
adviser. This tendency may be even greater where the adviser asks the
candidate to sit on all the boards of the complex because the new
director may not identify with any particular fund. But, in practice,
regardless whether the new director is contacted by the president of the
adviser or by a board nominating committee, orientation is almost
always left to the adviser. The process is often both informal and
superficial. Typically, a new director is introduced to adviser officials
and the fund portfolio manager even before meeting the other directors.
Indeed, very few directors learn more about the funds they serve before
the first directors' meeting than what a shareholder may learn from
reading a prospectus or annual report. If new directors are often
friends of adviser officials, they are usually friendly to their mode of
business. This is hardly surprising because a reasonable man who
appreciates the potential liability of directorship will not join a board
if he knows that he cannot support the existing fund-adviser relationship,
188 See, e.g., STAPF OF HousE COmm. OF BANKING & CURRENCy, 92D CONG., 1ST
SEss., REPORT ON THE PENN CENTRAL FAILURE AND THE R LE OF FINANCIAL IN-
STITUTIONS, PART III, PENPHL: THE MISUSE OF CORPORATE PovER (Comm. Print
1971).
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or if he suspects he may be asked to approve practices he would feel
were unfair.'89
Advisers who see independent director orientation as another cir-
cumstance that may affect the weight a court would give the board's
judgment have turned this process over to the independent directors or
separate fund counsel.' 90 Of course, what is said is far more important
than who explains the responsibilities of an independent director. There
are, however, several compelling reasons the independent directors and
fund counsel should assume this responsibility. First, although most
new directors have some knowledge of the fund industry, they nearly
always see their independent-director role as identical to the role they
or their friends perform as directors of other types of corporations. The
new director must be alerted to his unique obligations to represent the
shareholders. Second, if a new director is elected to sit on the boards
of all of the funds in a complex, he must be familiar with the different
funds' investment objectives, fee structures, net asset values, and special
research or sales needs. Too often, directors see different investment
objectives among funds as eliminating the possibility of conflicts be-
tween them. Although fund objectives may vary, for example, in
terms of overall volatility of the portfolio, this does not guarantee that
the same investment will not be considered appropriate to more than
one fund. The stock of one promising company may be available in
only a limited supply in the market. Yet it may interest both a fund
with an aggressive growth objective and one with a more conservative,
balanced objective because, although they invest in stocks ranging over
different volatility spectra, those spectra overlap and both could ac-
commodate the particular stock.
C. Monthly Meetings, Individual Participation, and
Committee Functions
The 1940 Act's concept of arm's-length bargaining and independent
review of the adviser's handling of fund assets is seldom more at odds
with reality than in the matter of monthly board meetings. The reasons
for the divergence are hardly surprising. Mutual fund directors are
highly qualified and successful men; their time is at a premium and
devoted primarily to their own enterprise or profession. Fund director-
ship is at best a secondary occupation to which only a few hours each
189 Cf. Mundheim, supra note 177, at 1058 & n.4.
190 The orientation of new independent directors might also be undertaken by
the Investment Company Institute or some other industry-wide organization whose
objectivity or expertise would be less open to criticism.
[Vo1.120:179
MUTUAL FUND INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
month can be allocated."9' In addition, the investment company in-
dustry is extremely complex. Understanding the fund's place, not only
in the complex and the industry but among all the competing equity
investments, requires years of experience. Most directors simply can-
not take time to learn thoroughly on their own the detailed problems of
fund operation. Finally, independent directors derive nearly all the
information on which their decisions are based from the adviser, which
controls not only the content but the form of presentation and even
the selection of the topics discussed.
Most boards meet monthly for approximately one and a half hours,
although special committees may meet more frequently.Y92 If the same
board serves all the funds in the complex, a joint meeting for two to
three hours is common. Joint meetings not only conserve time but may
give the independent directors an overview of the adviser's allocation
of investment opportunities, common expense, and pooled brokerage
among the various funds. This practice also permits joint determina-
tion of the advisory and underwriting contracts between the individual
fund and adviser. Both directors and adviser officials agree that it
would probably be unrealistic to ask the independent directors to spend
substantially more time either in preparation for or in attendance at
board meetings.
The independent directors typically receive an agenda and reports
showing portfolio additions and deletions, investment performance, and
sales and redemptions of fund shares, a week before each meeting. Com-
paring agendas for the year indicates that the format of each board
meeting is nearly identical. Several directors described the discussion
as "predictable": they could, for example, anticipate that at a part of
the presentation with which a particular director was knowledgeable, he
would interject the same question each month. With almost ritualistic
precision, boards move through the minutes of past meetings, portfolio
changes, sales reports, the president's report, and special committee
presentations to adjournment. One director suggested that meeting
monthly for an hour was less productive than former quarterly meetings
because the short time span between meetings gave no perspective on the
direction in which the fund was going.
When asked if certain issues were discussed, such as whether an
advisory fee increase would be necessary if the adviser could no longer
191 Most directors questioned indicated that they spent approximately 2 to 3 hours
each month on fund matters. Nearly all of these directors considered this time
sufficient to satisfy their obligations to the fund.
192 In several complexes an investment committee met bi-weekly to review fund
portfolio transactions. When special committees were appointed to deal with particu-
lar problems, such as selection of a new independent director, they frequently met on
the same day as the regular monthly meeting.
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use fund brokerage to generate sales or gather research, several inde-
pendent directors responded that the board meeting was not the appro-
priate setting for such questioning. If bothered by a particular report,
they preferred to question the president of the adviser privately, possibly
because they did not want to take up their fellow board members' time
or wish to appear not to understand a seemingly well-accepted practice.
The extent to which the directors asked discerning questions usually
depended upon whether the adviser solicited their participation. If a
single independent director or the affiliated directors took the lead in
questioning, the rest of the board often followed. When asked what
occurred if the adviser's answer was unsatisfactory, most directors said
they either dropped the subject until such time as someone else raised
it or relied upon the adviser's integrity. The impression from most
interviews was that the "first-Monday-of-the-month" meeting was con-
genial, conducted with dispatch and minimal unpleasantness, often pre-
dictable and repetitious, and seldom produced changes in fund operation.
D. Renewal of the Advisory Contract
Most independent directors indicated that the annual meeting called
to renew the advisory contract is the longest, most detailed and informa-
tive meeting of the year. Usually the agenda for this meeting includes
not only the advisory agreements for each fund but also the under-
writing contracts and N-lR forms."93 Although the substance of the
adviser's presentation of this information and the directors' evaluation
of it will be discussed in Part IV, it is important here to note the atti-
tude that most independent directors bring to renewal of the advisory
contract.
The renewal process is commonly referred to as "negotiation," but
the meeting bears few of the earmarks of arm's-length bargaining.
Advisory contracts are seldom forged in the heat of an adversary
process, nor is it clear that they should be. On the other hand, the ad-
visory agreement is seldom arrived at by independent directors and
adviser representatives participating with a community of interest to
scribe a new contract. The adviser usually presents a completely drafted
contract calling for a certain fee structure. No independent director
suggested during this study that either the board or any independent
193 Form N-1R, filed annually with the SEC, contains a wealth of information
on fund policies and transactions, including, with other information, a list of the top 10
brokers with whom the adviser placed portfolio brokerage, the allocation-of-oppor-
tunities formula, the brokers selling fund shares, and all transactions with affiliated
persons. See 1 CCH MUTUAL FuNDs GuiDE 116201-15, at 4201-86 (forms with
commentary). Although several independent directors indicated that they found
this compilation useful, many thought it too detailed for their purpose. In some
complexes, form N-1R is the subject of an entire meeting during which the fund
counsel or an affiliated director explains each of the answers submitted for the fund.
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director acting alone should contact other investment advisory houses
to ascertain the price of comparable services. Only a few directors
indicated that the adviser was ever asked to submit a lower fee. Con-
tract renewal is not a bid-and-ask proposition.
Independent directors' acquiescence in this pattern of contract re-
newal is again attributable to the unique structure of the fund industry.
Most independent directors believe that fund shareholders have pur-
chased a package of investment management services based upon the
strength of a particular adviser's reputation. Most directors feel that
it would be difficult for them to justify to these shareholders hiring an
adviser untested with regard to their fund simply to get a reduction in
a widely accepted fee rate. Although the same independent directors
said they might want to look for new advice if they believed the fee
excessive or an adviser practice unfair to the funds, they believed such a
drastic step a practical impossibility. Most admitted that their funds
could secure comparable investment advisory services from other ad-
visers, but asserted that their present adviser offered not only investment
advice but all of the management, shareholder accounting, and distri-
bution services necessary to maintain the complex-management serv-
ices that could not readily be duplicated by others. Thus, most independ-
ent directors were reluctant to use the ultimate weapon of terminating
the advisory contract. Finally, they insisted that although in theory they
could always refuse to renew the contract, as a practical matter this
would be impossible. The independent directors would first have to
obtain a majority within their own ranks to withhold renewal. More
important, any attempt to switch advisers would surely lead to a proxy
battle for board control with the existing adviser having a great incen-
tive and some advantages of incumbency.' 94
E. Independent Directors' Contributions to Fund Affairs
This description of board meetings and contract renewal certainly
does not negate the contributions of the independent directors or mean
that they do not serve important functions. First, their very presence
inhibits practices which cannot stand even superficial scrutiny. Even
the adviser's president knows and accepts the fact that he must report
periodically to men accustomed both to top level decisionmaking and to
evaluating subordinate's reports. Similarly, a portfolio manager with
absolute discretion will seldom act to the limits of this authority if a
194 Proxy contests involving attempts to select directors who will approve a
management contract with a competing adviser are extremely rare. The one recorded
contest took place only after existing management relationships had completely
broken down and the SEC had taken disciplinary actions, see Managed Funds, Inc.,
39 S.E.C. 313 (1959), against the adviser for serious violations of 1940 Act.
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director is likely to question his recommendation. But the salutary
effect of the independent directors' presence typically bars only practices
they can readily perceive to be unconscionable.
The independent directors often contribute most in areas in which
they have independently developed experience. For this reason, ad-
visers seek directors with varying business, professional, and geographic
backgrounds. An adviser does not usually consult an independent
director about day-to-day fund management, but may seek his advice
when a problem arises in his area of expertise. If, for example, the fund
is considering participation in a real estate investment trust, a director
who knows the real estate industry in general and the mortgage market
in particular may be called upon to advise management. Similarly, an
investment banker may be asked to evaluate new financing arrange-
ments, a broker to explain the impact of negotiated rates, or an attorney
to criticize the fund's prospectus. Although independent directors feel
this advice is their major contribution, it usually only supplements the
information upon which management's decisions are based. Advisers
must seek more detailed professional advice because large amounts of
capital are involved.
A third area of active director participation is membership on
special committees. The complexity of the mutual fund industry has
led some directors to try to develop intra-board areas of expertise.
Thus, many funds have an investment committee to review an "eligible
list" of securities in which the portfolio manager may invest,'95 the
adviser's investment strategy, and the fund's overall performance. A
"special" committee may investigate new selling techniques, redemp-
tions, advertisements, and use of contractual plans. An auditing com-
mittee recommends the fund's certified public accountants and reviews
accounting procedures and the reporting of "fails." "' Committees
composed entirely of independent directors are an even more recent
development, and experience has been limited to four areas. As noted,'
97
the selection of new independent directors has been assumed in a few
complexes by nominating committees chosen and manned exclusively
by the independent directors. In one complex, all the independent
195 The directors of The Investment Company of America have established an
"Advisory Board," composed of experts in several investment areas who meet with
the directors to discuss proposed investments. The directors suggest securities for
addition to an "eligible list ' from which the portfolio manager must choose. Securi-
ties proposed by the directors are added to the list unless objections are raised by
more than one-third of the Advisory Board within ten days. The Advisory Board
may also remove any security from the eligible list if one-third of its membership
so agree. The Investment Company of America, Prospectus 2 (Apr. 30, 1970).
196 The term "fail" refers to a broker-confirmed purchase of stock that subse-
quently cannot be produced on the delivery date.
197 See text accompanying notes 180-82 supra.
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directors serve on an advisory fee committee and negotiate with a team
of affiliated directors. A third group of independent directors formed a
special committee and hired their own legal counsel when faced with
shareholder litigation. Finally, the advent of negotiated commission
rates has spurred some boards to select a committee of independent
directors to establish policies defining the circumstances in which port-
folio transactions may be executed through an affiliated broker. The
potential such committees have to develop special competency and also
avoid charges of adviser domination may lead to their use in nearly
every area of director responsibility. The expertise and added compen-
sation produced by such committee work should not result in their being
held to the higher standard of care sometimes applicable to "specialist
directors," because they are merely performing in a more orderly and
efficient manner the responsibilities which the 1940 Act assumes every
independent director will perform. 9 " Increased potential liability could
deter greater independent director participation, a result contrary to the
goal of the 1970 Amendments. Moreover, additional compensation is
both reasonable and necessary for directors asked to spend additional
time on fund affairs and does not suggest that they have undertaken
new or different responsibilities. A more significant problem is whether
such committees should depend upon the adviser for information or
conduct their own investigations. The latter approach certainly en-
hances the objectivity of the committee's report but is not feasible unless
the independent directors have separate counsel to assume most of these
responsibilities.
F. Staff Facilities and Legal Counsel
Only one of the fund complexes interviewed had a permanent
staff; it consisted of a president, vice president, secretary-treasurer, and
general counsel. Only the funds' president also served as a fund
director."s Although a full-time staff can better check the accuracy of
reports presented by the adviser, most smaller funds cannot afford the
additional expense of full-time directors, assistants, secretaries, and
office space. Cost is not the only drawback; absent special precautions,
the fund's staff could become so identified with the adviser through shar-
ing the same facilities that its objectivity would be impaired. If the
board needs greater expertise, a committee of independent directors
could select and oversee a special consultant. Even a small complex
might be able to afford a management consultant to evaluate the
adviser's profit margin on a particular fund, the efficiency of certain
198 Compare text accompanying notes 149-50 supra.
'99See Investors Mutual, Inc., Prospectus 12-14 (Jan. 13, 1971).
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personnel structures, or the fairness of the adviser's allocation of
common expenses.
Very few fund complexes have recognized the practical, if not
statutory, necessity of separate legal counsel for their funds. Granting
the highest integrity to attorneys who simultaneously serve the funds
and their adviser and underwriter, it nonetheless seems highly anom-
alous that since 1941 an attorney retained by the adviser is disqualified
from voting as an independent director on any aspect of fund operations,
advisory contract negotiation, and the resolution of conflicts of interest,
yet continues to counsel the funds' boards on all of these issues.200 No
attorney familiar with mutual fund regulation could deny that by repre-
senting both sides in these deliberations he has placed himself in a
position of conflict of interest; 201 the fact that this practice has been
accepted for years is no answer. Indeed, continuing to serve both fund
and adviser may be a disservice to both because a conscientious court
would certainly take this into consideration when deciding the weight to
be given the directors' business judgment.
This warning is well stated by the court in Kohn v. American
Metal Climax, Inc.,2 2 a shareholder derivative action alleging that an
amalgamation of Roan Selection Trust, Ltd. (RST), and American
Metal Climax Company (AMAX) violated the proxy rules and anti-
fraud provisions of the 1934 Act, and that the RST directors had
breached their fiduciary duty to their shareholders during the merger
negotiations. Ruling for the plaintiffs, District Judge Masterson sug-
gests that a controlling factor in the decision was that both RST and
AMAX were represented by the same legal counsel. He found:
[Legal counsel] thus placed itself in a clear position of
conflict of interest. Though this position is sought to be
justified because the RST directors agreed to allow [the law
firm] to continue to represent it notwithstanding the conflict,
such an agreement is meaningless in view of AMAX's control
of RST . . . . Nevertheless, even assuming [the law firm]
could continue to represent both, their position is a material
fact which should have been disclosed to the shareholders. It
would be important for shareholders, in evaluating the advice
of RST directors to vote in favor of the amalgamation, to
200 The SEC has ruled that no partner or associate of a law firm on a general
retainer from the investment adviser may serve as an independent director. SEC,
Opinion of General Counsel, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-214 (Sept.
15, 1941), in 3 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1[48,032, 48,033; cf. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2 (a)
(19) (B) (iv) (1970).
203 Cf. ABA CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, disciplinary rule 5-105(B)
(1970).
202 322 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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know that through December, 1969 RST was being advised
by lawyers who were also advising AMAX." 3
Although Chief Judge Aldrich did not reach this issue in Moses v.
Burgin,14 he did note that the attorneys who surveyed the possibilities
of recapturing fund brokerage commissions through a broker affiliate on
a regional stock exchange were either affiliated directors or associates in
the law firm which represented management.20 5 Because their report
was never fully communicated to the directors, the court was able to
disregard it and avoid weighing either its accuracy or its credibility.20
Both decisions clearly evidence judicial concern that in an area with
substantial public interest one party to the agreement lacked effective
legal counsel. Admittedly, the AMAX case arose in a context different
from the relationship between fund and adviser. There, AMAX
dominated the RST directors in a manner that prevented them from
reaching a disinterested business judgment whether RST should have
been represented by the same counsel as AMAX. In the fund context,
the independent directors can, after full disclosure, approve the same
counsel for the funds as retained by the adviser. The independent
directors of a small fund might decide that the cost of separate counsel
could not be justified to their shareholders. This determination how-
ever, should only be reached after the directors have assured themselves
that they can retain counsel who can structure the relationship so as to
maintain his integrity in this situation. Both the independent directors
and the adviser must realize the extent of the liability they risk should
a court later disregard their decisions made upon information or advice
furnished by the adviser's attorney. At least with regard to the advisory
fee, the weight a court will give the independent directors' "sound
business judgments" may depend upon whether they were advised by
counsel who represents only the fund.
The Moses decision further suggests that the funds should be
represented by counsel at least as independent as the directors them-
selves. The new definition of "interested persons" emphasizes this re-
quirement by prohibiting an attorney, his partners, and his employees
from serving as independent directors if they have represented the
adviser or underwriter within the past two years.207 The soundness of
203 Id. at 1362.
204 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Dec. 14,
1971).
205 Id. at 376-80.
20
6 See id. at 381 n.18.
207 Section 2(a) (19) (B) includes within its definition of "interested person":
any person or partner or employee of any person who at any time since the
beginning of the last two fiscal years of such investment company has acted
as legal counsel for such investment adviser or principal underwriter.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (19) (B) (iv) (1970).
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this prohibition is obvious: an independent director must often be a
diplomat, a role that might conflict with that of advocate for the fund.
G. Compensation, Insurance, and Indemnification
Despite potential liability and increased responsibility for fund
decisionmaking, independent directors' fees remain nominal. Most inde-
pendent directors receive between $1200 and $1800 per year from each
fund.0 8  It is either a flat fee or a certain minimum plus a sum for each
board meeting attended. The independent directors within a single
board occasionally receive different fees, especially if some of them
assume special responsibilities such as reviewing portfolio decisions or
reporting on companies within their geographic area. For independent
directors sitting on the boards of all of the funds in a complex, the fee
from each fund is allocated either on a net asset basis or divided on a
ratio of the fund's net assets to the assets of the entire complex. In
nearly every instance, the independent directors are paid by the fund
rather than the adviser. -0 9 Unless the combined fees become significant
in relation to an independent director's total income, there is little reason
to believe that increasing compensation to reflect added responsibilities
impairs a director's independence. In addition, there are sound reasons
to suspect that director service, like any other, is worth what one pays
for it.
Despite the potential liability that their independent directors
assume, very few complexes can obtain any form of insurance protection
for them.210 The director-and-officer-liability or errors-and-omissions
coverage frequently offered other types of directors is not readily avail-
able to fund directors. Perhaps insurers believe the contours of liability
are too unsettled, or directors believe the exclusions are too broad and
the premiums too great to justify the expense to the fund."' The 1970
Amendments may, however, fix money damages recoverable from
independent directors with sufficient particularity that insurers will now
208 The trustees of the few remaining fund groups that are organized as trusts
may receive substantially greater compensation. The amount of discretion which a
trustee can delegate is not entirely clear. Thus, in order to protect against liability,
a fund trustee may be called upon several times a week to approve the portfolio
selections recommended by the adviser.
209 If they receive any separate compensation for serving on the fund's board,
the affiliated directors are paid by the adviser. See, e.g., Wellington Fund Inc.,
Prospectus 3 (May 10, 1970).
210 Only four of the fund complexes interviewed offered their directors any form
of insurance. In each of the four, the adviser was associated in some way with an
insurance company that had dealings with Lloyds of London.
211 For differing views on the public policy implications of director insurance,
compare Bishop, New Cure For An Old Ailment: Insurance Against Directors' and
Officers' Liability, 22 Bus. LAw. 92, 107-12 (1966), with Note, Liability Instrance
for Corporate Directors, 80 HARv. L. REv. 648, 669 (1967).
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offer coverage.2 12 In addition, section 36(b) and the Moses decision
may lead shareholders to name only the adviser and affiliated directors
in hope that the court will apply the higher standard of fiduciary
obligation.
Assuming a fund may purchase liability insurance for its directors,
the allocation of premium expenses poses three problems. First, it
might be argued that it is unconscionable for the fund to insure its
directors against liability for conduct that redounds to the detriment of
fund shareholders.2 13 But, as a matter of public policy, liability insur-
ance cannot even today protect a director from liability for his inten-
tional or reckless wrongdoing. 1 No similar policy prohibits a company
from insuring its directors for their careless or negligent mistakes.
Second, in many instances the fund's adviser must bear some responsi-
bility for their failure either to discover or to prevent an unfair practice.
Thus, some portion of the premium should be borne by the adviser.
Third, the independent directors should pay part of the expense for
their own coverage even though their fee may be increased to reflect
part of this expense. For example, one fund complex allocates ten
percent of the insurance premium expense to the independent directors;
forty percent of the premium is assigned to the fund, and the adviser
pays the remaining fifty percent of the expense. Although several dif-
ferent allocation schemes are equally rational, the adviser should in
every case bear a substantial part of the premium.
Most fund charters provide for indemnification of the directors.
Because state corporation codes expressly permit indemnification,21 5 the
public policy arguments that might be raised against insuring directors
are minimized. Some states, however, have gone so far as to authorize
indemnity insurance even in those circumstances in which indemnifica-
tion would not be permitted by the same state's statutes.216 If a fund
were to undertake this type of coverage, such an expenditure could be
attacked either as a waste of assets or as a violation of federal policy
expressed in the 1940 Act.217  Moreover, the SEC might condition
212 Section 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970), limits the damages recoverable
from an independent director to the amount of the director's fees received during
the year before the action was instituted (and while it is pending). Section 3 6(a),
id. § 80a-35 (a), does not limit damages to compensation received, but an insurance
company probably could not lawfully reimburse a director for liability based on
a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct See Note, Indemnification
of Directors: The Problems Posed by Federal Securities and Antitrust Legislation,
76 H v. L. REv. 1403, 1428 (1963).
213 See Note, supra note 211, at 669.
214 The SEC has taken the position that indemnity insurance in cases of reck-
less or willful misfeasance by a director subverts civil liability as a deterrent. See 3
L. Loss, SEcumRIms REGULATION 1829-32 (2d ed. 1961).
215 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1968).
216 See, e.g., id. § 145(g).
217 See Note, supra note 212, at 1428.
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acceleration of the fund's prospectus on waiver by the benefited party
of such indemnification or on inclusion in the registration statement of
a promise to submit the public policy question to a court. 18
IV. SCOPE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES
IN SPECIFIC CONTEXTS
When Congress made the policy decision in 1940 that advisers
could continue to offer their services through external management
companies, 19 it was assumed that the judgments of the independent
directors would be given effect so that every fund decision would not
be challenged in the courts. Although the 1970 Amendments make
explicit that advisers, as well as directors, owe fiduciary obligations to
the fund, they nonetheless continue the concept that the independent
directors are the initial guarantee that the adviser is fulfilling its obli-
gations to the fund. Thus, the courts" should only overturn board de-
cisions that cannot reasonably be justified and are unfair to the fund.
Unless the sound business judgments of the board are insulated to this
extent, a heavy burden of policing fund managements will be placed on
the courts. One of the reasons the courts are still in the business of
reviewing board decisions, not only when board-approved transactions
are alleged to be unfair but when another course of action might have
been more profitable, is that neither the independent directors nor the
shareholders have a common standard with which to determine whether
the board's choice was in fact a sound business judgment. Thus, guide-
lines defining the factors controlling board decisions in specific contexts
will give the directors a measure for their own performance, the share-
holders a basis for evaluating the board's effectiveness, and the courts
a standard for reviewing the fairness of the transactions approved by
the board.
Any attempt to fashion such guidelines is limited by the diversity
within the investment company industry and the practical realities of
fund management. If guidelines are to offer a broad spectrum of
directors the standards that they now lack, these procedures must
deal with problems common to nearly all complexes. A specific check-
list of director duties may be worthwhile on the individual fund level,
but such a checklist must be developed by fund counsel who appreciate
the particular problems of that complex and can continuously review
218 SEC Reg. C, 17 C.F.R. §230.460 (1971) (note (a)). The Commission
enforces a promise to litigate by maintaining that the prerequisites for acceleration
under §8(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 are not met unless the promise is in-
corporated in the registration statement. For an appraisal of the impact of denying
acceleration, see 1 L. Loss, SEcuprrEs REGULATION 277 (2d ed. 1961).
219 See note 14 supra.
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this checklist. In addition, the key factors working against effective
independent director control are two practical realities: directors often
fail to appreciate their unique responsibilities and cannot devote sub-
stantial time to fund matters. Thus, guidelines must place upon ad-
visers the responsibility to present reports identifying and exploring
problems with sufficient detail and clarity to be understood and acted
upon within the few hours each month that independent directors can
reasonably be expected to spend on fund business.
A. Approval of the Advisory Contract
Section 15 (a) of the 1940 Act 120 requires that the advisory con-
tract precisely describe the adviser's compensation, be initially approved
by the shareholders, and be annually renewed by the board of directors
or a majority of the shareholders. Section 15(c) additionally condi-
tions board action on the approval of a majority of the independent
directors.22' Here, the independent directors' duty to "request and
evaluate" and the adviser's duty to provide such information as may be
reasonably necessary for their decision are identical. The renewal
process should be approached in three steps. First, the independent
directors must decide whether the quality of the adviser's service on
both an individual-fund and a complex-wide basis warrants continuation
of the advisory agreement. This determination turns upon a com-
posite evaluation of each fund's investment performance.' Perform-
ance comparisons should be presented to the directors monthly so that
the statistics presented at the annual renewal meeting need only show a
composite picture of the year's growth. If the fund's performance has
been disappointing, the independent directors should ask the adviser for
an explanation. Their inquiry should be specifically directed to an
evaluation of the investment management process, the adviser's formula
for allocating investment opportunities among the various funds in the
complex, the trader's approach to best execution, the allocation of fund
portfolio business, and the depth and quality of the adviser's staff. Only
after the independent directors have assured themselves that the adviser
can offer each fund an equal opportunity for performance should they
move to an analysis of the fee. Even assuming, however, the fund's
performance has been satisfactory, the directors should review these
factors although they need not concentrate upon them.
Second, to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee, the directors
must know what services are included within the contract and how the
22015 U.S.C. §80a-15(a) (1970).
2211d. § 80a-15 (c).
222 This discussion assumes that the adviser's ability to handle shareholder ac-
counts and transfer service is adequate.
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adviser has allocated common expenses. If the directors know what
each service costs and the cost of similar services to other funds or
advisory accounts, they can determine whether their fund is sharing in
the economies of scale inherent in the complex form of organization.
When determining whether the adviser's profit margin is reasonable,
the directors may consider the adviser's entrepreneurial risk and the
quality of the investment advice received, usually evaluated in terms of
the fund's performance.
Third, the independent directors must structure the adviser's com-
pensation. Usually this is either a flat percentage of net assets or a flat
fee plus an incentive for superior performance. Here, the independent
directors must decide if incentive arrangements are necessary or appro-
priate in light of their fund's objectives. They should employ a risk-
adjusted formula 223 to ensure that the fee actually reflects superior
investment advice and not just a general increase in market prices.
The following subsections will develop each of these steps. Before
the directors begin their evaluation of the contract, however, they should
make two initial judgments. If they sit across a complex, they must
decide if a particular course of action will affect a single fund or all the
funds. In many cases, the independent directors can jointly determine
fee rates and structures for all the funds. Joint determination permits
more exact comparisons among the funds and perspective on the ad-
viser's total compensation. The independent directors should also de-
termine if the adviser's self-interest in a particular fund or funds is
greater than in others." If the fee structure, net asset size, new sales
relative to increased performance, and current market conditions indi-
cate that the adviser will gain more from favoring a particular fund, the
independent directors should scrutinize with particular care the fairness
of the adviser's treatment of the other funds.
1. Assuring an Opportunity for Performance
Most shareholders invest in a particular fund because of its ad-
viser's reputation for performance measured by the fund's objective.Y5
223 The most complete performance comparisons are published in the monthly
periodicals Fundscope and Insight by Arthur Lipper Services, Inc., of New York
City. The criteria for comparisons adjusted for risk are discussed in I. FRIEND,
M. BLUmE & J. CROcKETT, MUTUAL FUNDS AND OTHER INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS:
A NEW PERSPEcTvE 54-55 (1970), and in SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY
REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at xiv (1971).
224 See Glazer, supra note 74.
225 The Wharton Report found a positive relationship between a fund's perform-
ance and new sales. Both the volume and consistency of fund sales were affected by
its performance over several years. WHARTON REPORT, supra note 12, at 343-44.
The relationship between performance and the inflow of new money has increased
since that publication. See I. FRIEND, M. BLUME & J. CROcKETT, supra note 223,
at 13.
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The quality of the adviser's service is thus judged in part by the fund's
ability to achieve its objective relative to either its past performance, a
market index, or the performance of like equity investments. 226 The
independent directors should begin to evaluate the adviser's service by
comparing each fund's achievement of its objective against a selection
of comparable investment companies with like objective and risk. They
should then compare the performance of each fund against the other
funds in the complex. When presenting comparisons, the adviser should
point out the criteria for selection and the method of reporting invest-
ment results. This can be simplified by using a recognized tabulation
such as that published by Arthur Wiesenberger or Arthur Lipper
Services. T If similar adjustments for objective and volatility can be
made, nonfund advisory assets managed by the fund's adviser or others
in the industry can provide meaningful comparisons. For example, a
conservative income fund's performance might be compared with a
pension or endowment account, or a capital appreciation fund compared
with an aggressive hedge fund so long as both entities employ similar
investment techniques, such as leveraging or short sales.228 In most
instances, however, a combination of these comparisons will be neces-
sary to reflect performance adequately. The adviser's performance re-
ports should cover the most recent period or portion thereof for which
published data is available as well as the preceding three and five year
periods.
Performance comparisons, however, do not fully portray the quality
of an adviser's service. Adverse performance may not be symptomatic
of either the adviser's inattentiveness or its preference for other funds
in the group. Nonetheless, the independent dirctors should be alert for
consistently low performance patterns developing over several quarters.
They should pay particular attention if one fund in the complex per-
forms poorly but the other funds compare favorably with funds of like
objectives. This pattern may indicate either a weakness in the adviser's
ability to manage a particular type of fund or receipt of less than a fair
share of investment opportunities.
If the independent directors are satisfied with the funds' perform-
ances, they can generally assume that the quality of the adviser's service
226 See Mundheim, stpra note 177, at 1063-64.
227FuNDSCOPE, INSIGHT (Arthur Lipper Services, Inc.); MUTUAL FUND
PANORAMA (Arthur Wiesenberger Services, Inc.). Forbes also publishes annual
performance figures and rates various funds against the Standard & Poor's 500 Stock
Average. Mutual Fund Ratings-1971: 519 Funds Covered, FoRBsS, Aug. 15, 1971,
at 51-68.
228 Developing meaningful comparisons is difficult because the services provided
non-fund accounts were frequently quite different from those provided the funds.
See PUBLIc POLICY REPORT, supra note 3, at 90-92.
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warrants continuation of the contract. The significant problems arise
if one or all of the funds show unsatisfactory performance over several
comparison periods. When a pattern of poor performance develops,
the independent directors should ask the adviser for an explanation.
If the performance comparisons accurately reflect the fund's rate of
return adjusted for risk, such factors as size or adverse market condi-
tions should not explain poor performance. For example, a large
balanced fund's rate of return may be only half that of a smaller growth
fund, but the risk of loss in the large fund is only a fourth as great as in
the growth fund. Thus, the large fund has a better risk-adjusted per-
formance. Some advisers insist that a very large fund cannot be ex-
pected to perform as well as smaller funds with the same objective
because the large fund cannot take meaningful positions in smaller,
aggressive companies. 2" But exactly why size should justify poor per-
formance is unclear. The investor certainly receives no consolation
from the fact that the larger fund may expose his dollars to less risk
when the most reliable measures of performance compensate for this
factor in arriving at comparisons.
If the independent directors are not satisfied with the adviser's
explanations, they should make further inquiry before deciding to con-
tinue the contract. The questions which then arise are: (1) What re-
ports should they request and evaluate? (2) Should the directors
attempt to secure further information from sources other than the
adviser? (3) Will additional staff help, such as a management con-
sultant, be necessary? (4) At what point should the directors refuse to
renew the contract? If the independent directors are not convinced by
the adviser's explanation of the fund's poor performance, they should
focus particular attention on four reports that they should have re-
ceived during the year. First, at least annually they should have received
a report on the internal operations of the adviser's staff presenting a
structural outline of the personnel assigned to each fund, the flow of
research information to each portfolio decisionmaker, and the trader's
policy for allocating limited quantities of securities requested by several
funds. ° They should begin their review of the investment manage-
ment process by asking the adviser to explain changes in its operational
structure for the past year. If not satisfied that these changes will en-
hance future performance, the independent directors should ask to speak
with the fund's portfolio manager. If the portfolio manager serves a
229 The SEC in 1966 found no relationship between fund size and performance.
Id. 263. The most recent study of mutual fund performance also concluded that
"there does not seem to be any consistent relationship between size and performance."
I. FRIEND, M. BLUME & J. CROCKETT, supra note 223, at 60.
230 Cf. text accompanying notes 237-40 infra.
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single fund and his compensation is tied to its performance,3 1 he can be
expected to be an effective advocate for the fund." 2 The independent
directors' inquiry should be directed not toward his investment philos-
ophy but toward his possible complaints about the ways in which re-
search materials are communicated, authorizations are executed, and
pooled brokerage is allocated to secure research for the fund. If one
portfolio manager serves several funds or lacks final discretion over
fund investments, the independent directors must assume the responsi-
bility for analyzing the investment management process. This burden,
however, could be delegated to fund counsel, who need not be experts
in adviser operations, but in time will become sufficiently familiar with
the process to assure the directors that it is fair to each fund.
The second report the directors should request is an explanation
of the fund's investment strategy for the past year and changes
anticipated for the coming one. Although the directors should not
become involved in the selection of individual investments for the
fund's portfolio, they do have a role in defining the fund's invest-
ment strategy. Because investment objectives cannot be changed with-
out shareholder approval,2 most prospectuses state the fund's ob-
jective in terms broad enough to permit nearly any combination of
securities whose composite volatility reflects a generally understood level
of risk. The independent directors' function in narrowing such broad
objectives as placing investments in "industries and companies which
have particularly favorable long-term prospects for appreciation in
value, based on increased earnings and dividends," 234 is twofold. First,
they should ask the portfolio manager or investment committee how the
stated ratios of cash, equity and debt securities, or industry groups fit
within the fund's objective.2" The independent directors do not have
sufficient expertise to develop limits on how fund assets should be
invested but do have the responsibility to see that the adviser's invest-
ment strategy is consistent with the goals of most shareholders.
Second, whenever a new portfolio manager is hired for the fund or its
investment committee is restructured, the independent directors should
231 See generally Ellis, To Get Performance Yozu Have to Be Organized For It,
INST. Ii v., Jan. 1968, at 44, 70.
232 The portfolio manager, however, is still an employee of the adviser. The
degree of his advocacy for a particular fund may depend upon whether the adviser
believes better performance will be achieved by promoting a spirit of competitiveness
or cooperation among the portfolio managers.
233 15 U.S.C. §80a-13(a) (1970).
234Windsor Fund, Inc., Prospectus 1 (revised ed. May 1, 1970).
235 The fund's portfolio manager usually attends the monthly directors' meeting
and should be asked to explain how each addition to the fund's portfolio fits within
its stated objectives. When the contract is reviewed, only the broad objectives
need to be considered.
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ask for a report on how the new decisionmaker will change existing
investment strategy. Frequently a fund's objective reflects the invest-
ment philosophy or style of its portfolio manager.23 6  Here the di-
rectors' role is similarly limited to an evaluation of whether changes in
investment strategy are consistent with the fund's objective. They
should not attempt to second-guess professional management's selection
of the portfolio companies, absent particular expertise in an investment
area or knowledge of a recommended company.
One consequence of a fund's participation in a complex is that its
orders or authorizations may compete with those of other funds or non-
fund accounts in the group. If the adviser's trading department cannot
acquire or sell sufficient quantities of the stock to satisfy each order, or
by executing a series of trades adversely affects the market price, the
fund's performance may suffer. Consistently low performance by one
fund while the others perform well may indicate that the adviser's policy
for allocating the opportunity to buy or sell a limited quantity of the
same security discriminates unfairly against that fund.
In most complexes the adviser has adopted a policy directing the
trader's allocation of investment opportunities. This is the third matter
the independent directors should request and review." 7 The typical
formula allows each fund daily purchases or sales based on the ratio of
the fund's authorization to the total authorizations of all funds." 8 This
formula, however, may cause a fund to forego lower brokerage com-
missions because none of its small orders over several days qualify for
the discount usually afforded orders over $500,000.239 To take ad-
vantage of these new, negotiated commissions, the adviser might per-
mit execution of authorizations over $500,000 on a sequential basis,
rotating the opportunity to trade first among the funds. Some advisers
have also instructed their traders to "bunch" the orders of two or more
funds to take advantage of negotiated commission rates. For example,
236 See Ellis, supra note 231.
237 Form N-1R, see note 6 supra, asks that the adviser state this policy, suggest-
ing that the SEC believes an allocation policy necessary.
238A typical allocation formula provides:
It sometimes happens that two or more of the funds for which the
Adviser acts as investment adviser, such as funds with similar investment
objectives, policies and restrictions, simultaneously purchase or sell the same
portfolio security. When this occurs, each day's transactions in such
security are, insofar as possible, averaged as to price and allocated between
such funds in accordance with the total amount of such security being pur-
chased or sold by each of such funds.
The Putnam Income Fund, Inc., Prospectus 3 (Feb. 22, 1971).
239 At the urging of the SEC, the Board of Governors of the New York Stock
Exchange approved on April 1, 1971, an amendment to the Exchange's constitution
permitting firms to negotiate commissions on portions of orders in excess of $500,000.
For a complete discussion of the views of the Board of Governors and the SEC, see
BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP., No. 96, M-1 to 0-2 (Apr. 7, 1971).
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if Fund A authorizes the purchase of $400,000 of IBM stock and
Fund B simultaneously authorizes $200,000 of the same stock, the
trader will execute a single trade. The first $500,000 will come within
the lower competitive rates and the remaining $100,000 at minimum
commission rates. The funds' custodian will receive and allocate the
total authorization.
The independent directors must ensure that the adviser's allocation
policy is fair to each fund in the complex and that the stated policy is
followed in practice. The independent directors should first check
whether the adviser has greater self-interest in a particular fund manifest
in the allocation formula. Several advisers insist that the allocation
problem is more apparent than real. While admitting that fund ob-
jectives often overlap, 40 they contend that differences in fund size and
the limits portfolio managers place on their authorizations mitigate any
potential for unfairness. A large fund cannot take a small position in
a security if the impact on performance is to be meaningful, and a small
fund cannot take a large position without either substantially affecting
its portfolio's composition and volatility or violating the 1940 Act pro-
hibition against investing more than five percent of the fund's assets in
any one company's stock.241 In addition, advisers contend that orders
are often qualified by limits which effectively prevent any competition
for the same security. For example, Growth Fund's portfolio manager
may authorize the purchase of 5000 shares of X Company as quickly as
possible, regardless of price. Income Fund may order the same number
of X Company shares but only if the trade can be executed at 35 or
less, with a single day's purchases limited to 1000 shares and the entire
order completed within 30 days of the authorization. Moreover, ad-
visers insist that investment research is but a highly technical estimate
of performance, and analysts will seldom agree on a "sure bet." Finally,
adviser officials argue that they have no greater interest in one fund
than in others because their reputations are founded upon the ability
of all of their funds to perform well. These arguments are persuasive
but do not undercut the necessity for an allocation policy which elim-
inates any potential for questionable allocation.
The independent directors can only check compliance with the
stated allocation formula by detecting a pattern of discrimination. 24
By selecting several allocations each month and applying the formula,
the independent directors can see if a disproportionate share of the
240 See, e.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc., Prospectus 5 (Apr. 24, 1970).
24115 U.S.C. §80a-12(d) (1970).
2 42 The monthly portfolio additions and deletions reports can be cross-checked
more easily by the independent directors if all of the funds' transactions in a security
are listed together.
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more highly recommended investments find their way into the portfolio
of a particular fund.
The fourth report the independent directors should request is a
list of the brokers through whom fund portfolio business has been
channeled. How the adviser's reciprocal business arrangements can
affect the fund's performance will be discussed in a following section.
It is only important here to note that the allocation of portfolio business
may be reflected in the fund's cash flow, size, and availability of outside
research, all of which may in turn influence performance.
If none of these reports shows a causal link between poor perform-
ance and the adviser's arrangements for investment advice, the inde-
pendent directors should make two further inquiries. First, they should
consider the depth of the adviser's staff assigned to a particular fund.
The quality of the adviser's service may well depend upon both the
number and the experience of analysts and portfolio managers who
manage fund investments. Although the directors are not in a position
to pass upon the quality of the second-level staff, they should recognize
that as a fund grows additional personnel may be required. In addi-
tion, the fund's performance may be closely linked to the ability of a
particular individual. The independent directors should know what
arrangements the adviser has made to replace such key individuals.
The independent directors cannot evaluate all of these reports at a
single meeting even with the help of separate fund counsel. Thus, much
of this information should be presented during the year and only a
synopsis of monthly reports discussed at the meeting called to renew
the contract. In most cases, monthly performance comparisons will
permit each independent director to formulate before the meeting an
opinion whether the quality of the adviser's service warrants continu-
ation of the contract. If performance is unsatisfactory, and the inde-
pendent directors can specify the problem with particularity, they can
request help from a management consultant. This course of action may
cause hostility between the adviser and directors and should only be
considered when they have reached the point of refusing to renew the
contract unless dramatic changes in adviser practices are forthcoming.
2. Evaluating the Reasonableness of the Fee
After satisfying themselves that the arrangements for providing
investment advice offer each fund an equal opportunity for performance,
the independent directors should determine whether the fee is reason-
able. Reasonableness implies that the fund is participating in the econ-
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omies of scale inherent in the complex form of organization.143  Thus,
the key elements of this evaluation are the costs incurred to manage the
funds, the advisers' direct and indirect compensation from the entire
complex, and a profit reflecting not only the cost but the value of these
services.244 If the fee is later challenged as a breach of the adviser's
fiduciary duty, the weight a court gives this approval will depend on
the objectivity with which information regarding the fee was presented
and explained to the independent directors.245
a. Costs Incurred in Managing the Fund
Most advisory contracts offer a package of investment advisory
and administrative services representing the major operating expenses
of the fund.24 In a few complexes, the fund enters two contracts with
the adviser: 247 an advisory contract covering research and investment
advisory services, and a management services contract covering the
administrative and shareholder accounting functions performed by the
adviser.24 The advisory fee paid by a particular fund cannot be readily
compared with the fees of similar funds for two reasons. First, the
adviser may assume such expenses as fund office space or shareholder
recordkeeping, or the fund may pay them directly. Second, the fee is
nearly always stated as a percentage of net assets rather than as a com-
pilation of individual charges for the distinct services offered the fund.
Because the industry does not volunteer, nor the SEC specifically re-
quire, a breakdown of the advisory fee, the independent directors cannot
compare, for example, the investment advisory or shareholder account-
ing fees paid by comparable funds. Such a breakdown would facilitate
the directors' evaluation of the adviser's compensation, but until this
information becomes publicly available, the independent directors should
require a breakdown of the advisory fee as part of their evaluation of its
reasonableness.
Most of the expenses assumed by the adviser are incurred jointly
for all the funds and accounts in the complex. For example, research
243 See PUBLIC POLICY REPORT, .upra note 3, at 94-96; WHARTON ZEPORT,
supra note 12, at 503.
244 Cf. note 35 supra.
245 See text accompanying notes 88-97 supra.
246 Brokerage commissions are not paid out of the advisory fee but directly out
of fund assets. Brokerage is typically considered not an operating expense but a
capital expenditure reflected in the fund's overall performance. See PUBLIC POLICY
REPoRT, supra note 3, at 90.
247 For a more complete description of the variety of contractual arrangements,
see id. 90-94.
248 In addition to an advisory fee, several funds pay an administrative fee based
upon a percentage of the fund's average net assets for the year. This fee typically
covers non-advisory services such as shareholder accounting and custodian services
performed or paid by the adviser. Id. 92.
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is nearly always performed collectively, 49 and the salaries of traders
and administrative personnel are paid by the adviser.2 50  In addition,
the adviser can purchase shareholder accounting services 251 and pay
legal and printing fees at savings reflecting volume discounts. In this
way the adviser and the funds benefit from the economies of a complex.
When expenses are incurred jointly, however, the portion of the ex-
pense benefiting a particular fund is not directly ascertainable. And, if
the fee is not broken down into readily identifiable costs, the independent
directors have no way of knowing whether the adviser is passing on
part of the economies of the complex to their fund. In addition, they
cannot know if the fund's advisory fee encompasses expenses that should
be covered under the underwriting contract, or expenses that the fund
should not bear either because they were not contemplated by the ad-
visory contract or because they are properly allocable to other funds
in the complex.
The independent directors should request a cost breakdown of each
service included in the advisory fee. Most advisers already compile
such information for internal audits of each fund's expenses. 252  With
this information, the independent directors must then determine whether
the adviser's allocation of each expense accurately reflects the costs of
providing that service to the fund, and whether the expense of operating
the complex accurately reflects the combined fees paid by all the funds.
Most advisers have developed formulas for allocating the different col-
lective expenses, and not only the formula but the criteria upon which
it was devised should be made available to the directors. For example,
the formula for investment analysis expenses is usually based upon the
relative net asset values of the various funds.2 This formula may not
be appropriate, however, for such expenses as shareholder accounting
and prospectus and annual report preparation2 5 By weighing each of
the formulas, and their application during the past year, the directors
can determine whether the fund is paying an appropriate share of the
common expenses.
249 Id. 47.
250 Id. 46.
251 Administrative and shareholder accounting services can be purchased from
such organizations as Investment Companies Services Corporation or the State Street
Bank of Boston. See Glazer, supra note 74, at 262 n273.
252 Early drafts of the 1970 Amendments would have required that the directors
be given a breakdown of the advisory fee by expense category. See note 66 supra.
Most directors do get at least a partial breakdown. MUTuAL FumNs 312-13 (Prac-
tising Law Institute 1970) (remarks of General Counsel David Silver, Investment
Company Institute).
253 For a discussion of the development and implementation of formulas for
allocating fund expenses, see Glazer, supra note 74, at 265-68.
254 See id. 266-67.
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The independent directors should also compare the investment
advisory expenses charged the non-fund clients of the adviser. If these
fees are lower than those charged the fund, the directors should ask for
an explanation. Although the services provided pension, endowment,
or individual accounts may differ,25 these fees are arrived at through
arm's-1ength bargaining and offer significant comparisons.2 56
b. The Adviser's Direct and Indirect Income
The adviser's income, for purposes of determining a reasonable
management fee, can be accurately estimated by checking two sources.
The first, direct income from the funds, is easily ascertainable by com-
bining the various advisory fees. The second, indirect income received
either as the profits of the adviser's broker affiliate attributable to fund
business or in the form of services for placing fund portfolio brokerage,
is more difficult to evaluate. If the adviser has a wholly-owned broker-
age subsidiary which acted as soliciting broker in a takeover or received
commissions or clearance fees, 57 these profits of the broker affiliate
should also be taken into account. The adviser may also have received
research information or sales promotion from brokers with whom it
placed fund trades.255 The directors should attempt to place a value on
these services to reflect the money saved by the adviser's not having to
purchase them. The question here is not whether in either the broker-
affiliate or services context this income could be recaptured for the fund,
but simply how much income it represents to the adviser. One approach
to valuing this research may be to consider the cost of equivalent re-
search purchased with cash from these brokers or from "research
houses"-firms that offer only investment analysis and not market
executions.
The independent directors should also ask for the adviser's profit-
and-loss record for the preceding year. Some advisers argue that their
profit-and-loss statement is not "reasonably necessary to evaluate the
255 See WHARToN REPORT, supra note 12, at 490-91.
256 The Wharton Report concluded that:
The principal reason for the difference in rates charged open-end companies
and other clients appears to be that with the latter group "a normal procedure
in negotiating a fee is to arrive at a fixed fee which is mutually acceptable."
In the case of fees charged open-end companies, they are typically fixed by
essentially the same persons who receive the fees, although in theory the fees
are established by negotiation between independent representatives of separate
legal entities, and approved by democratic vote of the shareholders. This
suggests that competitive factors which tend to influence rates charged other
clients have not been substantially operative in fixing the advisory fee rates
paid by mutual funds.
Id. 493-94 (footnote deleted).
257 See text accompanying notes 326-34 infra.
25S See text accompanying notes 310-17 infra.
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contract" within the meaning of section 15(c).2' They contend that
when they contract for services the profitability to the other party is
never disclosed, and that their obligation to the fund is the same regard-
less of their profit margin. But both arguments are merely an ex-
tension of the pre-1970 Amendments position that, at least with regard
to fee negotiations, advisers were not fiduciaries. 6° Arm's-length bar-
gaining seldom occurs in the fund context, and the competitive forces
that shape the adviser's bargaining with others are not present in
advisory fee negotiation. Although funds pay an advisory fee that is
typically not broken down into individual prices, a high profit by the
adviser from managing the entire complex should lead to an examina-
tion of whether a single fund is sharing in the economies inherent in this
form of organization. A second indicator may be a comparison of the
expense ratios of similar funds belonging to other complexes assuming,
of course, that like services are included in these ratios.
Determination of a reasonable or fair profit should include three
elements: a comparison with other funds' expense ratios, an allowance
for assumption of entrepreneurial risk, and, most important, an evalua-
tion of the quality of the adviser's service. Although performance is
the primary gauge of effective management, cost is also an important
element. By comparing the expense ratios of the fund with those of the
funds used to test performance, the independent directors can determine
whether they are paying more or less for comparable value received by
funds in other complexes. The pitfall of emphasizing expense ratios is
that it often develops into a cost-plus philosophy of reasonable return, an
approach which rewards the expensive, inefficient adviser."
c. The Rewards for Entrepreneurial Risk
Most advisers contend that a reasonable profit must include a
reward for entrepreneurial risk if the industry is to attract the personnel
and capital necessary for maintaining the quality of investment advice,
continuing the industry's growth, and encouraging new funds to com-
pete through different objectives and investment techniques. This ele-
ment of profit was recently considered in Rosenfeld v. Black.262 As
discussed above, the plaintiff argued that the payment in stock receivable
by Lazard when its former shareholders approved the advisory contract
259 See also Mundheim, supra note 177, at 1067.
260 See University of Pennsylvania Law School, Conference on Mutual Funds,
115 U. PA. L. Rv. 662, 745 (1967) (remarks of Alfred Jaretzki, Jr.).
261 A large profit margin may reflect very efficient management. To reduce the
profit margin of an adviser who has consistently kept the fund's expense ratio low
would be to penalize efficient, conscientious management.
262445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971).
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with Moody's A & D was not consideration for the series of agreements
merging the Lazard Fund into Moody's Capital, but compensation
for Lazard's assistance in securing appointment of Moody's A & D as
investment adviser and the profits anticipated from this position. -03 The
district court found no evidence to support this claim but chose to rest
its summary judgment for the defendants on the automatic termination
on assignment provision of section 15 (a). District Judge Mansfield
ruled that:
Where (as here) a majority of the stockholders approve
a new advisory contract, as they are empowered to do by
15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (a), the management's conduct in arrang-
ing such a substitution does not violate the Act, regardless how
it is labelled.264
This decision relied upon the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in SEC v.
Insurance Securities, Inc., which held that section 15 (a) was directed
not at the money received by the former adviser but at a transfer of
control without shareholder consent.265
The Rosenfeld district court opinion was reversed by the Second
Circuit in a decision by Judge Friendly. 66 Beginning from the "well-
established" principle of equity that a fiduciary cannot sell his office for
personal gain, the court reasoned that because the adviser stood in a
fiduciary relationship, the receipt of profit derived from influencing the
selection of its successor was a violation of this relationship. The court
noted that:
A fiduciary endeavoring to influence the selection of a suc-
cessor must do so with an eye single to the best interests of
the beneficiaries. Experience has taught that, no matter how
highminded a particular fiduciary may be, the only certain way
to insure full compliance with that duty is to eliminate any
possibility of personal gain.
. . . If Lazard did not wish to continue as adviser and
chose to recommend a successor and assist in the latter's in-
stallation, it was obliged to forego personal gain from the
change of office, no matter how deeply or rightly it was con-
vinced it had made the best possible choice.26 7
To Lazard's contention that there could be no sale of fiduciary
office because the contract automatically terminated on assignment,
263 See notes 122-24 supra & accompanying text.
264 319 F. Supp. 891, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
265 254 F.2d 642, 649 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958).
266 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971).
267 Id. at 1342-43 (footnote omitted).
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Judge Friendly responded that as organizer of the fund and controller
of the proxy machinery, Lazard was in a position to influence the
shareholders' appointment of a new adviser. Nonassignability of the
contract, he reasoned, simply underscored the fact that payments to an
outgoing adviser represent compensation for using its influence to
secure shareholder approval of a new adviser that anticipates profit from
this relationship. The Ninth Circuit's decision in SEC v. Insurance
Securities, Inc., (ISI) was distinguished by the court both upon its
facts and upon the section of the 1940 Act under which the action was
brought. In ISI the SEC unsuccessfully challenged the sale of adviser
stock by a controlling group of shareholders to a new controlling group
at a price twenty-five times its book value. The SEC alleged that,
despite shareholder approval, this transaction constituted a "gross abuse
of trust" as then provided in section 36 of the Act. This allegation, in
Judge Friendly's view, was readily distinguishable from those in
Rosenfeld because the former section 36 standard was "addressed to
highly reprehensible conduct [and] we would not dream of suggesting,
much less holding, that Lazard's actions were so culpable." 268 Al-
though noting that in the Ninth Circuit's opinion none of the price in
excess of book value received by the outgoing controlling group was
recoverable under any circumstances by the fund, he concluded:
While we do not find it necessary at this time to determine
whether the difference between a transaction such as that
here before us and the sale of a controlling block in a corpo-
rate adviser at a price reflecting the expectations of profit
under a renewed contract with the corporation which the
sellers were to aid in procuring, is sufficiently substantial to
warrant a different result in this latter case, we should not
wish to be understood as accepting these broad views." 9
Implicit in this language is the suggestion that a sale of a control-
ling block of adviser stock, at a price in excess of the value of the
adviser's tangible assets plus some amount representing the value of the
adviser's expertise absent a contractual relationship with the fund, may
make the recipients liable to the fund. This suggestion has very sig-
nificant implications not only for the founders of investment advisory
firms who may be locked to their companies but also for the shareholders
of advisers whose stock is publicly traded'7 0 The most important im-
plication in the advisory fee context, however, may be that the inde-
268Id. at 1346.
269 Id. (footnotes omitted).
270 In 1966 the SEC found that the securities of approximately 20 fund advisers
were publicly held. PuBlic PoLIc" REPorT, supra note 3, at 46. The number of
publicly held advisers is probably greater today.
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pendent directors can no longer approve an advisory fee that includes
compensation for entrepreneurial risk.
Earlier in his opinion Judge Friendly had questioned, but had not
decided, whether, even assuming the D & B-Lazard stock transfer had
been fully disclosed to the shareholders, they or the independent di-
rectors could have approved the transaction. 1 Put more simply, pay-
ment to an outgoing adviser is so fundamentally unfair to the fund that
it could not be a sound business judgment for the independent directors
to approve it. The fund had received no benefit from the D & B-
Lazard stock transfer; Moody's A & D would presumably have been
even more willing to advise the Capital Fund without paying Lazard
for its influence. Indeed, the independent directors of the Fund might
have negotiated a lower fee with Moody's A & D because, if it was will-
ing to pay Lazard, it would in all likelihood have been willing to make
the same concession to the fund.
The conclusion that the Lazard-D & B agreement was so unfair
that it could not be approved by the independent directors does not
necessarily mean that they could not approve a renewed advisory con-
tract at the same fee rate after a sale to a new controlling group of the
adviser or that the previous advisory fee was excessive. The distinction
lies in the fact that if the adviser organization continues to manage the
fund, the fund is benefited because it does not have to accept an adviser
whose satisfactory management had not been proven by advising the
fund. In the ISI case, this benefit, a form of "good will," was held to
be an asset of the adviser, not the fund. 2 If the former chief executive
officer of the adviser, its portfolio managers, research analysts, and ad-
ministrative personnel continue to serve the funds after the transaction,
the directors can exercise sound business judgment in approving a fee
that is not reduced by the amount in the excess of the tangible asset
value plus the value of the adviser's organization absent the contract
received by the selling shareholders. Here the contract cannot be char-
acterized as unfair to the funds.
This conclusion also implies that in the usual contract renewal the
independent directors can consider entrepreneurial risk although the
rationale is somewhat different and the amount in question will be sub-
stantially less. The adviser typically sustains a loss when starting a
new fund or group of funds and must recoup these losses through its
profit margin in later years. Although these losses cannot be consid-
ered after they have been recouped, they can be an element of a reason-
able profit. Some advisers have created funds through an initial public
271 445 F.2d at 1343.
272254 F.2d 642, 650-51 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958).
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offering and almost immediately generated a net asset base sufficient to
assure a reasonable profit. If this technique becomes prevalent, the
independent directors should not reward an adviser who does not or
cannot employ these techniques, and who thus sustains initial losses, by
returning these losses in the form of a higher advisory fee.
d. The Quality of the Adviser's Services
The final element of a reasonable advisory fee is an evaluation of
the quality of the adviser's service. If performance of the fund has been
superior, a greater profit acts as an additional incentive.2" There is no
reason to assume that the best performing fund should not have the
highest paid adviser so long as its expense ratio remains comparable to
those of similar funds.
The independent directors should not, however, approve an ad-
visory fee including as an element of profit a subsidy for losses sustained
in the adviser's selling. Regardless whether the adviser distributes fund
shares through broker-dealers or its own retail selling network, the
underwriting function is frequently unprofitable. To rescue this part
of its operation from red figures, the adviser may seek a corresponding
increase in the advisory fee. If the independent directors are presented
a package of services that is not broken down into individual charges,
this added compensation can easily be disguised. This "bundling prac-
tice" may place the cost of the selling effort on existing shareholders in
violation of charter provisions requiring all sales at full net asset
value." 4 The independent directors should request a breakdown of
each expense under the advisory contract to prevent this subsidization.
3. Structuring the Fee
Until recently, a majority of the largest funds and nearly all of the
smaller funds paid a flat fee, a fixed percentage charged against the net
assets under management, regardless of the fund's size or objectives.
The Wharton Report and the SEC's Public Policy Report criticized
the customary one-half of one percent fee for failing to reflect the econo-
mies of managing greater assets.2  In addition, a flat fee may not
provide sufficient incentive to advisers who incur greater cost and
273 Because performance spurs new sales, which increase the fund's net assets
and thereby increase the advisory fee, additional incentives may be unnecessary, even
assuming a relationship between the size of the fee and performance. See note 225
supra.
274 See notes 98-112 supra & accompanying text (discussion of Moses v. Burgin).
275 In 1960, 13 of the largest 20 mutual funds charged a flat fee; by 1965 the
number had dropped to 3. WHiARTON REPoRT, supra note 12, at 28-29, 480-81;
PUBLIC POLICY REPORT, supra note 3, at 11, 97-100.
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thereby risk more of their capital by managing funds with aggressive
objectives.
276
Usually the adviser's cost of managing a second $50 million is
less than that of the first2 77 A flat fee does not permit a fund to share
in these economies because the charge per dollar under management
remains the same . 7  Thus, some complexes have adopted a scaled-down
fee: for example, 0.5 of one percent on the first $150 million, 0.4 of
one percent on the next $150 million, 0.36 of one percent on assets be-
tween $300 and $600 million, 0.33% of one percent on all additional
net assetsY.2 9 The independent directors must structure the fee for each
fund to permit it to share proportionately in these economies. For
example, if the first break point is set at $150 million, a small
fund may never realize any benefit from being part of the complex.
This problem can be eliminated either by lowering the break point for
smaller funds or by charging each fund that portion of the total fee
which its net assets represent in the entire complex. For example, if
Fund A has $100 million in net assets, Fund B $200 million, and Fund
C $300 million, and the total fee is $12 million, Fund A would pay $2
million, Fund B $4 million, and Fund C $6 million. The "whole com-
plex" approach still charges each dollar under management equally but
permits all the funds to share in the savings.
Many funds have recently adopted a performance fee, a propor-
tionate increase or decrease in the advisory fee based on the fund's
performance. A typical performance fee arrangement charges the fund:
a basic fee of % of 1% (annually % of 1%7) of the Fund's
average month-end net asset value for the quarter, subject to
a decrease of %2 of 1% quarterly (annually % of 1%) if the
Fund's investment performance for the twelve months preced-
ing the end of the quarter is two percentage points or more
below that of the Dow-Jones Industrial Stock Average and
subject to an increase of %2 of 17 quarterly (annually % of
1%) if the Fund's investment performance for the twleve
months preceding the end of the quarter exceeds that of the
Dow-Jones Industrial Stock Average by two percentage points
or more. Under this formula, the total annual management
fee may vary from a minimum of 3Y of 1% to a maximum of
276 Cf. WHiARTON REPORT, supra note 12, at 492.
277 The Wharton Report concluded that:
[T]he decline in operating ratios is much more rapid in cases where invest-
ment company assets alone are managed. In that type class of advisers the
operating ratio declines by some 32.7 percentage points between the $10 to
$50 million asset size class and the largest size class of assets, those in excess
of $600 million.
Id. 503.
278 Id. 30.
279 See, e.g., American Mutual Fund, Inc., Prospectus 3 (Feb. 24, 1971).
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8 of 1% of average net assets depending on the Fund's in-
vestment performance. 8 °
The 1970 Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
eliminate the one-way street that gave advisers a bonus if they out-
performed a specific index but exacted no penalty if performance fell
below the index. 8' But the 1970 Amendments leave much for the
independent directors and fund counsel to consider before approving a
performance fee structure. First, they should consider whether an addi-
tional performance factor is necessary or a built-in incentive-tying
adviser compensation to increases in net assets-is sufficient. They
should also realize that an incentive fee, unless adequately adjusted for
risk, may encourage investments of a more speculative nature. Second,
they must select an index offering a fair standard for comparison. For
example, the thirty common stocks included in the Dow-Jones average
are usually high-grade industrial stocks with composite performance
that may be an objective indicator but too conservative an index to be
used in judging the performance of an aggressive capital appreciation
fund. The independent directors should ask the adviser to prepare a
chart comparing the fund's performance against several market indexes.
If, for example, the fund would have outperformed a given index in
eighteen of the past twenty quarters, the directors might well conclude
that the index offers too low a standard. Third, the independent
directors should be aware that a performance fee, unless uniformly ap-
plied to all of the funds in a complex and properly adjusted for risk,
might encourage the adviser to favor one fund over another, thus de-
stroying an important element of the community of interest that should
exist among the funds and the adviser.
4. Summary of Independent Director Responsibilities in
Approving the Advisory Contract
The independent directors' determination whether to continue the
existing arrangements for investment advice should be based upon in-
formation received throughout the year. Reports covering the organi-
280 Ivest Fund, Inc., Prospectus 3-4 (Jan. 1, 1971).
281 The 1970 Amendments deleted the exemption of investment advisory contracts
from the prohibitions of § 205 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Congress
also amended § 205 to prohibit any performance fee arrangement unless it:
provides for compensation based on the asset value of the company or fund
under management averaged over a specified period and increasing and de-
creasing proportionately with the investment performance of the company or
fund over a specified period in relation to the investment record of an appro-
priate index of securities prices or such other measure of investment per-
formance as the Commission by rule, regulation, or order may specify.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1970).
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zational structure of the adviser, and its policy for allocating income
and expenses and assigning fund portfolio business should be presented
by the adviser at monthly meetings. The information given the inde-
pendent directors before contract renewal should be limited to perform-
ance comparisons, service and expense breakdowns, comparisons of
expense ratios, and profit-and-loss computations for the adviser. Spe-
cifically, the independent directors should receive:
1. A comparison of the fund's performance with that of similar
funds during the past year. These statistics can be taken directly from
Arthur Wiesenberger's Panorama or the Arthur Lipper Services.282 In
both instances, funds are categorized by objective, size, and volatility,
and the criteria for selection are adequately explained. The fund's per-
formance should also be compared with the Dow-Jones, Standard &
Poor's, or New York Stock Exchange index, and with the ability of
other funds in the group to compare favorably in their respective
categories.
2. A breakdown of the services provided under the contract and
the adviser's policy for allocating income and expenses among the funds.
The statement of a certified public accountant that these policies con-
form to acceptable accounting practices for equitable allocation of ex-
penses should accompany this report.
3. A description and tabulation of the advisory fees and the expense
ratios of the funds against which the fund's performance has been com-
pared. If similar comparisons are available for pension, endowment,
or private counseling accounts, these statistics should also be given to
the independent directors. If the fund has a performance fee, a de-
scription of the fee structure and rate paid by other funds with similar
incentives should be presented. Finally, a graph showing the expense
ratio and advisory fee for each fund in the complex may be more mean-
ingful than the statistics alone.
4. A consolidated balance sheet and profit-and-loss statement for
the adviser's total operations. If the adviser breaks down its profit by
individual fund or advisory account for internal accounting purposes,
these figures should also be disclosed.
5. The advisory and management services contracts for all the
funds in the complex. In addition, the fee structures and descriptions
of services rendered nonfund accounts should be presented.
After the affiliated directors have explained this information, the
independent directors should meet separately to consider their approval.
282 MUTUAL FUNDS PANORAMA (Arthur Wiesenberger, pub. 1970) ; IbWSTmwT
CompANIES- 1 9 70 (Arthur Lipper, pub. 1970).
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Although in most instances the board acts as a whole, here a separate
meeting of the independent directors seems appropriate. The 1940 Act
requires approval by a majority vote of the independent directors to
approve the contract,2" and the 1970 Amendments further require that
the vote be taken in person at a meeting called specifically for this pur-
pose.2" 4 The independent directors may be hesitant to undertake a
critical analysis of the proposed contract in the presence of affiliated
directors who are closely related to the adviser. But if their decision
is to be one of substance, the disclosure of information alone is insuf-
ficient. The Act contemplates an evaluation of this information un-
influenced by the adviser. At the board's monthly meetings, the con-
tinuing review of fund management can take place with the entire board
present, but, when the independent directors meet to go over the pro-
posed contract, only their opinions on behalf of the shareholders should
be determinative. Although a separate meeting may not be required by
the 1940 Act, how the contract was approved is a circumstance which
a court will consider along with its fairness when determining the
weight to be given the independent directors' approval.2
If the independent directors conclude that the fund's performance
has been satisfactory and that the fee proposed is reasonable in light of
the quality of the adviser's service, they have no fiduciary obligation to
require a lower advisory fee. As fiduciaries, the directors have no obli-
gation to bargain for the least expensive investment advisory services
for the fund.2" 6 But if the fee is not reasonable in light of the fund's
performance, the independent directors should bargain for a lower fee
either by reducing the percentage charged against net assets, lowering
the break points, or asking the adviser to assume more of the fund
expenses.
If, however, the independent directors are convinced that the
present adviser cannot offer the funds a chance for good performance,
they should contact other investment advisory houses and solicit com-
peting offers to manage the fund's portfolio. This dramatic step should
not be undertaken without the professional help of, for example, a man-
agement consultant firm. Finding another adviser willing to assume
not only the investment advisory responsibilities, but also the adminis-
trative and sales responsibilities, of a fund that has a tarnished reputa-
tion is a task the directors should assume only as a last resort.
283 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1970).
284 Cf. 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 39.
285 See text accompanying notes 88-97 supra.
286 See generally Jaretzki, supra note 86, at 786.
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B. Approval of the Distribution Contract
Section 15(b) of the 1940 Act requires that the independent
directors renew the distribution contract with the fund's underwriter,
usually an affiliate of the adviser. This approval is typically given
almost as an afterthought at the meeting called to renew the advisory
contract.28 7  Most distribution agreements state only that the under-
writer will use its "best efforts" to find purchasers, a contractual carte
blanche to sell as many shares as possible so long as the selling practices
are lawful. The independent directors' willingness to give the adviser
such complete discretion is traceable to three assumptions. First, most
directors believe that continuous sales are necessary to offset redemp-
tions and that new sales cannot be successfully initiated whenever neces-
sary. Second, they believe that a positive cash flow is essential to
performance. Finally, they see their duty as extending only to existing
shareholders and not prospective purchasers. 8 ' Although each of these
assumptions is true to a degree, none is so axiomatic as to relieve
the directors from their obligation to review the adviser's arrangements
for selling fund shares.
The increase in net assets of most funds is attributable primarily
to a level of sales well in excess of redemptions. Indeed, between 1957
and 1965, the reinvestment of dividend income and capital gains by
existing shareholders alone offset more than half the outflow caused by
redemptions.2  The independent directors should recognize that the
adviser benefits directly from sales, because the advisory fee is based on
net assets that increase with sales, but the benefit to the fund of new
sales is indirect at best. If total assets under management increase,
a scaled-down fee may reduce the cost of management charged
against each dollar,"' and many portfolio managers believe a positive
cash flow improves performance.2 9 The absence of a positive correla-
tion between size and performance separates the adviser's interest from
that of the fund. -92 If cash flow were in fact so essential to performance,
the independent directors should see their fund's performance exceed that
of closed-end, dual-purpose, or exchange funds which have no continuous
cash flow. Possibly the best comparison is the performance of exchange
287 See Mundheim, supra note 177, at 1068-70.
288 Id.
289 PuBLIc POLIcY REPORT, supra note 3, at 204.
290 Fund growth generated by new sales may produce economies of scale not
only in investment advisory services but in custodial services, transfer agency services,
and administrative services. These economies, however, benefit only the adviser
unless the advisory fee scale-downs are accurately related to fund size. See id. 252-53.
291 See Glazer, supra note 74, at 253 n.222.
292 See note 229 supra.
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funds. They have no continuous cash inflow but must redeem their
shares at net asset value, yet they maintain performance records nearly
identical to open-end funds with similar objectives.293
Several advisers argue that even if sales cannot increase perform-
ance, a substantial outflow caused by net redemptions may impair their
ability to attract new personnel or even keep their key employees, as the
best analysts and portfolio managers want to be part of a dynamic,
growing organization 94 This argument is persuasive, but the inde-
pendent directors should remember that a very large fund may lose
flexibility and thus be unable to take meaningful positions in smaller
companies, and that a rapid influx of cash may have to stand idle until
sufficient opportunities for new investment can be found." 5  The inde-
pendent directors should be prepared to restrict or suspend sales if rapid
growth threatens either the quality of portfolio investments or the ad-
ministration of shareholder accounts.296 If the independent directors are
convinced that new growth in the fund will not be detrimental to exist-
ing shareholders, they may approve a continuous sales effort by the
adviser. After this determination, their role is limited to policing the
load the adviser charges and its selling practices and observing the
volume of redemptions; all three factors may reflect on the fund's repu-
tation and thus its ability to achieve new sales.
The underwriter's selling effort is financed in part by the "sales
load," usually 8.5 percent of the total price charged new investors for
fund shares."' Because sales charges apply to dividend and capital
gain reinvestments by existing shareholders, the independent directors
must decide whether these charges are excessive. To the investor, all
293 See Mutual Fund Ratings-1971: 519 Funds Covered, FORBEs, Aug. 15, 1971,
at 51.
294 The converse of this argument, that sales increase the adviser's compensation
and thus its ability to hire better analysis and portfolio managers, is very questionable.
There is no evidence that fund growth is reflected in better performance. See note
229 supra. See generally PUBLIC POLICY REPoRT, supra note 3, at 252, 255; Glazer,
supra note 74, at 253.
295 See, e.g., Fiske, Fidelity: The Problems of Success, INST. INV., Mar. 1969,
at 29; Mattlin, The Problems of Being the Enterprise Fund, INsT. I v., Mar. 1970,
at 25.
296 The directors of Rowe Price New Horizons Fund, Inc., voted to terminate
sales when the rapid inflow of new cash exceeded the supply of attractive investments.
The New Horizons Fund, in the best interest of its shareholders, sus-
pended sales of new shares to the general public in October, 1967. This
action followed a very rapid increase in subscriptions . . . . Fund assets
escalated from $26,000,000 in December, 1966, to over $104,000,000 only nine
months later . . . . With most of the stocks in the Fund's portfolio and new
candidates for investment selling at prices far above our buy limits, it was
simply impossible to invest the large flow of new money to advantage;
consequently, management restricted sale of new shares.
Undated letter to potential investors from Curran W. Harvey, President, Rowe Price
New Horizons Fund, Inc., copy on file Biddle Law Library, Univ. of Pa. Law School.
297 PUBLIC PoLicY REPORT, supra note 3, at 204.
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charges are costs of securing investment management and therefore
within the unique responsibility of the independent directors. In addi-
tion, the fund's ability to increase sales in cases in which this is desirable
may suffer if sales charges are not competitive.
The fund's underwriter usually wholesales shares to broker-dealers
who solicit sales from their customers. The selling broker usually re-
tains between six and eight percent of the sales load as a "dealer dis-
count." 28 To promote additional sales, advisers have in the past sup-
plemented the dealer discount by placing portfolio business with
broker-dealers who sold fund shares. 99 Typically, the distributor
gave the trader a list of the broker-dealers responsible for most sales
so that brokerage business could be channeled through their houses.
This practice, commonly called "reciprocal business," meant that a
broker often received orders on the basis of his sales record rather than
his expertise in executing fund transactions. In addition to the prob-
lems of best execution, this practice encouraged the use of a fund asset
to promote the adviser's interest in new sales.
The First Circuit's opinion in Moses v. Burgin prohibits not only
the use of recapturable commissions (so-called soft dollars) to promote
sales but the use of fund cash (hard dollars) as well.300 Judge Aldrich
found that the fund's charter required sales to be at full net asset value
in order to protect the value of existing shareholders' investment from
diminution. He reasoned that if a fund receives net asset value for
fund shares but rewards the selling broker with freely recapturable
commissions, the fund has sold shares in violation of its charter. The
phrase "free money" encompasses not only "soft" dollars but any use of
fund cash to promote sales. 01 Thus, the underwriting contract cannot
place the expense of preparing selling literature or advertising on the
fund.
Several funds employ their own retail salesmen on either a full or
a part-time basis. °2 Captive sales forces have become more prevalent
as insurance companies with sophisticated sales networks have entered
the fund industry. 3 Unlike independent directors in funds that sell
298 Id. 207-08.
299 For an analysis of reciprocal business practices, see Note, Conflict of Interest
in the Allocation of Mutual Fund Brokerage Business, 80 YA .a L.J. 372 (1970);
Glazer, supra note 74, at 241-59.
300 See notes 98-112 supra & accompanying text.
301 Moses v. Burgin, 445 F2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W.
3279 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1971).
302 See, e.g., Hamilton Growth Fund, Inc., Prospectus 7 (May 1, 1970).
303 See, e.g., Foldessy, Rush to Mutual Funds by Insurance Concerns Approaches
Stampede, Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 1970, at 1, col. 1. Not only are insurance companies
creating new mutual funds, but some investment advisers are acquiring insurance
companies. See Wall St. J., May 10, 1971, at 40, col. 6 (Equity Funding Revises Its
Proposal to Acquire Bankers National Life).
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through broker-dealers, those in complexes with a captive sales force are
able to check selling practices directly. By reviewing sales literature and
reports of the adviser's spot checks with new investors, the directors can
assure that the fund's reputation remains high.
Finally, at least quarterly the independent directors should con-
sider the fund's redemptions. A pattern of high redemptions in one
geographical area may indicate that the selling practices employed by
the customer representatives within the independent retailers' networks
or by the fund's own salesmen create unrealistic expectations and in
turn tarnish the reputation of the fund and harm its ability to generate
new sales. The independent directors should also ask the adviser for a
synopsis of any letters expressing shareholder dissatisfaction with their
investment. These complaints may indicate not only deficiencies in the
selling effort but other areas of dissatisfaction with fund management
and should prompt the independent directors to ask for an explanation
or a change in adviser practices.
Most of the considerations regarding new sales and increased net
assets apply with equal force to the creation of a new fund. The prob-
lems arising from the adviser's concentration of research and pro-
motional talent on the new fund are obvious. The independent directors
should ask the adviser to explain how their shareholders will benefit
from the new fund. Unless the existing funds' advisory fees are scaled
down as the assets of a whole complex increase, it is difficult to see
what benefits, other than any exchange privilege between funds, will
flow to existing shareholders.
C. Allocation of Portfolio Brokerage
The investment management contract authorizes the adviser to
select the broker and the exchange through which fund portfolio trans-
actions will be executed. Brokerage commissions are paid directly from
fund assets rather than through the advisory fee." 4 Thus, the adviser
has a fiduciary obligation to place portfolio business in a way that
will achieve the best result for the fund." 5 The phrase "best execution"
implies that fund purchases and sales will not only be made at the best
available price for the stock but also for the lowest possible commission
charge. Although best execution is a convenient shorthand, the term
"best realized price" more aptly describes the adviser's obligation be-
cause it connotes both the price per share and the non-price consider-
804 See note 246 supra.
305 See, e.g., Delaware Management Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 8128 (July 19, 1967), in [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
77,458.
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ations that control the trader's decision for each transaction. 0 6 Price
means the best available market price for the entire block or, more
simply, the highest or lowest average price per share. Non-price con-
siderations, including speed, secrecy, and expertise in placing orders,
are also important. If a fund wishes to acquire or dispose of large
block rapidly, the broker's ability to execute a series of trades without
adversely affecting the market price or to place the entire block with
another broker or institutional investor has an important bearing upon
the fund's ability to obtain the best realized price.
30 7
The commission for executing the trade also affects the price at
which the fund acquires or disposes of a holding. Funds frequently
deal in very large blocks.30 ' The commission on trades in excess of
$500,000 can now be negotiated with individual brokers.0 9 "Nego-
tiate" in practice encompasses not only the commission but the price
per share. Thus, brokers on the New York Stock Exchange are now
offering the same services as those provided by the third 31 and fourth
markets.311 The best realized price in a hypothetical sale could be
stated either as 55 for the stock and $1.20 a share commission or 54% at
$0.70, usually depending upon whether the commission is a highly visible
item as in the fund context or important only as it reflects an ultimate
price as in the private pension or hedge fund context.3" Whether nego-
tiated rates mean different commissions or simply a different way of
stating a standardized fee is questionable.313 If the fund cannot find
buyers through a broker, it may sell the entire holding to a "block
positioner," a dealer who buys and attempts to immediately resell the
stock. Because such a block trader incurs the risk of a price decline
before he can liquidate his position, his willingness to purchase depends
upon how much below the market price the fund is willing to sell.
Instead of charging a brokerage commission, block houses are com-
pensated by this spread in price.314 Regardless of how the trade is
306 See The Negotiated Rate Experience, INST. INV., June 1971, at 28.
307 Glazer, supra note 74, at 242-43.
3 0 8 The average fund order involves approximately $150,000. N.Y. Times, Oct.
26, 1970, at 58, col. 1.
309 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9148 (Apr. 14, 1971), in [1970-
1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 178,029; see note 239 supra.
310 The "third market" is a specialized segment of the over-the-counter market
that deals in the securities of New York Stock Exchange listed companies. PuBLIC
POLICY REPORT, supra note 3, at 159-61.
311 The "fourth market" refers to the direct trades, which are not reported on
exchanges, between institutional investors. These transactions do not usually involve
a brokerage commission. Id. 161.
312 See The Negotiated Rate Experience, INST. INv., June 1971, at 28, 29.
3 1 3 See id. 29.
314 See Note, mipra note 299, at 376 n.19.
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executed, however, best realized price means the best average price per
share, including transaction costs, for the entire block.
As part of their obligation to review the expenditure of fund
assets, the independent directors should formulate and require com-
pliance with a series of brokerage allocation guidelines."" Because the
adviser may receive either investment research services or the sale of
fund shares in return for placing fund portfolio business with a broker,
the adviser may select brokers on a basis other than their ability to
offer the best realized price.31 If an adviser selects a broker based
upon his willingness to return valuable services, or if the fund incurs
any expense unrelated to best execution because it is denied an oppor-
tunity to recapture commission dollars, the adviser has dealt unfairly
with the fund and breached his fiduciary obligation.
The independent directors' brokerage guidelines should define al-
location policies covering the trader's obligation to check various
markets and to employ block trading techniques. The directors must
also decide, assuming no charter provisions to the contrary, whether
to allow brokerage use to spur new sales. A somewhat different but
equally difficult problem is encountered when developing a policy for the
trader's allocation of portfolio brokerage in return for investment re-
search services.
As a practical matter, the independent directors cannot check the
trader's adherence to their guidelines in every trade. Nonetheless, they
should spot check several transactions each month and carefully review
the brokerage allocation information contained in the fund's form N-1R.
Finally, the independent directors must formulate policies in areas of
particular conflict of interest, such as trades executed through a broker-
affiliate of the adviser that might be executed on a negotiated com-
mission basis. Although direct cash rebates have been abolished, 17
advisers frequently allocate commissions to brokers who sell fund shares,
and, to a lesser degree, to those brokers who provide the adviser with
research or statistical information. As noted in the discussion of selling
techniques, reciprocal business such as this nearly always benefits the
adviser, while providing only indirect and often questionable benefit to
the fund.
1. Assuring Best Execution
Market transactions must be handled quickly and decisively by
the fund's traders. Except to acquaint themselves with fund operations,
315 See Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W.
3279 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1971).
316 See Glazer, mspra note 74, at 242-44; Note, supra note 299, at 375-79.
317 See note 102 supra.
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the independent directors have no place in the trading room. Their
proper role is limited to developing policy for the adviser to follow in
the allocation of fund brokerage and, occasionally, checking to make
certain that trades are executed only on the basis of the approved policy.
Few directors have developed a definition of best execution for
their funds. Most assume that trading, like investment research, is
sufficiently technical that uninformed tampering will do more harm than
good. But, following the Moses v. Burgin decision and the advent of
negotiated rates, several boards have appointed independent director
committees to develop precisely this type of trading guideline.
318
Initially, the independent directors must determine whether any
services unrelated to the execution of a particular order may be con-
sidered part of best execution. Whether the trader can reward brokers
who sell fund shares with reciprocal business has perhaps been rendered
moot by the Moses decision. If a fund can recapture a portion of its
commissions through a broker affiliate, failure to do so is tantamount to
using fund assets to stimulate sales at less than net asset value, a practice
prohibited by most fund charters. Similarly, when a better price is
available through a third or fourth market broker who offers no
services, the adviser cannot pass up these houses in favor of brokers who
sell fund shares.
A more complex problem exists if a trader assigns brokerage in
return for research services. By contracting to perform investment
management, the adviser assumes the obligation to maintain a research
staff sufficient to meet the fund's needs. If recapturable dollars are
used to buy research, the fund is paying expenses that the adviser has
agreed to assume. Most advisers believe that this research merely
supplements their own work, is not essential for the performance of
their obligations under the management contract with their funds, and
does not even necessarily reduce their expenses.319 However, many
advisers apparently would be willing to pay higher commissions, even
under negotiated rates, to receive research services, although few
advisers would pay hard dollars for this research.
320
If the investment research services that the adviser receives in
return for brokerage are merely corroborative, in the sense that the
318 See text accompanying notes 197-99 supra.
310 See, e.g., Windsor Fund, Inc., Prospectus 5 (May 1, 1970).
320 A recent survey of 127 financial institutions including 23 mutual fund advisers
conducted by Institutional Investor Systems, Inc., reported that approximately 60%
of those surveyed would be willing, if rates were set competitively, to pay higher
commissions to firms providing research than to firms that only execute trades. Only
about 40%, however, said they would be willing to pay cash separately for research.
Wall St. J., Mar. 8, 1971, at 7, col. 1 (Negotiated Rates Would Help Big Board
Lure Institutional Business, Survey Finds).
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adviser has already completed his research and uses this information
simply to supplement his conclusions, and the research has no readily
ascertainable market value because no adviser is willing to pay hard
dollars for it, the advisory contract cannot be said to have been violated.
But the validity of advisers' claims becomes suspect when they
explain the impact of negotiated rates. Several adviser officials agreed
that if soft dollars could no longer be used to buy research, they would
have to purchase some research with hard dollars. A few advisers ad-
mitted that brokerage was being used for more than supplemental re-
search and suggested that the independent directors should be prepared
to increase the advisory fee to compensate the adviser for using hard
dollars for research.32
Several large brokerage houses have developed particular expertise
in assembling and disposing of block orders, but such houses offer no
other services. The combination of their expertise and willingness to
negotiate a commission should lead the independent directors to require
the adviser to make maximum use of these brokers. If Broker A offers
execution for $10,000, and Broker B offers execution plus research
services for $11,000, the adviser's fiduciary obligation to seek best exe-
cution requires that the order be placed with Broker A. Here, the
services have a readily quantifiable value and are clearly not a trans-
action cost.
William J. Casey, Chairman of the SEC, recently stated that some
fund advisers were not taking advantage of block traders but continuing
to seek services in return for assigning fund portfolio business, either by
splitting orders or by obtaining secondary offerings." Both techniques
result in additional expenses for the fund. To assure best execution, the
independent directors should require that the monthly transaction report
supply statistics on each trade not only by broker and exchange, but by
cost and transaction type (such as fixed or negotiated commission, or
secondary offering). If they find that a single brokerage house has
been given several orders to buy or sell the same stock in a short period
of time and that the total authorization would have exceeded the
$500,000 break point needed for negotiated rates, the independent
directors should ask the trader to explain why a single block at nego-
tiated rates was not executed. And if the fund engaged in any secondary
321 Somewhat surprisingly, the independent directors of the funds these advisers
managed did not react adversely to this apparent contradiction of a position espoused
for so many years. At least one adviser, however, has found that fund shareholders
reacted adversely to an increased management fee by refusing to renew the contract
at the higher fee. See Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1971, at 4, col. 1 (Keystone Fund Meeting
Adjourned Without Voting on Fees).
322 Wall St. J., June 18, 1971, at 3, col. 1 (SEC Is Studying Whether Funds Pay
Excess Fees).
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offerings during the month the independent directors should ask why.
If the fund is selling a large block and uses the secondary technique, it
may incur commission expenses on both the buy and sell sides of the
transaction with a total cost higher than even the minimum commission
rate. In addition, if the trader executes a secondary offering through
retailers who sell fund shares rather than a block house, the fund may
incur even greater expense through both higher commissions and poorer
execution.
The independent directors' monthly review of the adviser's allo-
cation of portfolio business may also reveal a consistent pattern of dis-
crimination against certain types of trades or market. When spot
checking particular transactions, the directors should question any ab-
sence of solicitation of quotes from the third or fourth markets. Mutual
funds can now deal directly with other institutional investors or market
makers in over-the-counter transactions listed on several automated
markets. Although fewer stocks are traded on these markets than
on the major exchanges, commission rates may be reduced or avoided
entirely. Such opportunities suggest that the independent directors'
trading guidelines should require the trader maximize the use of these
markets whenever possible.
2. Creation of a Broker Affiliate
Although adviser affiliation with a broker-dealer may for some
transactions complicate the selection of a broker offering best execution,
the independent directors must decide whether the opportunity to re-
capture part of the fund's brokerage through the affiliate offsets any
disadvantage arising from the potential loss of best execution,3 The
SEC has taken the position that the adviser and independent directors
of each fund complex can weigh the benefits of an affiliate and choose
whether to create a brokerage subsidiary.2 4 Judge Aldrich in Moses
v. Burgin noted that Fidelity Fund's independent directors had exer-
cised business judgment in deciding not to seek membership on a
regional exchange. He concluded:
323 See note 103 supra.
324 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8746 (Nov. 10, 1969), in [1969-
1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FFn. S~c. L. REP. 1f 77,761. The SEC states:
We do not believe that management [has a fiduciary obligation to create a
broker affiliate on a regional exchange] if in the exercise of its best business
judgment management determines that it is not in the best interest of the
fund to create such an affiliate.
[If a broker affiliate is created, however,] there may be circumstances under
which such recapture could be required . ...
Id. 83,747.
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It is only too clear, as the [district] court found, that the
unaffiliated directors had noted the general risks attendant
upon a brokerage operation, especially the risk of loss of best
execution, and they had long decided against it. The court
found, on adequate evidence, that there were sound business
reasons for this decision. We agree; the directors had no
duty to pursue [affiliation on a regional exchange], and with-
out their doing so, recapture was not freely available."2
In deciding whether to create a broker affiliate, the independent
directors should first determine whether a broker affiliate of either the
fund or the adviser will be profitable. The cost of establishing mem-
bership on a regional exchange is substantially less than the cost of a
seat on the New York Stock Exchange. Most advisers already have
the personnel and expertise in their trading departments to staff the
subsidiary and could create a broker affiliate without significantly in-
creasing their operating costs. The profitability of affiliates, however,
has been reduced both by the abolition of some reciprocal arrangements
and by the advent of negotiated rates.326
If the independent directors determine that a broker affiliate can
be profitable, they must decide what portion of that profit to allow the
adviser to retain. A substantial part of the profit of existing affiliates
is attributable to "clearance commissions," fees received when the trader
assigns fund portfolio business to a New York Stock Exchange member
who later directs a broker on a regional exchange to give up part of his
commission on an unrelated trade to the adviser's affiliate, which also
maintains a seat on the regional exchange. The SEC ruled in Provi-
dent Management Corp., that the adviser must credit all such "clearance
commissions" against the advisory fee.327 This was based upon section
17 (e) of the 1940 Act, which makes it unlawful for any affiliated person
of the fund "acting as agent, to accept from any source any compen-
sation . . . for the purchase or sale of any property to or for such
registered investment company . . . except in the course of such
person's business as [a] broker." 128 Clearance commissions do not
fall within the exception for brokerage services because the affiliate
performs no brokerage services in connection with the transaction that
gave rise to the commission.
Section 17(e) does not prohibit a broker affiliate from receiving
commissions on fund portfolio transactions, but neither does it indicate
325 445 F.2d 369, 375 (1st Cir. 1971).
326 Welles, The War Between the Big Board and the Regionals, INST. INV.,
Dec. 1970, at 21.
327 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9028 (Dec. 1, 1970), in [1970-
1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 77,937.
328 15 U.S.C. §80a-17(e) (1) (1970).
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whether some or all of them must be credited toward the advisory fee.
One federal district court opinion, Kurach v. Weissman,3" suggests that
the broker affiliate may retain part of its profit from executing fund
portfolio business, but this ruling preceded the SEC's opinion in
Provident Management,33 ° and the Moses v. Burgin decision 3 ' If the
ability of the fund to select the broker through whom its portfolio trans-
actions will be executed is a valuable asset of the fund, as the First
Circuit suggests, 3  then the entire amount of the recaptured commis-
sions should be returned to the fund. Even if a court should interpret
section 17(e) to permit the adviser's affiliate to retain part of this
profit,33 3 these receipts are nonetheless part of the adviser's indirect
income, which the independent directors must consider when determin-
ing the reasonableness of the advisory fee 334  Whether the advisory fee
is reduced directly, by crediting the affiliate's profits toward it, or in-
directly, by reflecting retained profits as part of the adviser's income,
approximately the same result should be achieved.
If part or all of the profits of the adviser's broker affiliate must be
returned to the fund, the adviser may attempt to allocate the expenses of
its trading department to the affiliate. The typical advisory contract
contemplates that the adviser will assume the expenses of the trading
department. When these expenses are paid from the profits of the
broker affiliate, which would otherwise go toward reducing the fee, the
terms of the advisory contract are defeated.
The broker affiliate's cost of operation and the division of its
profits are important but not exclusive factors to be weighed by the
independent directors. If the adviser retains part of the affiliate's
profit, it may be tempted to increase the fund's turnover rate and procure
executions at less than the best realized price. The Institutional In-
vestor Study found that funds with an investment adviser affiliated with
a broker-dealer had a 3.7 percent higher turnover rate than other
funds.33 5 The potential for poorer executions is also increased because
32949 F.R.D. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
330 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9028 (Dec. 1, 1970), in [1970-
1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RE,. 1 77,937.
331 445 F2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971).
332 See text accompanying notes 300-01 supra. See also Butowsky, Mutual Fund
Brokerage, 3 REV. SEC. REG. 915 (1970).
333 The SEC has interpreted the Moses decision to require that once commissions
are recaptured, they must be credited in toto against the advisory fee. Memorandum
of the SEC as Amicues Curiae in Opposition to the Proposed Settlement in Gross v.
Moses, Civil No. 2162 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 13, 1971), in BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP.,
No. 115, at F-1 to -5 (Aug. 18, 1971).
334 For a different interpretation of § 17(e), see Miller & Carlson, Recapture of
Brokerage Commissions by Mutual Funds, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 35, 53-55 (1971).
335 SEC, INsTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 173 (1971).
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portfolio transactions that might have been more expertly handled by
independent brokers are channeled through the adviser's affiliate. The
variety of factors influencing the trader's assignment of a particular
transaction make it difficult, if not impossible, for the independent di-
rectors to determine whether a trade was appropriately executed through
the affiliate. The advent of negotiated rates merely adds another di-
mension to the conflicts of interest possible when the adviser negotiates
a commission with its own subsidiary. The independent directors can-
not critically approve trades in excess of $500,000 with the adviser's
broker affiliate unless they adopt specific guidelines that enable them to
determine whether the fund has received the best realized price.
The difficulties that may lead the independent directors to decide
not to ask the adviser to form a broker affiliate are not limited to
conflicts of interest. Establishing a brokerage business may distract the
adviser from its primary function of investment research. In addition,
future rules of the New York Stock Exchange or the SEC may ad-
versely affect the profitability or even the legality of broker affiliates.3 3
Indeed, the recommendations of the Martin Report on restructuring the
New York exchange suggest that investment advisers should be pro-
hibited from maintaining affiliation with a broker.
337
If the independent directors decide that recapture of brokerage
commissions through an affiliate is desirable, they should consider fund
ownership of the affiliate. The cost of establishing and maintaining the
affiliate could be shared by all the funds in a complex. If the funds
owned the affiliate, the adviser's only interest in allocating fund business
to this affiliate would be to secure best execution.
D. Non-Conflict Areas of Independent Director
Responsibility
Although the role of independent directors is usually thought to be
resolution of conflicts of interests, these directors also have responsi-
bilities for fund operations in areas where the interests of the adviser
and the shareholders coincide. The most important examples of non-
conflict responsibilities are the directors' approval of the arrangements
for shareholder accounting and custodian services. As with investment
management and distribution services, the quality of these services is
336 The SEC has suggested that the present $500,000 break point for negotiated
commissions is not permanent. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9148
(Apr. 14, 1971), in [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1178,039.
337 The Martin Report on Securities Markets to the New York Stock Exchange,
in [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,184, at 80,562 (Aug. 5,
1971) ; Rustin, Wall St. Blueprint: Martin Exchange Study is Likely to Recommend
a Merger of Markets, Wall St. J., Apr. 30, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
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the primary concern; but the cost and formula for allocating these ex-
penses must also be reviewed.
1. Shareholder Accounting Expenses
The mutual fund shareholder purchases more than professional
investment advice. His shares entitle him to a wide variety of services,
including automatic reinvestment of dividends and capital gains dis-
tributions, systematic withdrawals, retirement plans, and the right to
move his investment from one fund to another within the complex
without charge as his objectives change."8 Although performance is
the goal of most shareholders, services are an important, if secondary,
consideration. Advisers may compete for new investor dollars more
through services than expense ratios, 339 and the adviser and shareholders
alike benefit from efficient management of these services.
In a small fund, purchases, reinvestments, accumulations, and ex-
changes can be administered internally. But as the number of share-
holder accounts grows, the fund may need an external "transfer
agency." The most frequently selected transfer agents are banks with
which the fund maintains its cash and custodian accounts,3 40 although
some advisers have found that in-house computerized transfer agencies
can do a more reliable job.341  The advantages of in-house service in-
clude direct control of personnel and procedures, speed and efficiency,
and availability of sophisticated equipment for investment research. In
fact, computer software systems can aid in such areas as portfolio pricing
and analysis of the financial reports of portfolio companies. Data
processing equipment is also being used to process shareholder surveys
on questions of social concern,3  portfolio selection, and selling practices.
If the independent directors determine that the quality of share-
holder accounting services can be substantially increased by creating an'
in-house data processing subsidiary, a new fund expense may be in-
curred. Custodian banks may perform shareholder accounting services
at a loss, while requiring the fund to maintain substantial cash reserves
in non-interest bearing accounts. Thus, creation of a data processing
subsidiary may initially increase costs, but will release cash reserves
for investment.
338 See, e.g., Hamilton Growth Fund, Inc., Prospectus 8-10 (May 1, 1970).
339 See note 25 supra. See generally PUBLIC PoLicy REPORT, supra note 3, at 86.
340 PUBLIC PoLicy R PORT, supra note 3, at 91.
341 Glazer, supra note 74, at 262 n273.
342 Stabler & Newman, More Money Managers Reconsider Their Role In Share-
holder Voting, Wall St. J., Apr. 28, 1971, at 1, col. 5. Dreyfus Corp., which manages
the Dreyfus Leverage Fund, surveyed the Fund's 128,000 shareholders to gather their
opinions on such social-action issues as "Project GM" and investments in South
Africa. See also Wall St. J., Apr. 22, 1971, at 15, col. 3 (Social Reform Group Bids
Mutual Funds Back Plans).
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The cost of an in-house transfer agency could be allocated among
the funds of a complex on either a net asset or a transaction basis, but
neither is particularly appropriate. A fund's proportion of the total
complex's assets bears little relationship to the cost of providing the
fund's shareholders with these services, and a set fee for each fund
transaction would be cumbersome and inefficient. A better approach
would be to allocate the expense according to the number of shareholder
accounts in each fund.
2. The Custodian Function
Although the 1940 Act does not prohibit internalization of the
custodian function, the blue sky laws of several states require that the
fund's securities be maintained in a bank with certain reserves. 3"
Typically, the bank receives securities from the brokers through which
the trade has been executed and makes payment from the fund's account.
Because advisers agree that services offered by different custodian banks
are relatively comparable, the more important question for the inde-
pendent directors is the fee paid for these services.
The annual custodian fee is not the bank's only compensation.
Although the cash account maintained by the fund is constantly
changing, the bank has the use of this "rolling" or "cash" float. Al-
though it cannot be used directly by the fund, this float value can be re-
flected in the custodian's fee. The time required for the fund's trades
generates a second float, commonly referred to as "transaction float."
The fund debits the purchase price of a security immediately upon exe-
cution of its purchase order, but the custodian does not pay out the
fund's cash until delivery, which usually occurs five days later. In the
past, funds could not invest this float because government securities did
not offer short enough terms. Recently, several major finance com-
panies have offered "master notes," which pay six to eight percent
annual interest for the overnight or weekend use of cash. The trans-
action float of one or all of the funds could be invested in these notes by
the fund's custodian and the interest used to offset its custodian fee.
The independent directors should also request that the adviser
select a custodian who will make combined orders to take advantage of
volume discounts and negotiated commission rates. A broker is pro-
hibited from combining orders only if it receives them separately. 44 If
343 The blue sky laws of most states require that portfolio securities be held by
a bank with assets of over $2 million. At least one adviser, however, acts as its own
custodian and refrains from selling in such states. See Fiduciary Growth Associates,
Inc., Prospectus 12 (Dec. 12, 1971) (one of the mutual funds advised by Donaldson,
Lufldn & Jenrette, Inc., for shareholders who are tax exempt entities).
3 4 4 See NEw YORK STOCK EXCH. RuLEs rule 372, in 2 CCH NEW YORK STOCK
Excr. GUIDE 2372 (1967).
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it receives a single order for all the funds and the custodian divides the
authorization upon delivery, the prohibition is not violated. And, if
the broker cannot deliver the entire purchase, the custodian can simply
allocate the delivered stock pro rata by size of authorization and thus
avoid unfairness to any of the funds within a complex.
V. SUMMARY OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES
Before the 1970 Amendments were enacted, it might have been
argued that the presence of independent directors occasionally worked
against the interests of fund shareholders. Because most courts ac-
cepted the business judgments of the directors as conclusive, shareholder
litigation was largely ineffective in forcing advisers to adopt self-regula-
tory techniques. But Congress was apparently unwilling to abandon
the concept of independent director responsibility when the time came
for a major overhaul of the 1940 Act. Because the more radical change
of requiring internalized mutual fund management posed a real threat
to the emergence of new funds and even the continued existence of some
smaller funds, Congress continued the unique external management ar-
rangements that had come to be the dominant mode of operation in the
fund industry. Independent directors were recognized as a 'practical
necessity for these inter-corporate relations-a necessity which merely
increased as advisers began to manage whole complexes of funds.
Although the 1970 Amendments continue to place substantial re-
liance upon the independent directors, that reliance is no longer exclu-
sive and independent directors' decisions are more vulnerable to judicial
scrutiny. Section 15(c)'s requirement that the independent directors
"request and evaluate" certain information is a mandate to both the
directors and the courts to define with more precision the elements of a
sound business judgment. Similarly, section 36(b)'s fiduciary stand-
ards suggest that, although the directors' judgment should be a sub-
stantial factor in a determination of fairness, the weight a court will
actually assign to their decision will depend upon, in part, the depth of
their inquiry.
The recommendations of Part IV represent an attempt to develop
guidelines that focus the independent directors on the most acute prob-
lems of conflict of interest, the types of information they should require,
and the factors which should control their decision. Two objections
might be raised to these recommendations. The first, that directors
simply cannot become an effective voice in fund management, assumes
that guidelines would become a formalistic checklist devoid of any sub-
stantive inquiry. Why such a pessimistic view prevails among many
critics of the independent director concept is not entirely clear. The
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past studies of the directors' role in safeguarding shareholder interests
attribute their ineffectiveness to their identification with the adviser and
failure to comprehend their unique responsibilities. The 1970 Amend-
ments' definition of "interested persons" eliminates from independent
director status anyone with a material business, professional, or per-
sonal relationship with the adviser. In addition, many independent di-
rectors are now selected by their predecessors, and may seek advice from
other independents rather than advisers' personnel. There is no reason
to assume that if the independent directors are aware of a problem area
they cannot deal appropriately with it. Section 15 (c) requires that the
adviser provide the information they request. Moreover, most directors
are unquestionably men of intelligence and ability who can survey
material quickly and act responsibly within a short period of time.
Some critics argue that, even if directors follow guidelines precisely
delineating their responsibilities, they lack the bargaining power neces-
sary to change adviser practices. Admittedly, few directors are willing
to terminate the advisory contract, but they do have recourse to other
less dramatic methods of control. Few advisers will continue a practice
if the directors raise well-reasoned objections against it. A director can
always take his case to the shareholders, either at the annual meeting by
requiring that his position be set forth in the proxy statement, or through
public statements. And the adverse publicity attendant on a director's
resignation is a sobering and effective deterrent to the assumption by
the adviser of an uncompromising position.
A second objection to Part IV's guidelines might be that they
place entirely too much responsibility on the independent directors, who
have neither the time nor the expertise to implement them. These
recommendations do take the independent directors into fields of in-
quiry seldom approached by fund boards. Nevertheless, the 1970
Amendments and the mood of the courts seem to compel a greater in-
quiry if a board wants its judgment to be given substantial weight by
the courts. Of course, not every suggestion can or should be adopted
by the independent directors of every fund group. For example, con-
flicts of interest arising from the use of fund brokerage may differ de-
pending upon whether the adviser maintains a broker affiliate, or its
own retail selling force, as well as upon the ways in which the inde-
pendent directors oversee a particular situation. If the management of
a fund group is internalized, many of the recommendations are either
unnecessary or inappropriate. In addition, much of the groundwork
for the directors' determination is laid by the adviser. The independent
directors' duty of separate inquiry is a very limited one; in almost every
area they can rely initially upon the information provided by the adviser.
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The directors' obligation to actually negotiate with the adviser is limited
to the arrangements for investment advice and particularly the fee. In
all other areas, the adviser initially resolves the problem and the inde-
pendent directors merely review the fairness of the solution proposed by
the adviser. If independent directors sit across the complex, their over-
view allows them to compare efficiently the standardized reports for each
fund to ensure that each is receiving its share of investment opportunities
and bearing an appropriate portion of common expenses. Finally,
separate fund counsel can assume many of the independent research
tasks that the directors might wish to undertake. Their obligation is
then limited to merely reviewing the basis for counsel's conclusions and
approving or rejecting the action recommended.
The responsibilities of the independent directors of many fund
groups fall within four areas. To summarize this Article's conclusions
and recommendations, the following guidelines are proposed.
1. The independent directors should become familiar with each of
the funds and the non-fund accounts managed by their investment ad-
viser. If they know the net asset size and investment objective of each
fund, they may be able to detect whether the adviser has a greater in-
terest in some funds than in others. They should also inquire into the
correlation between sales of fund shares and better performance, and the
importance of those sales both to the individual fund and the entire
complex. If some funds have incentive fee arrangements, they should
determine whether this added reward for performance is adjusted for
risk and whether it promotes or detracts from a community of interest
among all the funds and their adviser. Finally, the independent
directors should be particularly aware of the possible conflicts arising
when the adviser creates a new fund. The expenses of an addition to
the complex should not be borne by the established funds. Rather, the
independent directors of that fund should permit the adviser's initial
losses to be recouped in later years when the fund's net asset size
produces a profitable advisory fee. This practice should, of course, be
limited to such losses and not continued indefinitely.
2. The major responsibility of all independent directors of ex-
ternally managed complexes is approving the fund's arrangements for
investment advice. This approval can occur in two stages. Through-
out the year, the independent directors should receive monthly perform-
ance comparisons, portfolio transaction reports, and fund income and
expense allocation reports. Monthly preparation and evaluation of
these reports has the desirable effect of limiting the amount of material
the directors receive at the annual meeting called to renew the advisory
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contract. At that meeting their attention can be focused on the three
steps for determining an appropriate fee suggested in Part IV. Per-
formance comparisons are the key to an initial evaluation of the quality
of the adviser's service. Only if a pattern of consistently low perform-
ance emerges should the independent directors undertake a review of the
investment management process, the allocation of investment oppor-
tunities, and the assignment of fund brokerage. Assuming performance
is satisfactory, these areas of potential conflict can be reviewed at a
later time.
The second element of the suggested approach is an evaluation
of the costs the adviser incurs on behalf of each fund. This evaluation
entails a breakdown of the common expenses of managing a complex
of funds and an analysis of the adviser's formulas for allocation of ex-
penses. For example, investment research is usually done collectively
and the salaries of the analysts and portfolio managers allocated based
on the ratio of net assets of each fund to the net assets of the whole
complex. The independent directors can only determine if the fund is
sharing in the economies of scale inherent in the fund complex form of
operation by reviewing these breakdown and allocation practices. These
figures cannot be precise, but it must be remembered that they are used
only for the internal purpose of checking whether each fund is bearing
an appropriate portion of the common expenses and whether these ex-
penses in turn bear a reasonable relation to the total fee. The final step
in approving the fee is an evaluation of the reasonableness of the ad-
viser's profit. The quality of the adviser's service as reflected in the
fund's performance is the most important factor in this determination.
Cost is similarly important, but only insofar as it shows that perform-
ance is achieved at an expense ratio comparable to other funds. The
independent directors have no obligation to demand the least expensive
advisory services. And, certainly, they should not approach the fee as
a cost-plus calculation, a method which rewards the inefficient .adviser
and undermines most shareholders' heirarchy of goals-performance
first and reduced expenses second.
3. This pattern of decisionmaking can also be effectively employed
by the independent directors when approving the underwriting contract.
The keys to their evaluation are whether the fund needs new growth and
whether the performance of the fund will be benefited by more sales.
The independent directors should realize that a larger fund may
sacrifice flexibility in its investment pattern. Absent a positive or
negative correlation between fund size and performance, however, the
directors may well conclude that there is no reason to forbid new sales.
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The distribution contract must of necessity give the adviser broad dis-
cretion as to how fund shares will be sold. Once the determination that
the fund will continue to grow has been made, the flow of new sales
cannot be simply turned on or regulated at a specific level. The di-
rectors' responsibility is limited to checking the adviser's selling prac-
tices, redemptions, and advertising to assure that the fund's reputation
remains unblemished so that it can continue to generate new sales.
Of course, if the cash inflow from sales exceeds the availability of new
investments, the independent directors should be prepared to suspend
additional sales efforts.
4. In their role of reviewing the adviser's assignment of fund port-
folio brokerage, the independent directors should focus on assuring best
execution and deciding whether the fund or the adviser should create a
broker affiliate on a regional exchange. Although the independent di-
rectors cannot determine whether the fund received the best realized
price on a specific trade, they can and should review monthly transaction
reports for patterns of discrimination against certain types of brokers or
markets. If, for example, no trades are executed through third market
dealers who offer no services beyond actual execution, the independent
directors should ask for an explanation. Similarly, if block positions are
avoided or if orders are not combined to take advantage of negotiated
rates above $500,000, the directors should be alerted to the possibility
that their fund is incurring unnecessary brokerage expenses. They
should require a monthly breakdown of all portfolio trades not only by
broker and market but by type of trade and commission. They should
also determine whether the brokerage that the fund contributes to the
pooled brokerage of the entire complex is generating as much outside
research as the portfolio manager requires.
The independent directors of funds with an adviser affiliated with a
broker-dealer face particularly difficult problems in deciding whether
their funds are receiving best execution. If the adviser retains the
profits generated by fund commissions, it may be tempted to channel
trades that could be handled more expertly elsewhere through its broker-
dealer. Of course, some large broker-dealers have the expertise neces-
sary to handle fund transactions adequately although large blocks that
qualify for negotiated rates probably should still be handled by the block
houses. Finally, if the directors of a fund with an adviser lacking a
broker affiliate conclude that one could be profitable, they should con-
sider fund ownership of an affiliate on a regional exchange. The inde-
pendent directors should consider here not only the cost and profit-
ability of a fund affiliate but its ability to offer best execution and any
conflicts of interest these arrangements might add. And they should
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remember that if the fund owns the affiliate the adviser's only interest
in assigning portfolio business to it will be to achieve the best realized
price for its funds.
5. The independent directors and the adviser share the common
goal of offering to the investor the most economical accounting and
custodian services. Many of these services could be contained in a
separate management services contract approved through the same pro-
cedures as those suggested for the advisory fee. Expenses paid directly
by the fund should be approved only after the directors are certain that
the quality of the administrative, custodial, or other services warrants
the expenditure. If external transfer agency services do not adequately
meet their fund's needs, they might ask the adviser if the complex of
funds could collectively support an in-house transfer agency. If the
quality and diversity of services suggests that shareholder accounting
should be internalized, a data processing subsidiary could be created by
either the adviser or the funds.
